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Abstract 
This study argues that the High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy is a constrained agent of Europe’s for-
eign policy. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reform created the remodelled 
version of the High Representative of the Union as a potentially power-
ful agent to represent and coordinate Europe’s foreign policy. Howev-
er, the analysis shows how and why the member states granted only 
limited discretion to the new foreign policy actor during the first years 
of the post’s existence. The aim of the study is to reveal the conditions 
of discretion of the High Representative. With the use of a principal-
agent (PA) approach, the study shows that conflicting preferences of 
the member states, tight control mechanisms, as well as inadequate 
cooperation with the European Commission limited the High Repre-
sentative’s room for manoeuvre. The findings suggest that the PA ap-
proach can be developed further in the future in order to better explain 
limited discretion of agents in matters of foreign policy. Based on the 
findings, the study also puts forward a number of characteristics of a 
‘constrained agent’. It is suggested that the post of High Representative 
has the potential to emancipate from its status of a constrained agent 
over time, and to gain credibility as a foreign policy actor. 
 
Word count: 72,906 (main text, including footnotes) 

 
 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung: 
Der Hohe Vertreter der EU:  
der eingeschränkte Agent der Europäischen Außenpolitik 
Die vorliegende Studie setzt sich mit dem Posten des Hohen Vertreters 
der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik auseinander, welcher mit 
dem Lissabonner Vertrag in 2009 geschaffen wurde. Mithilfe der Prin-
zipal-Agent Theorie wird argumentiert, dass es sich bei dem Hohen 
Vertreter um einen eingeschränkten Agenten der Mitgliedstaaten han-
delt. Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung weisen darauf hin, dass die In-
novationen des Lissaboner Vertrages nur einen geringen positiven Ef-
fekt auf den Handlungsspielraum des Hohen Vertreters hatten. Der 
Hohe Vertreter wurde von den Mitgliedstaaten geschaffen, um die Ef-
fizienz der Europäischen Außenpolitik zu erhöhen, jedoch erhielt er 
zum Zeitpunkt der Studie entweder keine Handlungsmandate oder, in 
anderen Fällen, nur einen geringen Spielraum in seinem Amt.  
Das Grundproblem zeigt sich in der optionalen und intergouvernemen-
talen Gestalt der Europäischen Außenpolitik, welche auch weiterhin 
nach dem Lissaboner Vertrag fortbesteht. In diesem Bereich wurden 
keine Kompetenzen nach Brüssel verlagert und außenpolitische Ent-
scheidungen werden nach wie vor von den Mitgliedstaaten einstimmig 
getroffen. Zugleich unterbrach der zügige Aufbau neuer außenpoliti-
scher Strukturen in Brüssel zeitweise die Verbindung zwischen mit-
gliedstaatlichen Verwaltungen und dem neuen Außenbeauftragten. Der 
Hohe Vertreter zeigte sich weder in der Lage die Autorität seines Am-
tes zu konsolidieren, noch die institutionelle Kooperation mit der Eu-
ropäischen Kommission voranzutreiben.   
Die Studie beschäftigt sich mit den Voraussetzungen für einen Hand-
lungsspielraum des Hohen Vertreters.  Der Handlungsspielraum ist eine 
Entscheidende Voraussetzung für den Hohen Vertreter um sein Amt 
effizient zu führen und mehr als nur Kompromisslösungen im Klub der 
28 Mitgliedstaaten zu erzielen. Jedoch haben die Mitgliedstaaten Be-
denken über einen möglichen Verlust ihrer Souveränität und sind daran 
gelegen den Handlungsspielraum supranationaler Akteure einzuschrän-
ken. Dieses Spannungsverhältnis, zwischen den Vorteilen eines hand-
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lungsfähigen Außenbeauftragten und den Souveränitätsbedenken  der 
Mitgliedsstaaten, ist der Hintergrund dieser Analyse.  
Die Studie kommt zu drei Befunden. Erstens: die Einrichtung des EU 
Außenvertreter Postens beruhte auf einem Kompromiss im Europäi-
schen Konvent. Während funktionale Aspekte durchaus angeführt 
wurden, führten die Souveränitätsbedenken einiger Mitgliedsstaaten zu 
einer Kompromisslösung, bei der Funktionen zwar auf EU Eben inte-
griert wurden, nicht jedoch die politische Entscheidungsgewalt. Die 
Linie zwischen Integrationsbefürwortern  und -gegnern  besteht auch 
weiterhin fort und führt zu einer Blockierung in der institutionellen 
Entwicklung der Europäischen Außenpolitik.  
Zweitens: der Hohe Vertreter hat nur einen begrenzten Handlungs-
spielraum. Eine Ausnahme betrifft den Aufbau des Europäischen Aus-
wärtigen Dienstes, bei dem enge Kooperation zwischen dem Hohen 
Vertreter und der Kommission, Uneinigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten und 
Zeitdruck zu einem Kontrollverlust der Mitgliedsstaaten führten. Die 
konkrete Amtsführung in den ersten Jahren nach Inkrafttreten des 
Lissabonner Vertrages zeigte jedoch, dass widersprüchlige Interessen 
der Mitgliedstaaten und eine strenge Kontrolle supranationaler Aktivitä-
ten den Handlungsspielraum des Außenvertreters einschränkten.  
Drittens: die Studie trägt zu einer weiteren Anwendung der Prinzipal-
Agent Theorie bei. In bisherigen Studien wird der Ansatz auf Prinzipal-
Agent Beziehungen angewendet, die sich durch eine klare Definition 
von Kompetenzen auszeichnen. Die Anwendung dieser Theorie auf 
den Hohen Vertreter ist insofern ein Novum, als dass er seine Autorität 
nicht auf festgelegte Kompetenzen stützen kann, sondern in seiner 
grundsätzlichen Funktionsweise in  einem Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zu 
den Mitgliedsstaaten steht. Der Hohe Vertreter wird daher als „einge-
schränkter Agent“ bezeichnet. Der Amtsinhaber muss sich um eine 
enge Verbindung zu den Mitgliedsstaaten bemühen,  um Vertrauen und 
Unterstützung zu entwickeln, und somit Handlungsspielraum zu erzeu-
gen.  
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1. Introduction 
 
"It is like a novel translated into a film. When the key actor does 
not look like you thought, then you don’t like the film.”  
Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union 2009-20141 
If European Union (EU) foreign policy since 2009 were to be made 
into a film, then Catherine Ashton, the first High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2 would have a starring 
role. She would star in a drama with ups and downs. In December 
2009, the start of EU foreign policy under new Lisbon Treaty rules was 
highly subdued. When the European Council nominated Ashton to 
Lisbon’s new-model High Representative post, close observers of the 
EU foreign policy project did not hide their disappointment. Many saw 
the choice of a low-profile and inexperienced candidate as a sign of the 
“self-dwarfing of Europe” (Ansgar, 2009). The new post created high 
expectations, as the incumbent would inter alia represent the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), sit in the European Commission as 
its Vice-President, chair the Foreign Affairs Council and head the newly 
established European External Action Service (EEAS). Many had 
hoped that the first office-holder would have a track record and experi-
ence in foreign policy making, thus being able to shape and develop the 
profile of the new position. Instead, Ashton’s CV was characterised by 
low-profile work in national politics and a short stint as EU Trade 
Commissioner – nevertheless, a career in which she was, overall, very 
successful. During the first rough years, it seemed like the sceptics had 
been proven right. The new High Representative stumbled through her 
baptism of fire. Haiti, Egypt, Libya, Syria; wherever a manmade or nat-
                                                   
1 Quote of Catherine Ashton in answer to a question about the reasons for criticism 
surrounding the performance of the High Representative (Ashton, 2014). 
2 Subsequently referred to as ‘High Representative of the Union’ or ‘High Representa-
tive’. 
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ural crisis occurred, Ashton and her service seemed to be slow, weak 
and cumbersome.  
Fast forward. Protesters chanted “Europe! Europe!” while Catherine 
Ashton walked amongst pro-European campaigners on “Euro-Maidan” 
(a renamed main square) in Kiev, Ukraine in December 2013. The 
large-scale  protests,  in  the dead of  winter,  railed against  the Ukrainian 
government’s decision to shelve an association and trade agreement 
with the EU. Ashton was welcomed as a representative of the Union 
that they want to get closer to; however, she did not just visit the pro-
testers  on  the  main  square  in  Kiev  –  but  talked  to  the  President  and  
opposition leaders as well. Even though the EU had little leverage on 
developments in the Ukraine crisis, Ashton was recognised as the top 
representative of the 28 EU member states. Yet, at the high point of 
the crisis in February 2014, when Ukraine was at the brink of falling 
into a civil war, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland 
mediated between the conflicting parties in Kiev. It seemed that in 
times of ‘hardball’ diplomacy, the responsibility fell where the power 
resided.  
Nevertheless, 2013 had seen Catherine Ashton achieve other successes. 
In spring, she secured a deal between Serbia and Kosovo that further 
promoted stability in the Western Balkans. Just a month earlier she had 
managed to score a first success in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear 
programme, which she headed in the name of the EU3+33 group of 
states. Even the press started to write positively about her, and por-
trayed her development from “Lady who?” to “EU’s diplomatic secret 
weapon” (Perkins, 2013). It seemed as if her work and the institutional 
innovations of the Lisbon Treaty were finally being acknowledged, and 
that the initial disappointment had faded. But did the new post of High 
Representative allow its holder the discretion to have an impact on EU 
foreign policy?  
                                                   
3 A job that she inherited from the previous High Representative for CFSP, Javier 
Solana. Ashton currently heads the negotiations with Iran on behalf of, and together 
with,  the ‘big three’  EU member states (Germany,  France and Britain),  as  well  as  the 
three other permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members (the United 
States (US), China and Russia) – hence, E3+3 (also called P5+1). 
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This study does not focus on the personal characteristics of the incum-
bent Catherine Ashton, but rather on the post that she (currently, as of 
June  2014)  holds.  Thus,  the  character  traits  or  leadership  style  of  the  
office-holder, and their effects on the organisation of EU foreign policy 
and its content, are not considered. Instead, the study takes one step 
back and considers whether the post actually gives its holder the agency 
to make choices that change the course of events in EU foreign policy. 
This means that the focus of the analysis is on the High Representative 
as an institution. The High Representative is the agent of Europe’s 
foreign policy, and the thesis analyses the discretion of the role in rela-
tion to how it is conditioned by institutional factors and distribution of 
preferences. Is the failure or success of the incumbent determined by 
their own choices, or is the High Representative merely a puppet of the 
member states? 
1.1. The study in a nutshell 
The study’s main finding may be stated simply: the High Representative 
is the ‘constrained agent’ of Europe’s foreign policy. The findings of 
the study suggest that the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty 
had little positive effect on the discretion of EU foreign policy agents. 
Instead, the High Representative has become caught in an agency trap. 
The post of High Representative was designed by the member states in 
order to improve the efficiency of Europe’s foreign policy; however, to 
date the High Representative has received either no mandate for partic-
ular actions or, in other cases, only limited discretion over the conduct 
of activities. The root cause of this is that the optional and intergov-
ernmental nature of EU foreign policy was not changed by the Lisbon 
Treaty reform, while the prompt creation of new institutions temporari-
ly interrupted the link between the member states’ administrations and 
the new foreign policy chief’s office. As a result, supranational agency 
even decreased, as the High Representative struggled to consolidate the 
authority of the new position and to increase the institutionalisation of 
cooperation with the Commission.   
The discussions leading up to the Lisbon Treaty were in many ways a 
continuation of the debates and decisions on the development of the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy over the last decades. 
However, the member states tried this time to reorganise EU foreign 
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policy to be more coherent, continuous and visible through institutional 
engineering. The new High Representative of the Union would – in 
addition to serving as a full Commissioner and heading the EEAS – 
chair the foreign ministers’ meetings and have a formal right to table 
foreign policy initiatives. It remained to be seen as to whether institu-
tional changes would translate into a more effective foreign policy, or if 
a coherent foreign policy would rather be hampered by the member 
states limiting the discretion of the new High Representative.  
This study aims to answer the following research question: What condi-
tions the discretion of the post of High Representative? The discretion 
of the High Representative – that is, the High Representative’s ability to 
achieve more than the lowest common denominator of the member 
state  positions  –  is  a  major  prerequisite  of  the  post  in  order  for  it  to  
provide added value. Without deliberately granted room for manoeuvre 
for the foreign policy chief, EU foreign policy cannot be more than the 
sum of the individual foreign policies of its member states. However, 
member states traditionally underline sovereignty concerns in matters 
of foreign policy, and thus strive to limit the discretion of agents be-
yond state level. The tension between the benefits of more discretion 
for EU foreign policy agents and concerns over sovereignty loss of the 
member states provides the context for this analysis.  
In order to answer the research question, the study uses a principal-
agent (PA) framework: member states are the collective principal that 
delegate tasks and control their agent, the High Representative. In this 
constellation, the discretion of the High Representative is possibly con-
ditioned by four factors:  
1) The preference distribution among the member states,  
2) The control and oversight mechanisms of the member states,  
3) Time pressure, and  
4) The nature of interaction between the High Representative and 
the Commission.  
The methodology for assessing the research question is based on expert 
interviews, qualitative content analysis (QCA) and process tracing. Ex-
pert interviews with 52 practitioners in Brussels and national capitals 
provided the necessary background information on which to assess the 
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relations and dynamics between the principal and agent. QCA was use-
ful in reorganising the data from different sources in a systematic way, 
and to single out important pieces of information. These process ob-
servations were then reorganised again, to establish a causal chain be-
tween the above-mentioned four independent factors and the level of 
discretion of the High Representative.  
The results of these endeavours are presented in three empirical chap-
ters that deal with the High Representative’s discretion during the crea-
tion of the office, and the actions and review conducted from it. First, 
the creation of the office under the new Lisbon rules possibly allowed 
the High Representative to gain discretion during the set-up of the 
supporting administration. Second, an analysis of the daily work of the 
foreign policy chief looks into the actions of the High Representative as 
agenda- and crisis manager, and as strategist and communicator of EU 
foreign policy. Third, the High Representative formally led the 2013 
review of the EEAS as an integral part of the overall EU foreign policy 
architecture.  
1.2. The puzzle: discretion of supranational foreign policy actors  
The empirical puzzle: an unfinished EU foreign policy 
The design of the High Representative post is a manifestation of the 
historic development of the EU’s institutional structure of foreign poli-
cy making more generally. Part of the history of EU foreign policy has 
been a constant aggregation of new instruments, resources and struc-
tures at the EU level that has been convincingly dubbed the “Brusseli-
sation” (Allen, 1998) or the “institutionalisation” (Smith, 2004) of EU 
foreign policy. A crucial part of this process was a tension between two 
objectives of the member states. On the one hand, the states needed to 
establish supranational agents at the EU level to make Europe’s foreign 
policy more coherent and effective. On the other, they have an urge to 
control the discretion of the established agents on foreign policy choic-
es in order to preserve the sovereignty of their foreign policies. The 
history of EU’s foreign policy architecture can thus be seen as a strug-
gle for and against supranational agency, which is carried out on hori-
zontal (intergovernmental versus community method) and vertical 
(member state versus EU-level) axes (see Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1: Agency struggles in EU external relations (author’s own 
compilation) 
The horizontal struggle of supranational agency is connected to the idea 
of reconciling the different realms of EU’s external relations: commer-
cial external relations, which were handled via the integrated ‘communi-
ty method’, and political and security matters, which were characterised 
by intergovernmental procedures.4 Leaving aside the creation of the 
Western European Union (WEU) in 1948, as well as the failure of the 
initiative to establish a European Defence Community in 1954, the 
European integration project was for decades predominantly an eco-
                                                   
4 The ‘community’ and ‘intergovernmental’ methods represent ideal types of policy-
making procedures in the EU that exist alongside various nuanced approaches. “The 
Community method of decision-making is characterized by (i) the central role of the 
Commission in formulating proposals; (ii) qualified majority voting (QMV) in the 
Council as a rule; (iii) involvement of the European Parliament with varying intensity 
depending on the decision-making procedure; and (iv) the role of the Court in ensuring 
judicial accountability” (De Baere, 2008: 73). In contrast, the intergovernmental method 
implies “the active involvement of the European Council in setting the overall direction 
of policy; the predominance of the Council of Ministers in consolidating cooperation; 
the limited/marginal role of the Commission […]; the basic exclusion of the EP [Euro-
pean Parliament] (bar budget) and the ECJ [European Court of Justice] from the circle 
of involvement in policy formulation, execution and control; [and] the adoption of 
special arrangements for managing cooperation […]” (Missiroli, 2011: 4) . 
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nomic enterprise with the European Communities (EC) at its heart. 
Member states complimented the economic external relations of the 
communities with intergovernmental arrangements to discuss and de-
cide on political and security-related matters of foreign policy. This 
process started first with the failed Fouchet Plan of the 1960s, and was 
taken up with the establishment of the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) in the 1970s, which became the CFSP with the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty. However, since day one, the idea that the two separate admin-
istration and decision-making arrangements could be “knit together 
[…] in a coherent and effective whole” (Heath, 1964: 42) was on the 
table.  
Over the years, steps were taken to bring the different elements of Eu-
rope’s foreign policy closer together. Awareness grew that in order to 
ensure an effective international presence, the foreign policy endeav-
ours of the member states had to match the EC’s growing influence in 
the world as a marketplace and agricultural player (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006: 27ff). As a consequence, the Single European Act of 
1986 brought the EC and the EPC under the same legal umbrella and 
pronounced that they “must be consistent”.5 The Maastricht Treaty 
established the EU, put the CFSP and EC under a common roof, and 
gave the Commission a (non-exclusive) right of initiative within CFSP. 
However, CFSP remained a separate and intergovernmental pillar.  
The Maastricht Treaty nonetheless boosted the development of foreign 
policy capabilities in the Commission in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
Commission created an external service of more than 120 delegations 
around the world to represent the powerful economic policies of the 
Commission, especially development and trade, and also created an 
administrative capacity to deal with CFSP matters (Lieb, 2013; Nugent, 
1997; Smith, 2004; Spence, 2006). The Commission became a heavy-
weight in Europe’s external relations. Reconciling the Commission’s 
weight in the world with the political goals of the CFSP was a tempting 
endeavour; however, it was never realised, as the member states were 
hesitant to grant political powers to the Commission, since they did not 
                                                   
5 Title III Art. 30 (5), The Single European Act, Luxembourg, 17 February 1986 (Hill 
and Smith, 2000: 139ff). 
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want to see their foreign policy choices affected by a supranational 
institution.6  
Instead, the member states built up a considerable foreign policy ad-
ministration outside of the European Commission. This endeavour 
symbolised the vertical struggle of member states for and against su-
pranational agency. The logic of a step-by-step increase of administra-
tive resources for political cooperation at the EU level worked best 
outside of the community framework, though the member states were 
still careful not to lose control over their foreign policies and not to 
grant discretion over foreign policy matters to supranational agents. 
The suggestions of the Fouchet Plan, to set up a European Political 
Commission in Paris staffed with seconded senior national diplomats to 
support the work of the Council, was rejected.7 The 1981 London re-
port on the EPC introduced support structures in the form of second-
ed diplomats to back the work of the rotating Presidency. However, the 
member states were careful not to grant powers to a supranational 
agent, and added that additional foreign policy officials would “remain 
in the employment of their national Foreign Ministries, and […] be on 
the staff of their Embassy in the Presidency capital”.8 A permanent 
EPC Secretariat was eventually introduced with the SEA. Though the 
Secretariat was housed on the thirteenth floor of the Council Secretariat 
building, strong efforts were put in place to make the EPC Secretariat 
as distinct as possible from its EC counterpart. The office, which only 
comprised 17 seconded national civil servants (including support staff), 
had few possibilities to develop an independent agenda. It had no 
budget of its own and worked under the authority of the rotating Presi-
dency (da Costa Pereira, 1988).  Only later, after the establishment of 
the CFSP via Maastricht, and especially after the nomination of Javier 
Solana as the High Representative for CFSP, did foreign policy struc-
tures grow exponentially. Solana, as former Spanish foreign minister 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General, 
                                                   
6 Supranational institutions are defined as “institutions that are organisationally and 
politically independent from the founding states” (Tallberg, 2002: 23). 
7 See Art. 9 and 10 in the Draft Treaty for the Establishment of a European Political 
Union (Fouchet Plan I), 2 November 1961 (Hill and Smith, 2000: 50). 
8 Art. 10, Report Issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on European Political Co-
operation (The London Report), London, 13 October 1981 (Hill and Smith, 2000: 
114ff). 
Introduction     23 
 
 
was a political heavyweight and pioneered the development of the EU’s 
foreign policy with the help of his experience and personal network 
(Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger, 2011). By the mid-2000s, a com-
plex foreign policy structure with more than 500 staff-members had 
developed in the Council Secretariat (Juncos and Pomorska, 2010). 
Member states’ feeling of ‘ownership’ of the Secretariat spurred this 
expansion; nevertheless, the member states deliberately granted actors 
in Brussels limited room for discretion over foreign policy formulation 
beyond the state-level, as they created the post of High Representative 
and capacities for EU-level policy analysis. 
The European Convention of 2002/2003 tried a new approach and 
turned the institutionalisation process upside down. Until then, each 
treaty revision had codified previously informal practices. However, the 
European Convention organised and simplified the complex, ad hoc 
structures that had evolved over the previous decades. At the heart of 
the reform, which eventually came into force in 2009 with the Lisbon 
Treaty, was the double-hatted High Representative. Due to the vast 
task description, comprising inter alia the job of a Commissioner as 
well as that of chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, the idea of the new 
office was contested from the start. However, the revamped EU for-
eign policy chief, supported by the EEAS, was supposed to bring all of 
the loose ends of Europe’s foreign policy together. The member states 
thus took another step in bringing Community-based external relations 
and security matters closer together. Still, the writers of the treaty stipu-
lated that the CFSP remained “subject to specific rules and proce-
dures”,9 and made sure that the post of High Representative was legally 
separate from the post of Vice-President of the Commission, even if 
occupied by the same person.  
To sum up, the Lisbon Treaty was a new step in both reconciling the 
separate spheres of EU foreign policy-making, and creating further 
supranational capacities to deal with the CFSP. But what was the effect 
of this new development? The question of the discretion of suprana-
tional agents on matters of EU foreign policy remained unanswered 
and worth exploring. 
                                                   
9 Art. 24(1) TEU. 
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The theoretical puzzle: institutions and supranational agency 
The institutional development of the EU foreign policy architecture, 
but also of the Union’s architecture as a whole, has always been part 
and parcel of the work of EU scholars. The three new institutionalisms 
– historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Aspinwall 
and Schneider, 2001; Hall and Taylor, 1996) – in particular focused on 
the interplay between institutions and policy outcomes. The creation of 
the High Representative and the institutional engineering of the Euro-
pean Convention were based on the intention to make the management 
of EU foreign policy “fit for purpose” (Crowe, 2008: 27). But do (for-
eign policy) institutions matter? How do theorists of EU integration 
and International Relations (IR) evaluate the likelihood of supranational 
agency beyond the state? 
The well-known, traditional debate in the field of EU integration theory 
is carried out between advocates of neo-functionalism and intergov-
ernmentalism. Neo-functionalist scholars highlight the prominent role 
of supranational institutions, which obtain enhanced functions and 
discretion via a process of ‘spill-over’ (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). 
From this perspective, EU member states delegate executive or admin-
istrative functions to EU-level institutions as a result of functional pres-
sures. The shift of policy issues towards the institutions in Brussels also 
implies a shift in the focus of national elites (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 
1991). In the end, delegation and socialisation processes contribute 
towards a situation in which supranational institutions enjoy substantial 
autonomy from national administrations, and can be regarded as actors 
in their own right (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998). The continuation 
of this argument is that supranational actors exert significant influence 
on inter-state bargaining, for example with the European Commission 
acting as the ‘engine’ of European integration (Pollack, 2003). Any spill-
over implying a transfer of legal competences to the EU level did not 
take place in matters of EU foreign policy (Wessels, 2004). However, it 
has been shown that socialisation processes among Brussels elites are 
present. A series of studies by Juncos and Pomorska (2006, 2010, 2013) 
revealed that officials in the Council working groups and Secretariat, as 
well as the new EEAS, developed distinct codes of conduct, role con-
ceptions and attitudes, which, to some extent, made them more closely 
attached to a European foreign policy than to their national one. Nev-
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ertheless, it has yet to be shown how far a distinct socialisation of for-
eign policy actors at the EU level translates into a significant suprana-
tional influence on foreign policy decisions. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism refuted ideas of spill-over effects leading 
to discretion or influence of supranational actors with respect to gov-
ernment decisions. Moravcsik (1993) strongly opposed any perspective 
on the European integration process that advanced a high degree of 
supranational entrepreneurship, suggesting that leadership by suprana-
tional actors would be neither necessary, nor effective. As a conse-
quence “[t]he role of legendary figures such as Monnet and Delors has 
been much exaggerated” (Moravcsik, 1999: 270). While supranational 
actors play a passive role as facilitators that bring down the transaction 
costs of international negotiations, they have little influence on the 
shape of the final decision. Member states’ governments, constrained 
by domestic preferences, rather than supranational institutions, are 
decisive for the outcome of international negotiations. A move towards 
further integration in the field of foreign policy with discretion for su-
pranational agents is unlikely, as governments only seek integration in 
policy areas in which supranational strategies increase their power vis-à-
vis domestic interest groups. However, this process is limited to matters 
of economic policy (Andreatta, 2011: 33f).  
These grand theories of integration, which, unsurprisingly, have most 
explanatory power when applied to policy fields that are subject to the 
integrated community method, reach their limits when trying to explain 
integration endeavours in the field of foreign policy (Helwig and Stroß, 
2012). It is thus fruitful to consult IR literature that places the relation-
ship between structure and agency in the wider context of dynamics in 
international systems. Predictably, classical realist models, which em-
phasised the economic and military power of states (Carr, 1964), as well 
as structural realist’s accounts (Waltz, 1979), assigned little or no discre-
tion to supranational institutions, and focused on power relations 
among states. Since then, however, the history and IR literatures have 
come a long way, and more recent concepts of power in international 
relations acknowledge the establishment and effects of international 
institutions. For example, Barnett and Duval (2005) categorise different 
ways in which international norms and institutions codify, structure, 
and impose power relations among states. Institutional rules in the 
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international system are difficult to alter, and might establish power 
relations that privilege certain states and disadvantage others. Discur-
sive activities carried out in the international sphere manifest new 
norms and interpretations that structure future actions. Within this 
more structured world, supranational agents can suddenly be analysed 
as independent entities as well, as their source of influence is further 
detached from traditional state power. Soft power resources (Nye, 
2008) can become a source of influence (and hence discretion) and 
might be based on the attractiveness (Weber, 1987) of supranational 
agents. However, these concepts still see international institutions as a 
passive means for nation states to exercise power, rather than as discre-
tionary agents with an independent self-concept and agenda.  
Theory Logic Supranational agency 
Neo-functionalism ‘Spill-over’ effects and 
loyalty shifts to suprana-
tional level 
Supranational actors enjoy 
autonomy from national 
administrations, and exert 
influence on interstate bar-
gaining 
Liberal intergovern-
mentalism 
Domestic preference aggre-
gation and interstate bar-
gaining 
Supranational institutions 
lower transaction costs but 
have no influence on deci-
sion-making outcome 
(Neo-)realism Balancing of traditional 
state power 
Institutions mirror power 
balances 
Power in IR  
approaches 
Institutions as mediators in 
international power rela-
tions 
Supranational institutions 
influence actors choices 
through their existence 
Role Theory Role conceptions direct 
information selection and 
assessment 
Role conceptions of suprana-
tional foreign policy elites 
influence collective actions 
 Principal-Agent 
approach 
Principals delegate tasks to 
agents and control their 
implementation 
Supranational agency varies 
given the level of discretion 
granted by the member 
states 
Table 1.1: Theoretical approaches and supranational agency 
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Foreign policy analysis, and in particular role theory, provide a frame-
work in which the agency of supranational actors is perceived as more 
likely, compared to traditional approaches. Holsti (1970) articulated that 
nation states’ foreign policy decisions are not merely based on systemic 
and material factors, but on role conceptions of foreign policy elites, 
which derive from sociological, historical and cultural characteristics. 
Role theory thus underlines ‘agency’ in the agent-structure debate, and 
recognises that foreign policy is made by policy-makers who act in re-
sponse to specific needs and demands in the domestic and international 
environment (Breuning, 2011). Even though EU foreign policy is not 
based on a national identity of a European state, its foreign policy elite 
also acts according to institutional and international role expectations, 
as well as according to their own role conceptions (Aggestam, 2006). 
The result is a framework for analysis, in which EU foreign policy insti-
tutions matter and have an independent effect on Europe’s external 
relations. The role performances of different EU Council Presidencies 
have received particular scholarly attention (Elgström, 2003; Schout 
and Vanhoonacker, 2006). While these studies have illuminated differ-
ent characteristics of supranational agents, they do not aim to explain 
the conditions under which more or less discretion for supranational 
actors is likely to occur.  
While role theory identifies sociological factors as a source of suprana-
tional discretion, the PA approach places the relations of national prin-
cipals and supranational agents in a rational choice framework. The PA 
approach identifies inter alia the preference distribution, as well as con-
trol and oversight mechanisms of principals as independent variables 
that condition the agent’s room for manoeuvre, and provide a basis on 
which to develop testable hypotheses (Kassim and Menon, 2003; 
Pollack, 1997). Two characteristics of the approach make it valuable as 
the main framework for this study. First, unlike grand theories of Eu-
ropean integration, it does not try to generate a catch-all explanation for 
a social phenomenon, but rather represents a toolkit to analyse a variety 
of PA relationships. The use of a middle range theory allows us to put 
the specific empirical observation in focus, and analyse it in a scientific 
manner (Boudon, 1991; Dür and Elsig, 2011). Second, the PA ap-
proach is suitable for filtering out the effect of institutional factors on 
supranational agency. In particular, it can be used to juxtapose the ef-
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fects of institutional mechanisms of the post of High Representative 
with the effects of disagreement among member states. Hence, the PA 
framework helps us to understand the possible impact of the Lisbon 
Treaty reform on EU foreign policy making, and allows us to answer 
the question: What conditions the discretion of the post of High Rep-
resentative? 
1.3. Design, argumentation, findings and limitations of the study 
Theory  
The study uses the PA approach to identify the conditions that lead to 
enhanced discretion for the post of High Representative. In a first step, 
the PA approach has  to be modelled to fit  the complex reality  of  the 
EU foreign policy architecture. This is a challenging undertaking, as EU 
actors in general are accountable and connected to a number of differ-
ent players (Dür and Elsig, 2011), and few extant studies apply the PA 
approach to EU foreign policy (Dijkstra, 2013; Klein, 2010). In addi-
tion, the construct of the High Representative/Vice-President 
(HR/VP) is complex in itself, and the incumbent is accountable to the 
member states, as well as, to some extent, to the Commission and the 
European Parliament (EP). In the developed model, the member states 
are the collective principal that delegates tasks to the High Representa-
tive of the Union, which represents the agent of the study. In order to 
obtain a clear-cut analysis, the Commission and the EP are not regard-
ed as principals in the basic model. 
The  dependent  variable  of  the  study  is  the  level  of  discretion  of  the  
post of High Representative. The level of discretion was ranked on an 
ordinal scale ranging from ‘limited discretion’, to ‘deliberate discretion’ 
to ‘unintended discretion’. While ‘deliberate discretion’ includes activi-
ties of the High Representative that are still within the intentionally 
granted room for manoeuvre, ‘unintended discretion’ encompasses 
autonomous action outside the control of the member states.  
The independent variables of the study are the preference distribution 
of the member states, control and oversight mechanisms, time pressure, 
as well as the nature of the interaction between EU-level agents. The 
preference distribution across member states (the collective principal) 
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can have a positive effect on the discretion of the High Representative, 
as member states might fail to agree on sanctioning unwanted behav-
iour on the part of the High Representative. However, disagreement 
among member states can also have a negative effect on the discretion 
of  the High Representative:  if  member states  disagree,  a  failure  to ag-
gregate their preferences might prevent them from delegating a task to 
the High Representative in the first place. After the member states 
delegate a task to the High Representative, such as common representa-
tion or agenda-management, they set up certain control and oversight 
mechanisms, in order to ensure that the agent’s activities are in line 
with their preferences. The level of discretion can be affected by de-
tailed mandates, member state participation in the implementation of 
the task, or sanctioning of unwanted behaviour. Time pressure is an-
other constraint on the collective principal, which might force the 
member states to write an unspecific mandate to the High Representa-
tive that widens room for discretion of the post. Last, but not least, the 
nature of agent interaction, in this case between the High Representa-
tive and the European Commission, might either enable or constrain 
the discretion of the High Representative on foreign policy choices. 
Competition between the two EU-level players reduces their collective 
room for discretion, while they can use cooperation to their advantage 
and plan decisions and actions that are more difficult for the member 
states to alter and sanction.  
It is thus not immediately clear whether the institutional powers of the 
High Representative as the Presidency in CFSP matters, Vice-President 
of the Commission, and EU foreign policy chief give the incumbent 
any discretion over foreign policy matters. The inability of the member 
states to agree on mandates, as well as various possibilities to control 
the High Representative, might mean that the post serves purely as a 
figurehead. 
Main argument 
This study points to the need for a reconsideration of the expectations 
attached to the post of High Representative. In the constitutional trea-
ty,  the  post  was  still  dubbed  “EU  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs”,  but  
recent analyses refer to the High Representative as a “potential diplo-
matic entrepreneur” (Hemra et al., 2011: 2), “an autonomous player” 
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(Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013: 5) or (under specific circumstanc-
es) “a political protagonist in its own right” (Thomas and Tonra, 2011: 
12). These descriptions assume a level of discretion of the High Repre-
sentative, which the post – in its current institutional constellation – 
lacks. The institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty have not had 
the positive effect on the discretion of EU foreign policy agency that 
was expected by many observers; instead, the High Representative 
should be considered as a ‘constrained agent’. 
The High Representative is caught in an agency trap. On paper, the job 
description is powerful and offers the post holder possibilities to initi-
ate, plan and implement EU foreign policy. Yet the powers come with a 
caveat. The High Representative’s actions rely on individual mandates 
from the member states, and are closely controlled. As EU foreign 
policy is currently characterised by unanimity rules and disunity among 
the member states on the future course of action, the High Representa-
tive has little discretion to carry out the job. If the High Representative 
acts outside of the predefined scope, these actions risk either being 
sanctioned, or leading to disengagement of the member states.  
The Lisbon Treaty – in the short term – reduced the discretion of the 
High Representative compared to the discretion enjoyed previously by 
the rotating Presidency and the High Representative for CFSP. The 
treaty confronted the member states with a supranational agent with 
new institutional powers, such as chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, 
sitting in the Commission, and heading the EU diplomatic service. 
These powers detached the post from the intergovernmental sphere of 
policy making with which the member states felt comfortable. There-
fore, the newly established position is equal to that of a ‘constrained 
agent’ in its current state of development. As a new player in intergov-
ernmental EU foreign policy, the mandate of the High Representative 
is still contested. Furthermore, without a solid mandate that stipulates 
concrete action priorities, the post is in constant anticipation of ex-post 
sanctioning of unwanted behaviour. In addition, the current state of its 
institutional development still lacks the capacity to cooperate efficiently 
with the Commission as the major EU trade, aid and development 
player.  
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In the conclusion section of this study, the implications for future de-
velopments are discussed. Over time, there are two scenarios that might 
alter the status of the High Representative as a ‘constrained agent’. The 
first option is a modification of the present PA constellation in which 
the High Representative is subject to close control of all member states. 
This would be achieved via a further integration of the policy field, 
either through strengthening the EP as an EU-level principal, or 
through a wider application of qualified majority voting (QMV). The 
second option is to halt further integration of EU foreign policy, and to 
strengthen the feeling of ownership of the post via close cooperation 
with national administrations. While this might sound counterintuitive 
from a PA perspective, closer networking of the High Representative 
with national foreign policy elites might increase the post’s discretion 
over Europe’s foreign policy, as it would create trust and lower the 
probability of control by, and sanctions from, the member states. 
Findings 
The main findings of the study can be summarised in three arguments 
about the historical development of EU foreign policy, the discretion 
of the High Representative in various activity areas, and the strengths 
and weaknesses of the PA approach.  
First, the study places the post of High Representative in the context of 
the historical development of EU foreign policy. The discussions with-
in the European Convention reflected a traditional debate between 
integrationist and intergovernmentalist member states. Functional 
goals, such as the quest for greater coherence, continuity and visibility 
of EU foreign policy, played a role in the creation of the post; neverthe-
less, the Convention was not free of politics. The sovereignty concerns 
of a group of member states led to a compromise, which is reflected in 
the double-hatted set-up of the post and the vast job description, which 
ensured operative integration without political integration of foreign 
policy. The negotiations on the set-up of the EEAS, and the review of 
the EU external action architecture, continued this institutional debate 
and revealed that the same front persisted between advocates of an 
integrated foreign policy and guardians of national foreign policy. The 
institutional development of EU foreign policy has resulted in deadlock 
and reform fatigue among the member states. This has forced them to 
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look at more technical aspects of the further development of the insti-
tutional apparatus.  
The second finding of the study is the collected empirical evidence that 
the High Representative had very limited discretion over the creation, 
actions and review of the office. While a lot of research concentrates on 
the development of the EEAS,10 only few academic contributions take 
the post of High Representative as the starting point from which to 
analyse Europe’s evolving foreign policy architecture.11 Given the depth 
and quantity of evidence on which it relies, this study maybe one of the 
most wide-ranging accounts of the post of High Representative to date. 
The discretion of the High Representative was found to vary across the 
cases analysed, though most of the cases revealed only limited discre-
tion. In the set-up of the EEAS, which was one of Catherine Ashton’s 
priorities, she had unintended discretion. Time pressure in setting up 
the new service, close cooperation between the High Representative 
and the Commission, as well as the disunity of member states, led to a 
situation in which member states lost control over the creation of the 
new service. However, the actual performance of the post in the im-
plementation of a number of tasks during the first years under the Lis-
bon Treaty revealed the shortcomings of the new set-up. Conflicting 
preferences among member states led to minimal delegation, and tasks 
that were eventually delegated to the High Representative were under 
close control by the member states. The agenda- and crisis-
management, as well as the strategic development of EU foreign policy 
and its representation, were performed under member states’ strict 
guidelines. Furthermore, coordination of the external relation portfolios 
of the Commission remained a challenge for the High Representa-
tive/Vice-President, rather than a source of discretion. The last empiri-
cal chapter of this study, which considers the review of the EU foreign 
policy architecture, illustrates the consolidation of the post of High 
                                                   
10 The  studies  focus  on  issues  such  as  officials’  attitudes,  security  and  development  
issues, delegations, consequences for the diplomatic system, and legal aspects 
(Blockmans, 2012b; Duke, 2011; Juncos and Pomorska, 2013; Lieb, 2013; Maurer and 
Raik, 2014; Smith, 2013).  
11 Some researchers have analysed the role of the High Representative in more detail, as 
part  of  the  overall  diplomatic  and  decision-making  system (Dijkstra,  2011a;  Edwards,  
2011, 2013; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger, 2011; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 
2013). 
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Representative. On the one hand, it shows that no significant changes 
to the set-up are to be expected in the medium term. On the other 
hand, it foreshadows the possible future working relationship between 
the High Representative and the member states, the strength of which 
develops from being based on close working relationships with the 
member states.  
A third achievement of the study is to contribute to a wider application 
of the PA approach. Few studies of EU foreign policy have applied the 
PA approach, partly because of the intergovernmental nature of the 
policy field. The PA approach traditionally highlights the role of agents 
that can base their activities on a formal and uncontested mandate de-
fined by a contractual relationship between the principals and the agent. 
Hence, the application of the approach is more straightforward in do-
mestic politics, in which the relation of actors is codified within a con-
stitutional arrangement (see, for example, Weingast and Moran, 1983). 
Furthermore, application of the approach to the role of the Commis-
sion in EU politics (see, most prominently, Pollack, 1997) was conceiv-
able as the institutions can base its authority on the division of compe-
tences between the member states and the Union stipulated in the trea-
ties. In general, research on supranational agents has been mainly in the 
field of regulatory and judiciary politics (see Majone, 2001), begging the 
question whether agents operating in highly political policy fields are 
subject to the same dynamics and logics The post of High Representa-
tive fits uneasily into the PA framework, as it operates in a political and 
institutional environment that is more opaque, and in which no compe-
tences have been formally transferred to the European level. 
The study thus aims to contribute to the debates within the PA re-
search family. What are the means by which the principal can control 
the agent? Does the principal need to make costly investments into 
centralised control mechanisms in order to avoid agency slack, or is 
there a decentralised system of ‘fire alarms’ that indicates unwanted 
behaviour of the agent (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984)? How do 
agents that work in the field of nation-state-driven international diplo-
macy fit into the agent-typology debated among PA scholars (see 
Pollack, 2007)? Does the High Representative fit into the same category 
of agents as the European Commission or the ECJ? 
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The study offers some preliminary answers to these questions. In par-
ticular, it is suggested that the High Representative can be defined as a 
‘constrained agent’. Compared to well-established agents with an un-
contested standing, a constrained agent relies more on close engage-
ment with the principal in order to secure and consolidate the legitima-
cy of its mandate. In general, PA scholars interpret a close, or even 
intertwined, relationship between the principal and the agent as a pos-
sibility for control and supervision over the agent’s activity. Conse-
quently, PA scholars see this as a limitation of the discretion of agents. 
The evidence collected here suggests a different interpretation. A close 
link between the High Representative’s support structures, such as the 
cabinet and the EEAS, and the member states’ administrations, might 
rather be a source of trust, support and mutual understanding, which 
increase the probability of discretion of the High Representative in the 
first place.  
The sub-category of a ‘constrained agent’ differs from a classical agent 
definition. The principal challenges the agent’s general authority as an 
actor, and has means of side-lining the agent’s sphere of action. The 
constrained agent thus depends on a trust relationship to the principal 
in order to develop his authority. A subcategory of constrained agents 
is qualitatively different from the classical agents observed in domestic 
and regulatory PA analyses. While it is commonplace that principals 
contest the agents’ actions and choices and want to restrict their room 
of manoeuvre, it is usually not the case that the principal contests the 
legitimacy of the agent all together. Yet, principals create the agent in 
the first place, thus anticipating benefits with its creation and risking 
unintended discretion. Introducing the subcategory of a constrained 
agent adds thus not only insights to PA literature, but it is also relevant 
as an approach to analyse interstate cooperation. In contrast to liberal 
intergovernmentalist and realist models it puts supranational agency in 
the centre of the analysis, both as an intended instrument of the mem-
ber  states  and as  a  subject  of  their  contestation.  By defining the High 
Representative and other possible supranational actors as constrained 
agents, we can analyse their activities over time with the PA toolset, 
even if they work closely together with, and as representatives of, state 
principals.   
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Scope and limitations 
Given the limited resources of a PhD study, compromises of a theoret-
ical and empirical nature inevitably have to be made. For instance, the 
choice of the theoretical approach limited the analysis to certain factors 
and scientific worldviews: the PA approach is rooted in the scientific 
worldview of methodological individualism, which is characterised by 
an individualist ontology and a positivist epistemology. This means that 
it focuses on the direct observation of actors’ choices and behaviours, 
and assumes that these follow testable patterns. The choice of PA 
hence excludes other interesting questions that could have been asked. 
An approach embedded in social ontology would have discarded the 
rational perspective on actors taken in this study (Thomas and Tonra, 
2011). Instead of looking at the preference and utility-maximisation of 
agents, the study would have analysed how the High Representative 
followed a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1984). In line 
with the role theory approach mentioned above, the question would 
have been how the incumbent shaped their role within the new post via 
interaction and social processes with other actors in Brussels, in nation-
al capitals, and outside Europe. Whereas the PA approach singles out 
the mechanisms that lead to more or less agency of the High Repre-
sentative, it leaves us mostly in the dark with respect to a conception of 
how the internal and external role conception of the post are construct-
ed. What role in the EU and in the world is appropriate for the High 
Representative? In short, the PA approach reveals the scope, but not 
the content of agency.  
A consequence of focusing on institutions and preferences as the main 
variables of the study means that the personal characteristics of the 
office-holder play a very limited role in the analysis. Understandably, 
media coverage in recent years has focused on the character traits, as 
well as personal qualifications, of Catherine Ashton (Castle, 2011; 
Perkins,  2013).  In  addition,  the  officials  interviewed  for  this  study  re-
peatedly referred to certain personal characteristics and compared the 
leadership styles of Catherine Ashton and Javier Solana, who some of 
the interviewees had worked for when he was High Representative for 
CFSP. For this study, these accounts were only taken into consideration 
insofar as they referred to a comparison of the institutional and political 
context that both of the incumbents worked within. It might be 
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worthwhile to explore the effects of the post-holder’s qualifications, 
role conception and leadership styles in future studies.  
Moreover, the focus of the study is to explain and provide a better 
understanding of an institution, and not of a policy. Throughout the 
study, the reader will find discussions of events and political decisions; 
however, it is not the aspiration of the study to explain the content of 
policy choices taken by the member states, the High Representative or 
other actors. Policy cases are analysed with a focus on learning some-
thing about the post of High Representative and the relations of the 
post to the member states under particular conditions. For example, the 
immediate response of the High Representative to the crisis in Libya is 
discussed not in order to explain EU’s involvement, but to scrutinise 
the discretion of the post in this specific situation. The approach taken 
here is thus inward-looking and focused on the latest stage of the insti-
tutionalisation process of this policy field, and the internal dynamics 
between EU-level institutions and the member states.  
The study covers the first years of the post of High Representative 
between December 2009 and December 2013. Unsurprisingly, it was 
beyond the resources of the study to provide a complete account of all 
EU foreign policy developments concerning the post of High Repre-
sentative during this period. The methodology chapter (Chapter 3) of 
the study describes in more detail how six embedded cases were chosen 
to provide a comprehensive assessment of the post in accordance with 
the theoretical framework. Readers will miss accounts of important 
policy developments within this timeframe, such as the Iran nuclear 
talks, the Serbia-Kosovo deal, or crises in Egypt, Ukraine and other 
countries outside the EU, to mention a few. However, it is argued that 
the empirical evidence presented is enough to sustain a solid first an-
swer to the research question posed in the study.  
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
Seven chapters follow this introduction. Chapter 2 presents the PA 
approach as the main theoretical framework of the study. It will first 
outline the basics of the PA approach, which is subsequently modelled 
to fit the complex reality of EU foreign policy-making. It explains in 
detail the dependent variable of ‘level of discretion’ and thus what this 
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research seeks to discover. Based on the theoretical knowledge gath-
ered, the effects and indicators of four independent variables – namely 
conflicting preferences, control and oversight mechanisms, time pres-
sure and the nature of agent interaction – are outlined. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used for this study. In particular, 
it explains the steps that led to the findings gathered in this research 
and why they have the required level of robustness. These steps includ-
ed the case design, data collection, QCA and process tracing. 
Chapter 4 details the relevant historical background, and explains how 
the post of High Representative came to be created at the turn of the 
century. To that end, the main historical background of the institutional 
development of CFSP, the administration under the pre-Lisbon High 
Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and especially discussions in 
the Convention on the future of Europe are presented and analysed. 
The section shows how the post of High Representative was born out 
of a compromise between integrationists and intergovermentalists, and 
represents a continuation of the step-by-step institutionalisation of the 
foreign policy field.   
Chapters 5 to 7 contain the core, empirical analysis of the thesis. The 
negotiations undertaken during the set-up of the EEAS, which is the 
main supporting structure of the High Representative, are traced in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 goes into detail regarding the performance of the 
High Representative in different areas of the job, as an agenda- and 
crisis manager, in providing a strategic outlook for the Union, and in 
communicating the Union’s foreign policies. The discussions around 
the review of the EEAS in 2013 are evaluated in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 discusses the findings and returns to the puzzles and main 
arguments presented in the introduction. In particular, it focuses on the 
implications of the findings for the institutional future of EU foreign 
policy, and the theoretical development of the PA approach. It puts 
forward the concept of ‘constrained agents’ and discusses how this 
concept could be tested in future research. 

 
 
2. National principals and supranational agents 
 
 “What  a  nation-state  cannot  provide  alone  –  in  economics,  or  de-
fence – it can still provide through means far less drastic than hara-
kiri” (Hoffmann, 1966: 866) 
Stanley Hoffman’s quote from his article discussing the “fate of the 
nation-state”, summarises the dilemma and possible solution of democ-
racies in Europe. It is driven by the observation that member states in 
some policy areas are not able to efficiently ensure the wellbeing and 
interest-representation of their citizens as independent units in the in-
terconnected globalised world. On the other hand, the hara-kiri by the 
nation state, in form of its absorption into a European super-state, is 
unlikely, especially in times of regional peace and prosperity. Other 
means by which to ensure the safety and interests of the state without 
giving up on sovereignty are possible, and have been explored in recent 
decades. One of these means is explored in detail here: a partial delega-
tion and control of common tasks to supranational European agents. 
Instead of placing the analysis in the context of the battle of the grand 
theories of European integration, a mid-range approach is chosen; that 
is, the principal-agent approach. In this way, the thesis follows a wider 
trend  in  EU  research  since  the  1990s  to  use  analytical  frameworks  
common to general political sciences and less restricted to the single 
case of the EU (Saurugger, 2014: 9f). Dür and Elsig (2011: 331) even go 
as far as to state that “one of the major advantages of using a PA ap-
proach is that it does not come with a similarly extensive theoretical 
baggage as do the traditional macro-theories of European integration.” 
This argument remains valid insofar as the new approaches analyse how 
aspects of the EU political system work, rather than why regional inte-
gration occurs in the first place – thus limiting the analysis to distinct 
micro-phenomena. Nevertheless, as Saurugger (2014) argues, even 
middle range approaches should keep the overall picture of the Euro-
pean integration process, and its conditions and reasoning, in mind.  
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An analysis must thus acknowledge EU’s sui generis nature, which is no 
longer that of either federal state or a loose community of states. In the 
analysis of its external relations in particular, researchers are confronted 
with a complex network of actors and a plethora of decision-making 
mechanisms and instruments that need to be considered (see, for 
example, Hill and Smith, 2011; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). 
The effect of increased institutionalisation (or even integration) of EU 
foreign policy has not yet been fully explored. The PA approach pre-
sents its own interpretation of the causes and effects of institutions and 
actors’ choices in this field. The focus is not on arriving at a catch-all 
causal relationship, such as “more institutions” equals “more coopera-
tion” (Smith, 2004); rather, the aim is to single out the logics and condi-
tions for varying levels of agency of EU institutions within specific 
contexts.  
2.1. The PA approach and EU foreign policy  
Actors and institutions: methodological individualism 
The epistemological and ontological roots of the PA approach are in 
rational choice institutionalism, which also shares many of its assump-
tions (cf. Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000). The basis is a scientific 
worldview that is rooted in methodological individualism. This ap-
proach to knowledge assumes that the explanation for social phenome-
na can be found in the behaviour and choices of individual actors. 
These actors have exogenous given preferences, which they can rank 
on a scale and which build the basis for their utility-maximising behav-
iour. This perspective is especially dominant in economic sciences. 
However, while it is assumed that all decisions are individual in nature, 
it is argued that social institutions affect the choices of individuals 
(Arrow, 1994). Hence, institutions can be defined as “a set of rules that 
structure social interactions in particular ways” (Knight, 1992: 2).  In 
the economic field, this institution is known as markets. Markets de-
termine the prices on which individuals or firms base their strategic 
choices. In political science, the analysis focuses on ‘structured institu-
tions’ of the political system and their effect on actors operating in 
them. 
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In particular, Fritz Scharpf’s (1997) actor-centred institutionalism fo-
cuses on the interplay of methodological individualism and institution-
alism, the interplay in the behaviour of actors, and the structures in 
which interactions occur (see also van Lieshout, 2008). This interplay is 
inherent to social interaction,   
“[…] as it proceeds from the assumption that social phenomena are 
to be explained as the outcome of interactions among intentional ac-
tors […] but that these interactions are structured, and the outcomes 
shaped, by the characteristics of the institutional settings within 
which they occur.” (Scharpf, 1997: 1) 
It is possible to identify two interpretations of institutions: as con-
straints, and as expressions of an equilibrium (Shepsle, 2008). In the 
former case, institutions act as constraints as they structure the relation-
ship between individual actors. From this perspective institutions are 
‘the rules of the game’ and actors are the players that obey these com-
mon rules. However, in the latter case institutions are also an expres-
sion of equilibrium between actors. Just as market prices change ac-
cording to supply and demand, so can the institutions adapt in a politi-
cal system over time. Actors have, to some extent, the potential to de-
sign institutions according to their demands; however, as institutional 
change is not swift, periods of disequilibria can emerge in which institu-
tions are unstable.  
The PA approach represents a middle range theory (Merton, 1949) that 
is nested in rational choice institutionalism. As a middle range theory, it 
differs from the attempts of ‘grand’ theories that want to identify one 
independent variable to explain a variety of social processes. As Bou-
don (1991)  argued,  middle  range theories  are  closer  to what  other  sci-
ences call ‘scientific theory’, which is “a set of statements that organize 
a set of hypotheses and relate them to segregated observations” (p.520) 
. Rather than coming up with the one variable that explains PA rela-
tions in all thinkable contexts, the PA approach can be seen as a tool to 
explain actors’ relations and choices in particular settings. 
Because methodological individualism highlights actors’ choices as the 
main explanation for social phenomena, one of the independent varia-
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bles in this study will be the preference distribution of the principal. 
Nevertheless, the institution framework in which the interaction be-
tween the principal and the agent takes place structures the interaction 
with the agent and constrains or enables their behaviour. Thus, control 
and oversight mechanisms, as well as the existence of other institutional 
agents, are additional variables that explain agents’ discretion. 
Principal-agent 101 
The basic PA model distinguishes between a principal (or group of 
principals) and an agent. A principal enters into a relation with an agent 
on the basis of a contract that delegates the responsibility to perform a 
set of tasks (Pollack, 1997). The act of delegation comprises benefits as 
well as costs for the principal. In general, delegation of tasks to an agent 
helps the principal to circumvent the problem of collective decision-
making, as it may lower the cost of cooperation. The agent ensures the 
functioning of cooperation through a range of tasks, such as common 
representation, control of agreements, agenda-management or task-
specialisation (Damro, 2007; Delreux, 2009; Kassim and Menon, 2003; 
Tallberg, 2006). However, delegation is not without costs for the prin-
cipal. These costs emerge if the agent deviates from the agreed contract 
– a phenomenon labelled ‘agency slack’. Agency shirking and slippage 
are the primary forms of unintended actions of the agent. Shirking 
refers to minimised efforts, while slippage represents a shift from the 
principal’s preferred outcome towards that of the agent (Hawkins et al., 
2006: 9).  
In order to minimise the risks of ‘out of control agents’, the principal 
has to define the discretion of the agent and invest in control mecha-
nisms. Ex ante, the principal defines “the scope of agency activity, the 
legal instruments available to the agency, and the procedures it must 
follow” (Pollack, 1997: 108). By doing so, the principal determines the 
level of discretion of the agent. On an ongoing basis, the principal 
monitors the agent during the course of the action (Busuioc, 2009; 
Delreux and Kerremans, 2010). This can be through direct observation 
of the activity, or meetings with the principal in the action phase. Ex 
post, the principal has the possibility to apply positive or negative sanc-
tions (Pollack, 1997). This can include rejecting the results reached, 
such as international negotiation outcomes (Delreux and Kerremans, 
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2010), or limiting the budget and cancelling the contract (Hawkins et 
al., 2006: 30).  
In the simplified model, the question of whether delegation takes place 
and to what degree it is being monitored is a function of the principal’s 
cost–benefit analysis. Costs of delegation, also called agency losses 
(Hawkins et al., 2006), are the sum of independent actions of the prin-
cipal and the costs of the control mechanisms. If the benefits of delega-
tion exceed the agency losses, the principal will delegate a task to the 
agent. The agent can increase its benefit by minimising the cost of con-
trol; however, this increases the agent’s autonomy – that is, “the range 
of independent action that is available to [the] agent” (Hawkins et al., 
2006:  27),  and  might  in  turn  bear  the  unintended  risk  that  the  agent  
widens its room of discretion.    
PA and EU foreign policy: politics, fussy actors and complexity 
The PA approach was first applied to explain market behaviour in cases 
of contracting and – with regards to political science – in the area of US 
congressional politics (Weingast and Moran, 1983). Only from the 
1990s onwards has the approach been applied to explain agency in the 
area  of  IR  studies  and  EU  research  (see,  for  example,  Nielson  and  
Tierney, 2003; Pollack, 1997). When it comes to the EU, the vast ma-
jority of literature refers to integrated policy fields, and especially focus-
es on the discretion of Commission actors. However, first attempts 
have been made to apply the PA approach to the intergovernmental 
CFSP and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) inter alia 
looking at the role of the Council Secretariat (Dijkstra, 2011a; 
Drieskens, 2007; Klein, 2010). Application in this area is less straight-
forward, and meets several challenges that need to be addressed. 
It is important to bear in mind that the nature of EU foreign policy 
differs from the policy fields that have been the main focus of the PA 
approach so far. The traditional focus of PA studies has been on the 
assessment of regulatory policies, which are less politically sensitive and 
show a tendency for agency slack in the absence of the principal’s con-
trol. Damro (2007) concluded that distributive policies, like trade poli-
cy, are under much more scrutiny by the member states, and thus sub-
ject to tighter control. In politicised policy fields, the scope of manoeu-
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vre for the agent might be very narrow, thereby excluding it from a PA 
analysis. Academics might rather refer to the agent as a “spokesperson 
with privileges” (Damro, 2007: 900). This argument can certainly be 
transferred to an even more politicised policy field such as CFSP. On 
the other  hand,  Hawkins et  al.  (2006)  see  the act  of  delegation of  au-
thority,  as  well  as  the  ex post control, as the defining elements of the 
degree of agency, and not the context of the policy field as such. 
Elgström and Larsén (2010) came to the main conclusion that the dif-
ferent preferences of the member states provided the Commission with 
a high degree of autonomy during Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiations, which shows that agent discretion is possible even in dis-
tributive policy areas. 
Looking at policies in the area of security and conflict management – 
the ‘hard’ core of foreign policy making, the question arises in how far 
supranational agents play a role, which is more than simple representa-
tion and rule-driven implementation. Only a few scholars have tried to 
answer this question. Wagner (2003) argues, with the help of a rational-
ist institutional choice analysis, that member states have few incentives 
to delegate competencies to supranational agents in matters of crisis 
management, as their functions are not needed to realise member 
states’ preferences in times of crisis. In an analysis of the agency of the 
General Secretariat in civil and military crisis-management, Klein (2010: 
166) concluded that “agents have used their discretionary powers […] 
to pursue their own preferences as well”. Another study argued that the 
pre-Lisbon High Representative was in a PA relationship with the ro-
tating Presidency, which left – depending on the Presidency’s political 
expertise and resources – the international stage to High Representative 
Solana (Dijkstra, 2011a). Even though these studies acknowledge the 
limited scope of supranational agency in EU foreign policy, their results 
show that the application of a PA approach offers insights into the 
relationships and mechanisms between EU foreign policy actors. 
Another challenge in the application of the PA approach is to identify 
EU foreign policy agents as unitary actors with own distinct prefer-
ences. The application of the PA approach to EU foreign policy be-
comes most controversial when the supranational agents, as well as the 
principals, are modelled as actors in their own right (see Klein, 2010). 
Already concerning integrated policy fields, it is questionable as to 
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whether the European Commission can be viewed as a monolithic 
actor. It is an empirical fact that “the Commission is composed of hun-
dreds of bureaucratic sub-units and thousands of individuals” with 
different distinct policy preferences and intra-organisational struggles 
(Pollack, 2003: 36). As an attempt to overcome this empirical obstacle, 
a minimum amount of coherence between the sub-units is seen as nec-
essary for an organisation to qualify as an actor (Jupille and Caporaso, 
1998: 219). For Pollack (2003: 37), the analytical solution is thus not to 
look for a non-existent “monolithic block with uniform preferences”, 
but for organisations that “generally behave coherently and predictably 
according to a set of shared organizational preferences”. A set of 
shared organisational preferences is also a necessary assumption for any 
independent action by the agent (Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006). In sub-
stantial parts of EU foreign policy, it remains a challenge to assume 
internal coherence and distinct organisational preferences of suprana-
tional actors. Administrations such as the Council Secretariat, the 
Commission Directorate-Generals (DGs) and the new EEAS represent 
a hybrid mix of seconded national officials and international staff. The 
literature assumes that international staff tend to promote organisation-
al goals and to manifest their organisational existence (Cortell and 
Peterson, 2006); however, seconded national officials may not share the 
same preferences (Klein, 2010). Defining unitary actors on a suprana-
tional level is thus a complicated task. 
EU’s complex agency 
In addition, “complex agency” (Elsig, 2010) is a common feature of the 
EU foreign policy architecture, which can pose a problem during anal-
yses. National parliamentary systems, for example, are normally charac-
terised by a clear delegation chain. The electorate as the ‘ultimate prin-
cipal’ delegates decision-making powers to members of a parliament, 
while the parliament delegates responsibilities to an executive (see also 
Curtin, 2007). However, the multi-level system of EU governance is 
characterised by a complex set of responsibilities and accountabilities of 
different actors that earn their legitimacy via different channels. Dür 
and Elsig (2011) describe three different delegation chains in EU for-
eign economic policies. Agents that carry out foreign economic policies 
can get their delegation and legitimacy via the elected national govern-
ments represented in the Council of ministers, via the elected EP, or 
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through interest groups that directly influence activities on the EU 
level.  
At least two delegation chains can be identified for the High Repre-
sentative. First, as a representative of EU foreign policy the High Rep-
resentative represents the 28 elected governments that come together in 
the Council of ministers. The delegation chain is thus: electorate – national 
parliaments – national governments – High Representative. Second, the EP may 
represent a source of legitimacy, especially expressed by its budgetary 
powers and nomination of the High Representative as Vice-President 
of the Commission. Here, the delegation chain is: electorate – EP – High 
Representative.  
The  High  Representative  is  not  the  only  EU  actor  that  is  part  of  a  
complex delegation structure. Another example is the new non-rotating 
post of President of the European Council (Wessels and Traguth, 
2010). By nominating a President for the term of office, a number of 
principals (28 member states) entered into one contract with an agent. 
This structure was termed a “collective principal” (Lyne et al., 2006). 
The President of the European Commission has several contracts with 
principals after being nominated by qualified majority by the European 
Council and elected by the EP. In this case, the literature speaks of 
“multiple principals” (Lyne et al., 2006). The High Representative com-
bines features of both of the above-mentioned posts. This begs the 
question: Is the High Representative an actor, who has multiple princi-
pals (member states, EP, European Commission), or a collective prin-
cipal (member states), or both? 
2.2. A simplified model 
In order to avoid a conceptual overstretch of the PA approach, it is 
necessary to define a clear PA relationship for the High Representative. 
The agent in this study is defined as the High Representative. The post 
includes the High Representative’s cabinet, but not the EEAS, which is 
a separate organisational entity. This assumption follows from the pro-
visions of the Lisbon Treaty, in which the EEAS is treated as a separate 
organisational body.12 Thus, the hybrid character of the EEAS, which 
                                                   
12 In fact Art. 18 TEU on the High Representative does not mention the EEAS at all.  
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also comprises staff from the national foreign policy administrations, 
does not affect the definition of the High Representative as a distinct 
agent. It can be assumed that the post of High Representative has the 
necessary internal coherence to be treated as a separate actor.  
However, it is a challenge to define the High Representative’s princi-
pal(s). The key indicator of a principal is its ability to delegate a task to 
an agent (Hawkins et al., 2006). It seems obvious that the member 
states (or their common representation in the EU system as ‘European 
Council’ and ‘Council’) can be counted as principals of the High Repre-
sentative. Member states were in charge of the macro delegation,13 as 
they created the post of High Representative and the institutional 
framework around it. In addition, they mandate the High Representa-
tive on a day-by-day basis with the representation and planning of EU’s 
foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, the Commission and the EP also play an important role 
in the daily political interaction with the High Representative. Thus, 
one might argue that these EU institutions are additional principals of 
the High Representative, and that the post is confronted with multiple 
principals. The nomination of the High Representative after the Lisbon 
Treaty is a case in point. The European Council appoints the incum-
bent via a qualified majority and with the agreement of the (designated) 
Commission President.14 However, in order to acquire the post as Vice-
President of the Commission, the incumbent has to go through the 
same appointment procedures as the other Commissioners, with hear-
ings in the EP, which also has to confirm the whole college of Com-
missioners. In addition, the President of the European Commission 
and the EP can sanction and ‘sack’ the Vice-President of the Commis-
sion, which would make the incumbent ineligible for the role of High 
Representative  within  the  CFSP  as  well.  The  EP,  with  its  budget  and  
staffing authorities, and the Commission, with its college-principal, 
have further ways of sanctioning unwanted behaviour from the High 
Representative. A role as principals for the EP and the European 
Commission during the day-to-day decision-making can also be partly 
                                                   
13 Macro delegation refers to the writing of the basic mandate of an agent or its initial 
creation (Dür and Elsig, 2011). 
14 Art. 18 (1) TEU. 
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deduced from the literature. From a historical intuitionalist perspective, 
a greater ‘say’ of supranational actors is seen as an unintended conse-
quence during daily politics, in which “European-level decision making 
becomes both more prevalent and more complex [and it] places grow-
ing demands on the gate-keepers of member-state sovereignty” 
(Pierson, 1996: 137). 
Should we thus identify and conceptualise the EP and the European 
Commission as ‘fully-fledged’ principals? From the standpoint of sim-
plification of  the model,  and in  order  to arrive  at  a  clear-cut  PA rela-
tionship, such a conceptualisation is not desirable. It is possible to 
model the member states as the only principal.  
It is a fact that the EP has potential to supervise and sanction the High 
Representative, for example via the budget procedure or through ex-
changes of views with the members of the EP (MEPs). However, 
MEPs technically do not delegate any responsibilities to the post. The 
member states are the only actors that can define the mandate and the 
day-to-day tasks of the High Representative, for example through Eu-
ropean Council conclusions or Council conclusions on foreign policy. 
To put it bluntly, the EP may complain if the High Representative has 
not been active on a certain issue; however, the member states can 
actually delegate tasks within the scope of their competences. It remains 
open as to how the EP should be labelled from a PA perspective in the 
field of external relations. It is not yet a principal, as it is not able to 
delegate tasks to the High Representative. Neither is the EP an agent of 
the member states, as it is directly elected. The closest label that can be 
assigned to the EP is a ‘quasi principal’.  As such, the EP cannot dele-
gate tasks to the High Representative, but is already able to partly sanc-
tion unwanted behaviour, either directly, through its budgetary powers 
or by withdrawing support from the college of Commissioners, or indi-
rectly through public blaming. However, the role of the quasi principal 
will not be the focus of this study, and will only be referred to when 
necessary to paint the full empirical picture.  
A similar observation can be made regarding the Commission. Even 
though the Commission influences the discretion of the High Repre-
sentative, the Commission cannot directly delegate tasks to or control 
the High Representative. As Vice-President of the Commission, the 
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High Representative is bound to Commission rules and subject to the 
principle of collegiality among the Commissioners. Nevertheless, the 
member states made sure that the Vice-President’s post legally remains 
separate from the post of High Representative, and that the Commis-
sion does not control the foreign policy chief in terms of political activ-
ities in matters of CFSP.15 Only in terms of the Commission’s external 
relations does the President of the European Commission have au-
thority over the Vice-President, as the President has overall responsibil-
ity for the Commission’s external activities.16 This competence provides 
an interesting source of potential rivalry between the Commission Pres-
ident, the High Representative and the member states, and will be ana-
lysed further later in this study. However, at this point the Commission 
is not incorporated into the analysis as a principal of the High Repre-
sentative. The Commission and the President itself are agents of the 
member states, and their ability to delegate tasks is limited. The Euro-
pean Commission and its President will be modelled as other agents of 
the member states, which cooperate or compete with the High Repre-
sentative and thus have a positive or negative effect on the discretion of 
the High Representative (see below).  
As all 28 member states enter into a common contract with the High 
Representative (and do not have 28 individual contracts), the member 
states can be identified as the ‘collective principal’ of the High Repre-
sentative. The member states come to an agreement (based on the spe-
cific decision-making rules) and mandate the post of High Representa-
tive on the basis of one single contract.  
So far,  the different  actors  in  the EU foreign policy  architecture  have 
been modelled for the PA analysis. The next step is to define the de-
pendent and independent variables and formulate hypotheses on their 
causal relation. 
                                                   
15 See Art. 18(4) TEU: “In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and 
only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission 
procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 [implementation of 
the CFSP) and 3 [chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council].” 
16 Art. 17(1) TEU.  
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2.3. The dependent variable: level of discretion  
Level of discretion 
The study seeks to explain the conditions under which different levels 
of discretion of the High Representative arise. Discretion is thus the 
dependent variable and needs further clarification and operationalisa-
tion. Discretion is a widely used term in the PA literature; yet research-
ers have provided different definitions of the term. Hawkins et al 
(2006) described discretion as the ex ante given room of manoeuvre 
granted by the principal to the agent. It is thus something that the prin-
cipal intentionally defines in the contract with the agent, as he deems a 
scope of manoeuvre necessary for the agent to fulfil the task efficiently. 
Actions performed within this room of manoeuvre are thus not un-
wanted by the principal. Diplomats in foreign countries, for example, 
are usually left with room for discretion by their foreign ministries, as it 
is expected that they will be able to perform their job best if they adapt 
their actions to the context on the ground. This room for discretion is 
further defined by the control mechanisms that ensure compliance with 
the granted room for manoeuvring. The discretion intentionally granted 
by the principal is the “net of initial delegation minus the administrative 
and oversight mechanisms established to limit shirking” (Pollack, 2002: 
207). Huber and Shipan (2002) coined the term “deliberate discretion” 
– which will be used throughout this study – to describe the purposeful 
granted discretion of agents. 
However, agents do not always stick to this predefined and intentional-
ly granted room of manoeuvre, but might pursue their own and diverg-
ing preferences. As the agent can engage in unintentional activities, the 
concept of discretion has to be complemented by the concept of au-
tonomy.17 An agent has autonomy if it acts outside of the predefined 
scope of action and engages in unwanted behaviour that the principal 
will not, or cannot, overturn. The agent operates in a ‘zone of ac-
ceptance’, as its actions are ex ante not ruled out and ex post not sanc-
tioned, even though they do not reflect the preferences of the principal 
                                                   
17 Even though some recent authors have used the terms “discretion” and “autonomy” 
interchangeably (see, for example, Delreux, 2009), a distinction offers further conceptu-
al clarity (see Hawkins et al., 2006). 
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(Caughey et al., 2009). The agent thus engages in ‘agent drift’, meaning 
that his actions are outside the range of the principal’s preferences. If 
the High Representative has room for discretion that is not predefined 
in the mandate, and allows the incumbent to engage in autonomous 
actions, the term ‘unintended discretion’ will be used.  
Based on these theoretical considerations, the High Representative can 
have three levels of discretion in a particular situation: limited discre-
tion, deliberate discretion, or unintended discretion (see Table 2.1). 
Level of discretion Indicators 
 
Limited discretion 
 
The High Representative has no mandate to base an action 
on, or the High Representative’s mandate to perform a 
particular task does not leave any flexibility in its implemen-
tation. All details of the action of the High Representative 
are described and do not leave room for interpretation. 
Deliberate discretion The High Representative has a mandate, which leaves a 
range of potential actions to choose from. Only the aims 
and/or  guidelines  of  the  action  are  formulated;  however,  if  
the High Representative acts outside the predefined room 
for manoeuvre, the activities will be sanctioned.  
Unintended discretion The High Representative has potential room for manoeuvre 
to perform an action, which does not represent the prefer-
ence of the member states. The member states fail to sanc-
tion the actions that are not in line with their preferences. 
Table 2.1: Level of discretion 
Discretion in creation, in action and in review 
The current study places the PA relation in a dynamic framework. It is 
acknowledged that the institutional design on the supranational level is 
not fixed, but institutions are created and altered according to the de-
mand of the nation states. The discretion of a supranational agent must 
therefore be examined in the contexts of creation (does its design meet 
the preferences of the principals?), action (do its actions reflect the 
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preferences of the principals?) and review (is its institutional design 
being altered according to the preferences of the agent?) (see Figure 
2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Discretion cycle 
The argument for dynamic modelling is based on a point raised by 
Tallberg (2002). In his view, it is important not to look at different 
stages of institutional creation and their subsequent impact in isolation: 
“Why, how, and with what consequences are not three separate ques-
tions with three separate answers” (Tallberg, 2002: 24). A dynamic 
framework needs to look at the expected consequences of states when 
they create agents, the actual consequences of institutional design, and 
the positive and negative feedback loops that alter the institutional de-
sign of the agent. The case of the High Representative of the Union 
provides an opportunity to trace the question of discretion from the 
institutional creation to its review. Chapters 4 and 5 will thus look at 
the creation of the post and its supporting EEAS. Already in the crea-
tion of the post, the principal’s ability to realise its preferences is chal-
lenged. Chapter 6 looks at the discretion of the High Representative’s 
actions, and Chapter 7 examines how the experiences feed back into 
the first review of the institutional structures.  
Discretion performing different tasks 
The study faces a small n problem. As this study is focused on the post 
of High Representative of the Union, the number of cases is n=1. 
Thus, further variation is introduced by looking at the discretion of the 
High Representative in relation to task areas. Instead of looking at the 
Action
Review
Creation
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universal discretion of the High Representative over the post’s vast job 
description, the study groups the tasks of the post into functionally 
distinct areas: agenda manager, strategist, crisis manager and communi-
cator. The performance in these task areas is then analysed individually. 
A central field of analysis in the PA literature is the agent as an agenda 
manager. In the field of EU foreign policy, the member states delegate 
the task of agenda-management to supranational agents. By setting, 
managing and focusing the choice of available policy alternatives, 
agents may manage to reduce the transaction cost of international ne-
gotiations. During this process they might have discretion to shape the 
policy output (Pollack, 2003: 47ff). From this point of view, research 
understands the output of political systems as a result of a decision-
making process that follows subsequent steps of a policy cycle with an 
impact on the final output (Jann and Wegrich, 2003; Major, 2011).18  
The most obvious agenda-management power is the right to launch an 
initiative. The prime example is the sole right of initiative of the Euro-
pean Commission in most matters of integrated policy fields (former 
first pillar). The shared right of initiative of the High Representative of 
the Union also represents a treaty-based grant of authority, and as such 
a strong form of agenda-management power (Klein, 2010: 50).19 Next 
to the formal right of initiative, the literature also sees a possibility for 
“soft agenda-management” (Klein 2010, p.50) or procedural control 
(Tallberg 2006). Both the first-mover advantage of setting the agenda, 
and also the subsequent possibility to structure the agenda and exclude 
                                                   
18 The impact of the agenda-management of supranational agents is a matter of debate. 
This debate is mainly carried out regarding the legislative and constitutional politics of 
the EU. Moravcsik (1993) argued that “the scope of legislative agenda-setting power [is 
constrained] by the Council’s previous delegation of power and ultimate decision” (p. 
513). However, Pollack (2003) argued from a PA perspective that the agenda setting 
power of the European Commission in particular had a significant influence on the 
regional integration process on the continent.   
19 The right to launch an initiative is less decisive, if the initiative can easily be 
refused or changed. Pollack (2003) argued that the institutional rules governing 
the veto and amendments of initiatives are part of the institutional power to 
launch an initiative. Voting rules are decisive, and in cases of unanimity rules 
“the agenda setter loses its ability to “push through’ its proposals by majority 
vote, and with it much, if not all, of its formal agenda-setting power” (p. 49). 
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certain agenda items, are substantial parts of agenda-management. Tall-
berg (2006) argues that the ability to emphasise, de-emphasise and 
scrub items off the agenda are important elements of the procedural 
powers of institutional actors. The task area ‘agenda manager’ thus 
looks at the discretion of the High Representative over creating formal 
proposals, as well as over controlling the agenda as chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission. 
As an agenda manager, the High Representative operates on what Pe-
terson termed the “meso-level of EU decision-making” (Peterson, 
1995: 75). The study at hand also looks at the “super-systemic level” 
(Peterson, 1995: 72), which transcends the EU’s day-to-day policy pro-
cess.  On this level, the High Representative potentially acts as a strate-
gist. The discretion to make strategic decisions is in focus here; this level 
of decision-making requires discretion to make transformational deci-
sions, beyond the management of the status quo (Burns, 1978). Strate-
gic entrepreneurship involves framing the particular policy problem as 
part of a long-term development and appealing to overall goals. By 
creating or pronouncing such goals, a deadlock in decision-making can 
be overcome (Schout, 2008).20 Typical for processes in strategic deci-
sion-making is that they are far less institutionalised, and favour the 
agency of unconstrained decision-making fora, such as the European 
Council (Peterson, 2001). However, the formulation of the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) under Solana’s term as High Representative, 
which followed unconventional methods of policy formulation, can 
serve as an example (Bailes, 2005). The task description ‘strategist’ thus 
looks in particular at the High Representative’s discretion to develop 
and reinterpret the international relations of the EU and its relations 
with strategic partners.  
                                                   
20 Constructivist IR literature refers to “norm entrepreneurs” (Checkel, 1999; 
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) as actors that play an important role in the creation and 
diffusion of norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) see norm entrepreneurs as crucial 
for the development of international norms, as they name and reinterpret issues, there-
by contributing to the development of cognitive frames of what is future-appropriate 
behaviour. The task of a norm entrepreneur is thus to develop long-term strategies, or 
visions on which the group of member states can base their collective decision-making 
and action. 
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Foreign policy leaders in particular are confronted with international 
crisis situations that require them to act as crisis-managers. A crisis can be 
defined as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental 
values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly 
uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions” (Rosenthal 
et al., 1989: 10). A crisis thus comprises three elements: a threat, uncer-
tainty and urgency. Crisis management “refers to the organization, 
regulation, procedural frameworks and arrangements to contain a crisis 
and shape its future course while resolution is sought” (Blockmans and 
Wessel, 2009: 269). Boin et al. (2005) outlined five tasks within crisis-
management: identify and make sense of a crisis situation, coordinate 
decisions with stakeholders, communicate their efforts to the public, 
stabilise the situation, and provide feedback on organisational practices. 
Here,  the focus is  on the subcategory of  “external  crises” (Boin et  al.,  
2013: 8) outside the territory of the EU. The domain of external crisis-
management has received particular attention in the development of the 
foreign and security policy of the EU in the 1990s and early 2000s, with 
former EU High Representative Solana playing an influential role in 
this policy field (Major, 2011; Stahl, 2011). As Solana explained in the 
Convention on the future of Europe: “crisis management in the 21st 
century requires real-time reaction, high speed of contacts and co-
ordination, and the capacity to deploy resources flexibly and rapidly”.21 
When evaluating the High Representative’s activities as a crisis manag-
er, the discretion to swiftly coordinate decision-making and implemen-
tation of crisis instrument is in focus.  
Finally, the High Representative will be closely examined in terms of 
the posts’s function as a communicator. Positions of the Union have to be 
communicated to the outside world. In order to ensure this communi-
cation, the member states delegate the task of representing decisions or 
positions to EU-level actors. Member states in the EU may have the 
functional need to delegate their representation to an agent in various 
situations: “just like states cannot be represented by all citizens in multi-
lateral negotiations, international organizations cannot be represented 
by all constituent member states in their external relations” (Tallberg, 
2006: 28). EU-level agents have to base their communication on the 
acquis of decisions taken by the member states on a particular subject. 
                                                   
21 WD 08.  
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This regularly opens up room for the agent’s discretion, as member 
state positions miss the level of detail and allow a level of interpretation 
(Hawkins et al., 2006: 27). 
Agent’s influence on principal’s preferences 
The concept of discretion used in this study is narrow. The discretion 
of the agent is here seen as a function of the preferences of the princi-
pal, as well as of institutional and contextual variables. The agent is 
enabled and constrained by its environment, rather than by its own 
choices. A strand of PA literature, however, stipulates a more active 
role for agents. Hawkins and Jacoby (2006) identified several strategies 
that agents use to influence the principal in a way that increases their 
mandate. They refer, for instance, to the European Commission, which 
convinced the member states to broaden its mandate in the field of 
human rights. Delreux and Kerremans (2010) described how EU nego-
tiators weaken member states’ incentives to control international nego-
tiations. This significantly widens their scope of manoeuvre at the nego-
tiation table, and helps them to reach an international agreement. In 
particular, uncertainty of the principal’s preferences is seen as providing 
the possibility for agents to take control over their own mandates. Gar-
ret and Weingast (1993), with reference to decision-making situations 
with a high level of uncertainty, suggested that in situations with more 
than one possible solution, or “multiple possible equilibria” (Garret and 
Weingast, 1993), supranational agents may use their informational ad-
vantage to construct focal points around which further discussions 
evolve. The agent thus nudges the decision-making process in a favour-
able direction.  
While the insights of these studies and theoretical elaborations are fruit-
ful, agents’ strategies to influence the preferences and decisions of the 
principals are not considered in the study at hand. The preferences of 
the principals are seen as dependent variables that are exogenous to the 
model. Furthermore, it is unlikely that conditions exist in which the 
High Representative of the Union can influence the decisions of the 
principal. One of the scope conditions for the influence of an agent on 
a principal is that the agent has leverage that stems from an asymmet-
rical dependency of the principal on the agent (Hawkins and Jacoby, 
2006). However, the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy 
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gives the member states some level of choice with respect to acting 
through the common institution – or not. Member states do not neces-
sarily depend on the High Representative, and the High Representative 
has little leverage vis-à-vis the member states. Even when – for example 
in times of crisis – member states become uncertain about their prefer-
ences, it is unlikely that the supranational agent (with less bureaucratic 
resources) has a lower level of uncertainty and can use the window of 
opportunity in its favour.  
2.4. The independent variables: what conditions discretion? 
Conflicting preferences 
Theoretical approaches that explain the EU and its activities often give 
strong weight to member state preferences. For example, liberal inter-
governmentalism sees national preferences aggregated on the domestic 
level as a prime factor in explaining European integration (Moravcsik, 
1993). In addition, theorists who give stronger weight to the ‘suprana-
tional level’ of EU policy making do not try to deny the centrality of 
member state preferences. Pierson (1996) starts with member state 
preferences as the natural place to expect to find the roots of joint poli-
cy making. However, he argues, that issue density, domestic preference 
change or path dependency can lead to a situation in which gaps 
emerge between the preferences of the member states and those of the 
supranational actors. 
The PA model, applied to EU policy-making, is anchored in this line of 
thinking. PA literature in general identifies the distribution of prefer-
ences within a ‘collective principal’ as an important factor to explain the 
discretion of the agent (Lyne et al., 2006).  Applied to the EU and the 
agency of the European Commission, Pollack (1997) argues that supra-
national agents can exploit disagreements among the member states, as 
they are less likely to agree on sanctioning unfavourable agent behav-
iour. The idea is straightforward: the collective principal can only pun-
ish behaviour if it can agree on sanctions. If it cannot agree, due to 
unaligned preferences among members of the collective principal, the 
agent does not have to anticipate a punishment; thus, the agent has 
wider room for potential actions, including actions that are unwanted 
by the collective principal.  
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The challenge for researchers is to measure disagreement among the 
collective principal. What accounts for heterogeneous preferences? In 
this study, the concept of “conflicting preferences” (Pollack, 2003: 32) 
will be used. Here, the first condition for conflicting preferences will be 
the existence of contradictory positions on a particular issue within the 
collective principal.  Preferences are seen as “a set of consistently or-
dered goals or objectives […] defined […] across alternative future 
states of the world” (Moravcsik, 1993: 481). Members of the collective 
principal define their position before they interact with each other and try 
to aggregate their preferences.  
However, the static condition of the existence of contradictory posi-
tions within the collective principal is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition. Looking solely at the positions before the member states try 
to aggregate their preferences underestimates their ability and flexibility 
to arrive at a strong common position regardless. In particular, the 
application of bargaining and negotiation analysis to the cooperation 
within the Union has shown that member states are capable of aggre-
gating even unaligned preferences, as they have varying levels of prefer-
ence intensity, and engage in coalition-building and issue linkage 
(Moravcsik, 1993). The essence of the argument is that contradictory 
preferences do not automatically lead to a failure to agree, but that the 
threat of non-agreement, weak preferences of some member states, and 
the  creation  of  ‘package  deals’  allow  the  member  states  to  arrive  at  a  
common position. Several well-developed empirical accounts exist of 
how member states apply strategies to aggregate their preferences 
(Elgström and Jönson, 2005; Moravcsik, 1998; Tallberg, 2006): for 
example, smaller member states side with larger member states on cer-
tain issues, as they do not have strong preferences on certain issues; 
alternatively, member states agree to a compromise, as they anticipate 
that the favour will be returned on other issues, or in future negotia-
tions. Due to their ability to aggregate their preferences, member states 
can sanction agents’ unwanted behaviour in spite of contradictory posi-
tions. The second condition for conflicting preferences is thus that 
member states fail to overcome their different positions. The failure of 
the aggregation process is therefore a necessary indicator of conflicting 
preferences.  
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Perspective on prefer-
ences 
Condition Indicators 
Static, pre-strategic Members of the collective 
principal have different 
positions on a specific issue 
At least two member states 
can be assigned with contra-
dicting positions. 
Dynamic, strategic Members of the collective 
principal fail to aggregate 
their preferences 
Member states do not engage 
or succeed in brokering a 
common position vis-à-vis 
the agent, involving coalition-
building and issue linkage.   
Table 2.2: Conditions and indicators for conflicting preferences 
 If both conditions are met, the collective principal has conflicting pref-
erences. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The discretion of a supranational agent is conditioned by the preferences of the 
collective principal. In cases where the collective principal has conflicting preferences, 
the agent does not have to anticipate sanctioning of its behaviour, leaving the agent 
with unintended discretion.  
Note that the above hypothesis only applies to tasks that have already 
been delegated to the agent. If there is yet no mandate for the agent, 
and no delegation has taken place, a failure of the collective principal to 
aggregate its preferences leads to a failure of delegation. For example, if 
the member states do not agree on a common position in relation to an 
international event, the High Representative will receive no mandate 
and will be unable to represent the member states.  
Control and oversight mechanisms 
The collective principal is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, it 
needs to grant the agent sufficient scope of manoeuvre in order to carry 
out its task efficiently; on the other, the collective principal wants to 
avoid costs stemming from unwanted behaviour. Therefore, the collec-
tive principal has to invest in control mechanisms in order to avoid the 
agent ‘running loose’. This is done during the design of the mandate 
(‘ex ante’), while the agent is carrying out its tasks (‘ongoing’) and in the 
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decision phase, when the principal accepts the result and makes a deci-
sion about prolonging the contract (‘ex post’). 
Ex ante, the principal defines “the scope of agency activity, the legal 
instruments available to the agency, and the procedures it must follow” 
(Pollack, 1997: 108). In this way, the principal determines the level of 
discretion the agent has. The principal can either give detailed ‘rule-
based’ instruction on how to carry out the mandate, or grant more dis-
cretion to the agent by merely defining the goals, without specifying 
how to achieve them (Hawkins et al., 2006: 27). Another means of ex 
ante control is to screen and select an appropriate agent that ideally 
mirrors the preferences of the principal. In EU foreign policy, the 
member states have several possibilities for ex ante control of the EU-
level agents. Member states decide on the design, scope, mandate, 
budget and staffing of EU-level agents such as the High Representative 
or special representatives. These agents can only become active if such 
a decision is made by the member states. It is explicitly stated in the 
treaties that CFSP is “defined and implemented by the European 
Council and the Council acting unanimously”.22 The “strategic interests 
and objectives” of the EU’s external relations are defined by the Euro-
pean Council.23 
On an ongoing basis, the principal monitors the agent during the 
course of the action (Busuioc, 2009; Delreux and Kerremans, 2010). 
This can take place through direct observation of the activity, or meet-
ings with the principal during the action phase. Supervising the activi-
ties of the agent prevents the development of informational asymme-
tries between the agent and the principal, which the former could use 
to its own advantage (Vaubel, 2006). These considerations have been 
applied  to  study  the  EU’s  international  activities.  In  the  case  of  trade  
negotiations, the EU negotiator is monitored through participation in 
international meetings, as well as coordination and committee meetings 
(Delreux and Kerremans, 2010). Specifically, the role of the permanent 
member state delegations in Brussels and the constant interaction in 
working groups (WGs) has to be highlighted. The Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) is the ‘linchpin’ in the field of CFSP: through the 
                                                   
22 Art. 24 (1) TEU. 
23 Art. 22 TEU. 
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committee the member states not only coordinate their positions, but 
also monitor the activities of the EU-level agents (Duke, 2005; Juncos 
and Reynolds, 2007). In addition, the meetings of the permanent am-
bassadors to the EU (the Comité des Représentants Permanents 
(Committee of Permanent Representatives), or Coreper) are important 
in the control of institutional and horizontal issues of EU foreign poli-
cy. Furthermore, staff rotating from the foreign ministries into the bu-
reaucracies in Brussels and abroad makes the agents’ activities transpar-
ent to the member state capitals (Klein, 2010).  
Ex post, the principal has the potential to apply positive or negative 
sanctions (Pollack, 1997). This can include rejection of the results ob-
tained, such as international negotiation outcomes (Delreux and 
Kerremans, 2010), or limitation of the budget and the prolonging of the 
contract  (Hawkins  et  al.,  2006:  30).  Here,  the  member  states  decide  
whether to accept the task carried out by the agent. For example, mem-
ber states have to ratify international agreements24 and decide on initia-
tives developed by the High Representative upon request.25 In addition, 
the mandate of the High Representative can be terminated, and needs 
to be prolonged after it ends automatically after five years. In the multi-
annual framework, member states decide how much budget to grant for 
the next programme period. While these institutional and procedural 
mechanisms of control theoretically allow for a rather costly way of 
monitoring the actions of the High Representative, member states 
might also exert control via a system of so-called “fire alarms” 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 166). The idea is that actions within 
the room of unintended discretion by the High Representative, such as 
unauthorised comments or controversial initiatives, trigger ‘fire-alarms’ 
in form of, for example, media coverage or parliamentary debates. The 
agent anticipates the political costs resulting from ‘alarms’ and adheres 
to actions within its deliberately granted room of discretion.  
It follows that the member states’ toolkit for ex-post sanctions is espe-
cially differentiated. One can roughly distinguish between formal and 
informal sanction mechanisms. Formal sanction mechanisms are de-
termined by the treaties and focused on the formal contracting between 
                                                   
24 Art. 218 TEC. 
25 Art. 31 TEU. 
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the member states as the collective principal and their agent, the High 
Representative.  Formal sanctions, which imply decision-making in the 
Council, mostly include harsh measures, such terminating the mandate 
or altering the budget. They can also include the rejection of proposals 
for a CFSP decision. Decision-making rules play a dominant role, as 
they formally stipulate the majority needed to sanction the High Repre-
sentative’s behaviour.  
Informal sanction mechanisms, however, do not have their basis in the 
formal rules, but aim at ex-post questioning of the legitimacy of the High 
Representatives behaviour. Member states have the possibility to dis-
tance themselves from statements or activities of the High Representa-
tive. Furthermore, they have the possibility to act unilaterally outside 
the EU framework, for example through own diplomatic missions. As a 
consequence, the High Representative costs lie in the loss of reputation. 
In contrast to formal mechanisms, informal sanction mechanisms can 
more easily be deployed by single member states as well, if their clout 
on the specific issue is significant. Hence, while ex post sanctioning via 
‘blaming and evading’ is less formal, it may still lead to tight control of 
the agent’s activities.  
 Ex ante  Ongoing Ex post 
Tight  
 
Rule-based, detailed  
mandate defining 
task and implemen-
tation 
The collective prin-
cipal is present in the 
implementation 
Each member of 
the collective 
principal can 
sanction unwanted 
behaviour by the 
agent 
Loose Mandate defines 
basic tasks and goals, 
but no details on 
how to reach them 
The agent has to 
report regularly to 
the collective princi-
pal 
Only a majority of 
members of the 
principal can 
sanction unwanted 
behaviour by the 
agent 
Table 2.3: Indicators for control and oversight mechanisms 
All in all, many possibilities exist in terms of sanctioning the agent’s 
behaviour. In Table 2.3, for each of the three dimensions of control (ex 
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ante, ongoing and ex post), an indicator is assigned for what accounts 
‘tight’ or ‘loose’ control and oversight mechanisms.  
The following hypothesis is thus proposed: 
H2: The discretion of a supranational agent is conditioned by control and oversight 
mechanisms that monitor its activities. In cases where the collective principal installs 
loose ex- ante, ongoing and ex-post control and oversight mechanisms, the agent has 
unintended discretion over its activities.  
Time pressure 
The interaction between the principal and the agent does not take place 
in a vacuum. One critical contextual factor that potentially influences 
the discretion of an agent is the time pressure under which the delega-
tion and control by the principal takes place. Time pressure leads to 
imperfect delegation and control, and can lead to unintended discre-
tion. 
Delreux and Kerremans (2010) identified this logic when they analysed 
EU negotiators in multilateral negotiations. EU negotiators present the 
position on the basis of a mandate of the ‘133 committee’, which con-
sists of member state representatives. The time pressure of the interna-
tional negotiations often leaves the member state representatives with 
little time to discuss the various details. By the time the EU negotiator 
has to go back to the negotiation table, the mandate may be lacking 
details,  thus  leaving  wider  room for  discretion.  Moravcsik  (1993)  sees  
particular room for enhanced supranational agency if member states 
with conflicting preferences face time pressure. With member states 
being in need of an agreement, they are more prone to compromise and 
except increased agent discretion. The indicator for time pressure is the 
existence of an approaching deadline. The hypothesis for time pressure 
is: 
H3: The discretion of a supranational agent is conditioned by the time pressure of 
the decision-making context. In cases where the collective principal is under time 
pressure to arrive at a decision, it will not have enough time to formulate all details 
of the mandate, and will thus leave the agent with deliberate discretion.  
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Agent interaction 
So far the relation between the collective principal and the agent has 
been seen in isolation from the complex institutional framework that 
their activities are nested in. However, as already discussed above, the 
process  and  structures  are  often  less  ‘tidy’  than  a  simple  PA  model  
could replicate. In the case of EU foreign policy, for example, the bu-
reaucratic structure is much more complex, with different bureaucratic 
actors assigned to implement various tasks under specific decision-
making and control regimes.26 The explanatory power of the study can 
be increased if additional complexity is introduced to the analytical 
model. To that end, interaction with other supranational agents is in-
cluded as an additional variable that explains the agent’s discretion.  
The argument developed here on the effects of interaction between 
supranational agents is inspired by the bureaucratic politics approach 
(Allison and Halperin, 1972; Allison, 1971; Downs, 1966). Instead of 
looking at the political administration of a nation state as one unitary 
actor, this approach focuses on competing or cooperating bureaucratic 
actors within an administration, and on their opposing organisational 
interests, varying resources, and accesses to the decision-making pro-
cess. Insights from the bureaucratic politics approach add another im-
portant dimension to the study at hand. Control and oversight mecha-
nisms are important to assess the constraints of the agent by the princi-
pal. However, here the focus is on the constraints of the agent at the 
supranational level, in the context of bureaucratic politics in Brussels.27 
Central to the argument is the fact that a government’s (or, here, the 
bureaucracy in Brussels) actions arise as the result of a bargaining pro-
cess between different bureaucratic actors with different levels of pow-
er and resources to influence the outcome (Allison and Halperin, 1972: 
42). The formal and informal rules of the process have an influence on 
the ability of the actors to get their position through in the process 
                                                   
26 For an overview, see Vanhoonacker (2011). 
27 On the use of the bureaucratic politics approach in a principal-agent framework and 
the application to the analysis of different EU actors in crisis management see Klein 
(2010: 43–45). 
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(Halperin and Clapp, 2006: 105–111). Agent interaction can thereby 
have an enabling and restrictive effect on discretion.  
Agent competition has a restrictive effect on the High Representative. 
If the High Representative is in competition with the Commission as 
the other EU-level agent, each of the supranational agents will restrict 
the other’s range of possible actions. Klein (2010) termed this phenom-
enon “horizontal control”, and specified that it stems from overlapping 
and ambiguous defined competences of two supranational agents.28  
Nevertheless, agent interaction can also have an enabling effect, thus 
providing the agents with unintended discretion. Research on EU 
agents has shown that they possess a common set of preferences, 
which is directed at the deepening of the European integration process 
and transforms agents into “engines of European Integration” (Pollack, 
2003). According to this argument, supranational agents have a genuine 
preference to widen their area of competence. In particular, Pollack 
(2003: 389) found that the Commission used its powers to extend the 
scope of its own in negotiations with the member states. For the analy-
sis here, it is thus suggested that – in the absence of overlapping com-
petences or diverging preferences – agents will cooperate with the aim 
of widening their competences on a specific matter. To that end, they 
will use possibilities of cooperation that enhance their position in rela-
tion to the member states. For example, the Commission and the High 
Representative can increase the costs of member state control by ac-
tively limiting the possibility of oversight with respect to their activities 
and coordination.  
Agent interaction Indicators 
Competition Overlapping competences between the agents and diverging 
preferences 
Cooperation Clearly defined division of competences between the agents or 
converging preferences 
Table 2.4: Indicators for agent interaction 
                                                   
28 In that case, the analysis concentrated on the Commission services and the Council 
Secretariat in the field of EU crisis management. 
66     The constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy 
 
 
In order to simplify the analysis, the focus here will be on the interac-
tion between the European Commission and the High Representative, 
supported by the EEAS. The following hypothesis will be tested:  
H4: The discretion of a supranational agent is conditioned by its interaction with 
other agents, as follows: 
a) In cases where there is competition among the agents, the agents will not 
have the discretion that they were deliberately granted by the principal. 
b) In cases where there is cooperation among the agents, the agents will have 
unintended discretion. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined how the PA approach can be applied to analyse 
the post of High Representative of the Union. The chapter presented a 
new perspective to evaluate the potentials of the post. Based on previ-
ous literature, the PA framework had to be applied to the foreign policy 
structures  of  the  EU.  The  High  Representative  was  defined  as  the  
agent, while the member states were identified as the collective princi-
pal. In the context of this study, the European Commission will be 
treated as another agent of the member states. 
The discretion of the High Representative is the dependent variable. 
‘Limited discretion’ refers to a situation in which the agent either re-
ceives no mandate or no flexibility in the implementation of the man-
date. If the collective principal intentionally grants discretion to the 
agent to allow for an efficient implementation of the mandate, the term 
‘deliberate discretion’ will be used. Finally, the agent can also gain ‘unin-
tended discretion’ if the actions are not in line with the preferences of 
the collective principal. 
Four independent variables are defined that determine the discretion of 
the High Representative. Conflicting preferences of the members of the 
collective principal prevent the principal from sanctioning unintended 
behaviour as their relation to the agent is built on a single contract. In 
case of an existing mandate, changing the contract and thus sanctioning 
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the behaviour is difficult for the collective principal if faced with con-
flicting preferences, leaving the agent with unintended discretion. Con-
trol and oversight mechanisms of the collective principal ensure that 
the agent does not overstep its mandate. If only loosely controlled 
through the definition of the mandate, ongoing oversight and demand-
ing sanctioning criteria, the agent might realise preferences that are not 
in line with those of the collective principal. Time pressure is another 
variable that constrains the collective principal’s ability to realise its 
preferences as the principal is forced to leave aspects concerning the 
implementation of the mandate open in order to arrive swiftly at an 
agreement. As the agent is part of a wider bureaucratic system, it relies 
on the interaction with other agents, in order to realise its preferences. 
While cooperation with other agents increases the agent’s discretion by 
putting the collective principal in an unfavourable position, agent com-
petition has a negative effect on agents’ discretion. 
By focusing on these particular conditions the theoretical framework 
suggests that the treaty provisions that grant institutional powers to the 
High Representative do not fully condition the agency of the post. The 
discretion of the post is determined by the ability of the member state 
to agree on, and control, EU foreign policy. These variables – prefer-
ence distribution, control and oversight mechanisms, time pressure and 
agent interaction – condition the discretion of the new post in specific 
situations. Under certain conditions, the High Representative has little 
say on the conduct of the EU’s foreign policy, and its institutional 
powers of inter alia being the CFSP Presidency and sitting in the Euro-
pean Commission remain dead treaty letters. But before we go into the 
empirical investigation of the thesis, the next chapter discusses the 
methodology used for the analysis. 

 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The analysis of the post of High Representative is constrained by a 
small n problem. By definition, the analysis of the new Lisbon Treaty 
post is limited to the only available case of the first office-holder’s term, 
between 2009–2014. Given the unique construction of the post, and, 
more generally, of the EU as a regional organisation, the post cannot 
easily be compared to other foreign policy actors. The chapter thus 
suggests a methodology that increases the trustworthiness and credibil-
ity of the results through structured engagement with the single case at 
hand. This is achieved by looking into several embedded cases that 
offer variance in the identified factors of interest, obtaining additional 
insights through expert interviews, using process-tracing to reveal caus-
al relationships within cases, and a structured approach to analyse the 
qualitative data. 
3.1. Case study design 
An embedded case study design 
The case selection is an integral step in the research design, and should 
“provide the kind of control and variation required by the research 
problem” (George and Bennett, 2005: 83). The study used an embed-
ded multiple-cases design. As defined by the research question, the case 
that this study explores is the post of High Representative of the Un-
ion. However, if only an holistic view on the High Representative is 
taken, the research bears the risk “that the entire case study may be 
conducted at an unduly abstract level” (Yin, 2009: 50). Yin (2009) rec-
ommends splitting the case, when possible,  into several embedded 
units.  This  suggestion was taken up in  this  study,  so that  the research 
focuses on several embedded cases within the case of the High Repre-
sentative.29 These embedded cases add variation in the analysed varia-
                                                   
29 Note that the embedded units do not have to be embedded cases. The approach taken 
here differs from the embedded case study approach described by Yin (2009), insofar as 
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bles, and thus help to make statements about the causal relationship of 
the main case.  
The selection of the embedded cases is theory-driven, and thus closely 
linked to the dependent variable ‘discretion’.30 The discretion of an 
agent can be more closely evaluated in the creation of its office, during 
the actions that it carries out, and when its office is being reviewed. In 
addition, the High Representative has different task areas, which allows 
for further variation within the single case. These task areas were identi-
fied above as agenda manager, strategist, crisis manager and communi-
cator. Table 3.1 provides an overview on the six embedded cases se-
lected according to these criteria. Each case thereby represents an act of 
delegation, or failed delegation, that matches the task area.  
 
In  
creation 
In action 
In review 
Agenda  
manager Strategist Crisis manager Communicator 
Embed-
ded case 
Setting up 
the EEAS 
CFSP  
Presidency 
Strategic doctrine 
of the EU 
 
For example, 
European Coun-
cil Conclusion, 
September 2010 
Response to 
Libya crisis 
Statements and 
declarations 
Review of 
the EEAS 
Act of 
delega-
tion 
Art 27(3) 
TEU 
Art 18 
(2&3) TEU 
No specific 
delegation 
Article 18(2) 
TEU 
Council 
decision 
on EEAS, 
July 2010 
Table 3.1: Embedded cases 
Two other criteria ensured that the case selection was appropriate. 
First, the embedded cases selected are all comparable, as they are all 
“instances […] of only one phenomenon” (George and Bennett, 2005: 
69).  All  of  the  embedded  cases  share  the  common  feature  that  they  
represent a case of delegation of a task from the EU member states to 
                                                                                                            
Yin divides the case into several embedded units of analysis. However, both approaches 
arguably have a positive effect on the internal validity of the case study.  
30 As George and Bennett (2005: 83) argue, a selection of cases that is guided by a prior 
defined analytical framework is a valid approach.  
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the High Representative. This criterion of comparability excluded other 
potentially very interesting cases, such as the negotiations that the High 
Representative conducts with Iran about its nuclear programme on 
behalf of E3+3. However, here, the principals are the ‘EU big three’ 
(Germany, France and Britain), plus the other permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which makes this case 
less comparable.31  
Second, the selected embedded cases, though comparable, have a cer-
tain degree of variance. The embedded cases all represent very different 
activities of the High Representative: from setting up an administration, 
to issuing statements and declarations. After an initial round of inter-
views and a survey of the literature on the topic, the cases promised to 
provide a diversity of values regarding the dependent and independent 
variables under scrutiny. Thus, the selection of the embedded cases also 
fulfils the requirements of the diverse case method (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008), which seeks to replicate the full variation of the overall 
population of possible cases. Based on preliminary findings, the High 
Representative, for example, had limited discretion in the response to 
the crisis in Libya, while interviewees identified unintended discretion 
during the setting up of the EEAS. The independent variables also vary 
across the embedded cases. The early analysis showed that member 
states set up different levels of control: they rather loosely controlled 
the strategic partnership review, but in the case of Libya closely moni-
tored the unfolding situation. Variation can also be found for other 
independent variables, as time pressure, preference distribution and 
cooperation with the Commission seemed, in a preliminary analysis, to 
vary from case to case.  
                                                   
31 The High Representative conducts the Iran nuclear talks on behalf of Germany, 
France, the UK, the US, China and Russia. The institutional structure of the EU is used 
in various ways. The Political Director and the Strategic Unit of the EEAS are involved 
in the preparation of the talks, and stay in touch with the political directors of the 
national foreign ministries. Other EU member states are occasionally consulted via the 
PSC. However, other member states have limited control and are not represented by 
the High Representative (#42, Meier, 2013). 
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3.2. Expert interviews 
A total of 52 expert interviews were held in Brussels and in two of the 
member state capitals (Table 3.2. See also research notes in Appendix 
I). 
 
Commission EEAS EP 
Council, 
European 
Council 
Member 
states Total 
11 17 7 3 14 52 
Table 3.2: Interviewees and their affiliation (see Appendix I b) for more detail) 
The purposive sampling method was used for the interviews. Within 
this method, the goal is not necessarily to achieve a representative sam-
ple of a target population, but to study a diverse and limited number of 
observations guided by the purpose of the study (Johnson and 
Reynolds, 2012: 239). Similarly, in the study at hand the goal was not to 
interview a representative sample of all experts that take part in the 
process of EU foreign policy making following the Lisbon Treaty. Ra-
ther, the selection was guided by the research question, so that officials, 
ambassadors and MEPs from different bodies, member states and par-
ties were considered vital to evaluate the issue at hand. To further ex-
plore the target population, snowball sampling (Crossman, 2006) was 
used; this enabled the interviewees to suggest other valuable peers that 
could provide additional information on the subject. While snowball 
sampling is a useful approach to explore hidden populations,32 it might 
lead to bias in the selection of interviewees, as the researcher might be 
referred only to those within the close network of the person inter-
viewed. In order to minimise bias in the sample, a certain degree of 
representativeness in the selection was accounted for. For example, 
MEPs from the major political groupings in the EP, and representatives 
from ‘big’ as well as ‘small’ member states, were interviewed. The inter-
                                                   
32 Officials and diplomats working on EU foreign policy are not necessarily hidden. 
However, the identification of relevant interviewees is often difficult, given the complex 
structures of the EU.  
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views were partly carried out in connection with a study being conduct-
ed by the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels (Helwig et al., 
2013), within which three researchers (including the author of this 
study) carried out the interviews. 
The following units of investigation were identified as important for the 
evaluation of the research question: 
Commission EEAS EP 
European 
Council/ 
Council 
Member states 
General Secre-
tariat 
DG DEVCO 
DG ECHO 
DG Trade 
DG Enlarge-
ment 
Foreign Policy 
Instruments 
Service 
HR/VP 
Cabinet 
Corporate 
Board 
Political 
Affairs De-
partment 
Managing 
Directors 
Working 
Group Chairs 
Foreign Af-
fairs Commit-
tee 
(focus on 
MEPs of 
EPP, S&D, 
ALDE, 
Greens) 
General Secre-
tariat  
Cabinet of the 
President 
DG C – 
Foreign Af-
fairs, En-
largement and 
Civil Protec-
tion 
PSC 
Political Af-
fairs Depart-
ments in 
capitals (focus 
on Germany, 
Finland) 
Note: DG DEVCO = Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – Eu-
ropeAid (Commission); DG ECHO = Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection (Commission); EPP = European People’s Party (European Parliament); 
S&D = Socialists and Democrats (European Parliament); ALDE = Alliance of Liber-
als and Democrats for Europe (European Parliament). 
Table 3.3: Purposive sample of interview units 
The expert interviews followed a semi-structured questionnaire and 
were carried out between 2011 and 2013 (for more information on the 
construction of the questionnaire, see Appendix I). 
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3.3. Process tracing 
The case studies were conducted using a ‘causes-of-effects’ approach, 
which is directed at explaining the outcome of a small number of cases. 
As Bennett and Elman (2006) explain, causes-of-effects approaches “do 
not look for the net effect of a cause over a large number of cases, but 
rather how causes interact in the context of a particular case or a few 
cases to produce an outcome.” Process tracing is a common method by 
which to look for causal relations within a case (Bennett and Elman, 
2006).  George  and  Bennett  (2005:  206)  defined  process  tracing  as  a  
method that attempts “to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable 
(or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” It is not the 
number of cases, observations or independent variables that is im-
portant, but rather how the evidence in the particular case matches up 
against alternative explanations.  
The design used here thus differed from a quasi-experimental design, in 
which the different cases are treated akin to experiments, while varia-
bles and context are treated as if they can be controlled (Gerring, 2007). 
The research at hand started by acknowledging the complexity of the 
‘reality’ of the decision-making processes and the existence of a high 
number of factors that led to a particular outcome. The previous chap-
ter already deduced potential causal processes from the existing litera-
ture that connect a number of independent variables with the level of 
discretion of the High Representative. By tracing the processes that led 
from the independent variables to the resulting level of discretion, the 
developed hypotheses could be tested and, if necessary, refined.  
The causal process was aggregated from what Collier et al. (2004) call 
‘causal process observations’ which they define as an “insight or a piece 
of data that provides information about a context or mechanism” (p. 
252). The aim of the research was to connect causal process observa-
tions to a closed causal chain between the dependent and the inde-
pendent variable. This process can take different forms. The simplest 
form is a linear causal process, in which a series of observations links 
together to form a closed chain (see Figure 3.1, a). However, as George 
and Bennett (2005: 206) stated, “many or most phenomena in interna-
tional relations […] are characterized by more complex causality, for 
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which the concept of linearity is misplaced.” Thus, they mention addi-
tional forms that a process can take. A convergent process occurs when 
several observations lead to one outcome, and thus several paths join 
into one (see  Figure  3.1,  b).  A third form is  an interactive  process,  in  
which “two causal variables interact and are not independent of each 
other” (George and Bennett, 2005: 212). The outcome of the interac-
tion determines the future path (see Figure 3.2, c).  
 
Figure 3.1: Different forms of processes (based on George and Bennett, 2005: 
212) 
The processes, if traced carefully, can be summarised in a diagram. 
Gerring (2007) promotes this approach. He also admits that there is 
always a level of interpretation on the part of the researcher, and that 
the identification of steps and causal processes is a matter of judgment: 
“the same causal process might be diagrammed in different ways” 
(Gerring, 2007: 181). Nevertheless, “a diagram is a useful heuristic, 
forcing the author to make a precise and explicit statement of her ar-
gument” (Gerring, 2007: 182). One way of visualising a process was put 
forward by Mahony (1999, p. 1166) who visualised the process that led 
to the breakdown of the French state. A similar approach to visualising 
the process was used in this study. An example can be found in Ap-
pendix I.  
3.4. Qualitative Content Analysis 
The process within each of the analysed embedded cases is a chain of 
causal process observations. But how was the data collected, reduced 
and sorted in order to capture the complex ‘reality’ of a causal process? 
The study used methods of QCA to get from a large text-based dataset 
to explanations of causal processes. QCA can be defined as “a research 
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method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data 
through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying 
themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278). Thus, one essen-
tial characteristic of this approach is that it cannot be conducted with-
out a level of interpretation on the part of the researcher. As Hsieh & 
Shannon (2005) point out, the process “goes beyond merely counting 
of words” (p. 1278), since it requires the researcher to infer meaning 
from both explicit and inferred communication.  
Given the theory-guided nature of this research, the content analysis is 
directed by the theoretical framework of the study. Mayring (2010) 
describes this approach as deductive category application. Here, the 
researcher approaches the material with predictions about the variables 
of interest, and their causal connections. However, an initial scheme for 
the interpretation does not mean that the researcher must be blind to 
additional explanations, themes and causal relationships stemming from 
the material. Researchers can combine deductive and inductive ap-
proaches, and thereby refine their initial categories and understandings 
(see Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  
Based  on  the  advice  of  Mayring  (2010),  as  well  as  Gläser  and  Laudel  
(2011), the following multi-step approach was taken in the present 
study (see Figure 3.2). The overall material on the subject of interest 
was very broad, and included interviews, secondary literature, official 
documents, as well videos of public speeches, interviews and hearings. 
In cases were the material was not yet written down, a written version 
of the relevant content was produced.  The first step was to identify the 
relevant data from the large amount of information at hand. For exam-
ple, the interviews included a lot of unnecessary data, such as answers 
to introductory questions, which tended to be purposefully broad and 
often did not provide additional information. Another example relates 
to data from European Council conclusions: while the heads of states 
or government usually cover a broad agenda, only a few passages or 
even sentences were related to the research question.  
The step of selecting the material should not be underestimated; as 
Gläser  and  Laudel  (2011)  note  the  first  step  is  already  subject  to  the  
interpretation of the researcher. Overall, the material was selected based 
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on the research question and theoretical considerations (such as the 
variables that were of interest). 
 
Figure 3.2: Qualitative Content Analysis (author’s own compilation based 
on Gläser and Laudel, 2011) 
The second step was to structure the relevant data. In order to do this, 
codes were attached to the various pieces of information, with similar 
pieces of relevant data labelled with matching categories. For this pur-
pose, the QCA software NVivo 10 was used to organise larger collec-
tions of data. NVivo made it possible to organise and retrieve qualita-
tive data in a structured way. Within the programme, text-based materi-
al was tagged with codes, which assigned categories to specific pieces of 
information. After this coding process, the software was able to display 
all information within a specific category across all sources in an over-
view.  
78     The constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy 
 
 
In  the  third  step,  the  structured  data  was  used  to  identify  causal  pro-
cesses, by ‘stitch’ together the process observations to chains of events. 
Via NVivo, different accounts from different sources were aggregated 
and compared in order to develop a comprehensive picture of the pro-
cesses. At the same time, ‘black spots’ in the data were revealed, which 
led to more material being collected – that is, relevant information be-
ing sought from the secondary literature, or additional interviews being 
conducted. Once this step was completed, the researcher had an ac-
count of a process; to some extent, this was conditioned by the availa-
ble material, the interpretation of the researcher, and the theoretical 
perspective taken.  
In the last step, this account of the process was subject to a process of 
peer debriefing in order to increase the trustworthiness of the results, 
and decrease the risk of bias in the interpretation. The concept of peer 
debriefing goes back to Lincoln and Guba (1985), and was developed in 
order to enhance the credibility of qualitative research. It allows peers 
that are not directly involved in the research study to critically assess 
the researcher’s methodology, findings and interpretations, and to test 
them against alternative hypotheses. The peers included those from the 
research community, as well as practitioners during later rounds of 
interviews (an overview of presentations of research results can be 
found in Appendix I). This step was helpful, in order to further avoid a 
biased interpretation of the material. The research results are presented 
in the following chapters.   
 
 
4. The making of the High Representative 
 
At  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first  century,  Europe  was  “at  a  cross-
roads” (European Council, 2001). The intergovernmental conferences 
(IGCs) preceding the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties con-
structed a complex ‘temple’ that constituted the design of the EU insti-
tutional architecture. In the area of foreign policy in particular, the Un-
ion was split between pillars and policy-making procedures that ham-
pered Europe’s global ambitions. In addition, the community of states 
was scheduled to incorporate a large number of new entries to the 
‘club’ from the east and south in 2004. A need for simplification of the 
institutional structure seemed imminent, and was combined with expec-
tations that it would enable the European idea to be reconnected with 
its citizens. 
At the same time, a complex administrative structure had grown in 
Brussels around the office of the High Representative for the CFSP. 
Unsurprisingly, the reorganisation of the EU foreign policy architecture 
was high on the agenda of the Convention of the future of Europe33 
that took place in 2002/2003. Would the delegates from the member 
state governments and the European and national parliaments be suc-
cessful in their ambition to simplify the EU’s foreign policy and make it 
more effective? 
4.1. The Amsterdam High Representative for the CFSP 
The history of the High Representative of the Union starts at the 1997 
IGC, which led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. For the first time, the 
member states considered installing a permanent representative for 
their CFSP. The proposal came from the French; the initial idea was to 
create an office for a high profiled and independent ‘Mr CFSP’ outside 
of the existing structures. However, other member states were more 
cautious, and wanted to strengthen the post of Council Secretary-
                                                   
33 In the following, this is also referred to as the ‘European Convention’ or ‘Conven-
tion’. 
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General in the preparation and implementation of foreign policy deci-
sions (McDonagh, 1998: 116). Among the latter groups was Germany, 
which wanted to make sure that the new post would be embedded in 
the existing institutional framework (Dijkstra, 2011b). Eventually, the 
Amsterdam Treaty established a double hat: the Secretary-General of 
the Council would also function as the High Representative for CFSP 
and support the rotating Presidency on foreign affairs.  
The Treaty lines still left room for discussion. Should the incumbent be 
a diplomat with the focus of heading the Council Secretariat, or a poli-
tician, with the profile to significantly increase Europe’s visibility in the 
world? While France apparently had former President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing in mind for the job (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999: 64), 
Britain wanted a low-key bureaucrat (Dijkstra, 2011b). Speculation on 
the personality question came to an end after the 1998 Vienna Europe-
an Council called for “a personality with a strong political profile”.34 
The 1999 Cologne European Council appointed Javier Solana, former 
Secretary-General of NATO and Spanish foreign minister, as the High 
Representative for CFSP. The escalation of the crisis in the Western 
Balkans prompted the member states to choose a foreign policy chief 
with good high-level international contacts and experience.  
A policy planning and early warning unit (in general and in the follow-
ing referred to as ‘policy unit’) supported the new EU foreign policy 
chief in its work. A co-author of the draft declaration on the policy unit 
admitted that it was “designed to play a role, somewhat akin to that of 
the Commission in relation to normal Community business, in address-
ing issues and in identifying policy options from a European perspec-
tive” (McDonagh, 1998: 116).  One goal of setting up the unit was “to 
ensure full coherence with the Union’s external economic and devel-
opment policies.”35 To that end, the policy unit needed to establish 
appropriate contacts with the Commission. The policy unit had the task 
of assessing common policies in general, as well as analysing sudden 
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(Hill and Smith, 2000: 182ff). 
35 Amsterdam Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning 
unit. 
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international events for the Presidency and the High Representative, 
which were presented inter alia in policy option papers. 
The staffing and organisation of the policy unit has received heightened 
scholarly attention (for example Dijkstra, 2011b; Duke, 2011). In order 
to construct the unit, staff was drawn from the Council Secretariat, 
member states, and Commission, as well as the WEU Secretariat. In the 
early years, the seconded nation diplomats proved to be an important 
source of information and a valuable means of communication with the 
member states. They were usually appointed to a senior level and had 
high-level contacts back home; in addition, still hooked into their na-
tional diplomatic networks, they had access to intelligence from their 
delegations around the world. The declaration of the Amsterdam Trea-
ty on the policy unit stated that the member states should support the 
unit with “relevant information, including confidential information”.36 
Though probably never intended to such an extent, the policy-unit staff 
coming from all of the member states constantly provided Solana with 
confidential intelligence from their diplomatic networks, which was “a 
great help to him” (House of Lords, 2005: 54).   
The legacy of the informal and formal structures that grew around the 
office  of  the High Representative  in  the early  2000s is  mixed.  On the 
one hand, the intergovernmental set-up of the administration in the 
Council can be interpreted as an asset that contributed to Solana’s pres-
ence in the world. The member states wanted a strong, well-briefed and 
visible High Representative who would provide resources, as well as 
intelligence, to the policy unit and his personal office. On the other 
hand, the member states were growing increasingly aware of the need 
to control their creation and install mechanisms that limited Solana’s 
discretion. As Duke (2011: 36) noted: “the investment of the member 
states […] into the support of the High Representative may represent a 
form of Brusselisation, but it was also a mean to harness the High Rep-
resentative.” 
Meanwhile, the informal and ad-hoc structures of the High Representa-
tive office, though an expression of the pioneering spirit of Solana, 
                                                   
36 Art. 5, Declaration to the Final Act on the establishment of a policy planning (Hill 
and Smith, 2000: 181). 
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were not always easy to manage and soon reached their limits. Inter-
viewees for this study who started working in other parts of the EU 
foreign policy architecture after the Lisbon Treaty reform had a very 
positive – if not nostalgic – view on the old days under Solana. Accord-
ing to them, flat  hierarchies  and little  red tape allowed them to be di-
rectly involved in, and to shape, the policies within their portfolios. 
Members of the policy unit were an ideal bridge to national foreign 
policy administrations, as they had close links to the capital and were 
loyal to Solana at the same time. Solana often allowed his staff to work 
freely on their own responsibility, which made the whole enterprise 
quick and flexible.37  
Outside observers provided a more sober analysis. As Dijkstra (2011b: 
78) points out,  
“[C]onsidering all his relentless efforts to put European foreign poli-
cy on the map, one of the areas where Javier Solana spent little politi-
cal capital was in the development of his own organisation.”  
He delegated his duties as Secretariat-General of the Council largely to 
the deputy head of the Council Secretariat, Pierre de Boissieu (Duke, 
2011). However, in addition, the management of institutional develop-
ments that were closer to the core of his portfolio received less atten-
tion. The development of the civilian crisis-management structures is a 
case in point, as it lacked integration with the military aspects of crisis-
management, as well as with the crisis-management structures of the 
Commission. Given the busy schedule of Solana, he had less direct 
contact with his staff back in Brussels, and relied on his personal office 
to manage to deal with the management of the headquarters (Dijkstra, 
2011b).  
A growing need of the member states to oversee dealings in Brussels, 
and the limits of ad-hoc structures in the Council Secretariat, spurred 
the developments to further institutionalise structures around the High 
Representative. The further development of the new office “implied an 
equally important amount of buy-in” (Duke, 2011: 36) of the member 
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states, and was possible as the member states felt they had ‘ownership’ 
of the policy unit and Council Secretariat organisation. An early step 
was to make intelligence cooperation more structured and systematic. 
After the 9/11 attacks, several member states (France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) approached Solana with 
the idea of sharing sensitive information, and upgrading the Joint Situa-
tion Centre in the Council Secretariat to this effect (House of Lords, 
2005; van Buuren, 2009).  
Already in 1999, the UK had suggested introducing a standing commit-
tee of national representatives for CFSP matters in Brussels to replace 
the travelling political committee that had existed, with few changes, 
since the start of the EPC. The UK initiative not only aimed to pro-
mote a strong foreign policy, but to create a watchdog for the High 
Representative and to strengthen the intergovernmental foreign policy 
wing in relation to the growing importance of external economic policy 
instruments of the Commission (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). Not least, 
the establishment of the PSC underlined the seriousness of the newly 
launched European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as it especial-
ly monitored and deliberated decisions in this field (Duke, 2005). 
France put  forward the idea of  installing the High Representative  as  a  
permanent chair for the PSC meetings; however, the idea was quickly 
dismissed, as member states were hesitant to diminish the role of the 
rotating Presidency in CFSP (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). While the 
step would have further increased the standing of the High Representa-
tive, Solana was happy not to be bound to participate at ambassador 
meetings in Brussels twice a week (Dijkstra, 2011b). 
Meanwhile, the network of EU special representatives (EUSRs), as well 
as of Solana’s personal representatives, expanded. Special envoys for 
CFSP had already been deployed in the mid-90s. The Amsterdam Trea-
ty codified the practice of sending special envoys to act in the name of 
CFSP, and assigned them the label EUSRs. The integration of the 
EUSRs in the new institutional structure of the Council after the Am-
sterdam treaty was not without frictions, and their usefulness was seri-
ously  questioned  at  the  turn  of  the  century  (see  Adebahr,  2011:  92–
101). In the initial years, the EUSRs worked unaffected by the new post 
of High Representative, and under direct mandate of the rotating Presi-
dency. However, as the above-mentioned development of the CFSP 
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structures gained pace, they became more and more integrated into the 
Council Secretariat. The Council passed guidelines that placed the 
EUSRs under the authority of Solana,38 and established a privileged link 
to the PSC as the primary point of contact (Grevi, 2007). In addition, 
the structures of the Council units and the EUSR were closer inter-
twined, with a Council official placed in every EUSR office and two 
senior contact points established in the policy unit (Adebahr, 2011). 
Nevertheless, even at the time of adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
integration of EUSR was weak, due to the institutional frailty and pend-
ing reforms of the Secretariat itself, and the physical location of the 
offices outside the main Council building (Adebahr, 2011).  
While EUSRs (akin to the US special envoys) were a comprehensible 
concept for third parties, Solana’s growing number of personal repre-
sentatives  rather  risked  confusing  outsiders.  On  top  of  12  EUSRs  (in  
2009), Solana directly appointed five personal representatives to over-
see horizontal portfolios39 and represent him when he was unavailable 
(Duke, 2011). According to Duke (2011), the informal arrangement of 
personal representation enhanced the effectiveness of the post of High 
Representative and increased the presence on the ground. Nevertheless, 
it also added to the inflationary representation of different EU actors 
from the Commission, Council Secretariat, rotating Presidency, and 
even the EP in third countries.  
By mid-2000 a complex structure in the Council Secretariat had devel-
oped and was in need of simplification. In order to avoid a develop-
ment of parallel structures, parts of the policy-unit officials had been 
integrated into DG for External and Political-Military Affairs (DG E) 
of the Council Secretariat (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006). However, 
the policy unit was still a separate entity according to the Treaties, and 
its high-profiled leader Helga Schmid made sure it maintained its 
strength. Another starting point for reform was the establishment of 
the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), which 
                                                   
38 Who also received the right to propose candidates for nomination of a EU Special 
Representative. 
39 Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Human Rights in the area of 
CFSP, Counter-Terrorism Coordination, Energy and Foreign Policy.  
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brought separate units of the Council Secretariat under one roof to 
streamline the planning of ESDP operations (Dijkstra, 2011b).  
The general picture of EU foreign policy governance was, nevertheless, 
complex and messy. The creation of a CSFP administration outside of 
the Commission, and in the ‘safe haven’ of the intergovernmental 
Council, had triggered a significant increase in actors, resources and 
instruments around the office of an ambitious Javier Solana. In Octo-
ber 2009, more than 500 officials worked on foreign policy issues in the 
Council Secretariat (Juncos and Pomorska, 2010). Meanwhile, just 
across the street the Commission had increased its external-relation 
resources, given the growing importance of Commission-led portfolios 
such as Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, or Trade. For 
the management of financial external assistance programmes alone, 
3855 people worked for the Commission, of which two thirds worked 
in the network of over 120 Commission delegations (numbers from 
2005, Spence, 2006). In addition, several reforms had been undertaken 
to consolidate the fragmentation of different DGs dealing with external 
relations within the Commission that strengthened the mainstreaming 
function of the DG for External Relations (DG Relex) (Spence, 2006). 
DG Relex became a strong bureaucratic actor just across the street 
from the Council, and increasingly voiced opinions and tabled initia-
tives in the field of the CFSP. After the EU-level administrative capaci-
ty  inflated  within  the  10  years  following  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  it  was  
time to think about a complete overhaul of the EU foreign policy archi-
tecture. 
4.2. The European Convention 
The idea of a convention 
The beginning of the new millennium was in general characterised by 
an ambition among European leaders to bring the European integration 
project, including its foreign policy, to the next level. The German for-
eign minister, Joschka Fischer, delivered a speech at the Humboldt 
University in Berlin in May 2000 (Fischer, 2000). On the EU’s ability to 
act in the world, he acknowledged that the experience of the war in 
Kosovo triggered the decision of the member states in Cologne and 
Helsinki to establish a common defence policy. More ambitiously, he 
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continued to argue for a ‘Europäische Finalität’, in the form of a Euro-
pean Federation with sovereign member states based on a common 
constitution. An avant-garde group of willing member states, a “Ker-
neuropa”, was to go ahead and pioneer integration, “certainly in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy” (Fischer, 2000: 49).  
Jacques Chirac, President of France, argued in the same direction one 
month later in a speech to the German Bundestag (Chirac, 2000). 
However, Chirac stated that it was not in the German and French in-
terest to have a “European Superstate” replace the nation states on the 
international stage. He claimed that a “strong Europe on the interna-
tional stage needs solid institutions and efficient and legitimate deci-
sion-making procedures, including majority decisions that reflect the 
weight of the member states” (Chirac, 2000). Chirac thus pleaded for a 
stronger and more efficient EU foreign policy alongside those of the 
member states, and added that the period after the Nice Summit should 
be used to reflect on a European Constitution, possibly within the 
scope of a convention.  
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Great Britain, delivered another big 
speech  on  Europe  in  October  of  that  year  (Blair,  2000).  In  it,  he  ex-
pressed a faith in the vitality of nation states in foreign policy that was 
even more pronounced than that of his French counterpart, and pro-
claimed that Europe should be “a superpower, but not a superstate”. 
Interestingly, Blair went into more depth on how institutions could be 
strengthened. The continuity of the policy machinery had to be im-
proved by introducing elected chairs for various Council formations, 
and by strengthening the post of High Representative. He clearly ex-
pressed his devotion to a common foreign policy: “though nations will 
guard jealously their own national interests, there are times when it will 
be of clear benefit to all that Europe acts and speaks together”. How-
ever, rather than ending the debate on institutions with a single legally 
binding constitution, he argued for changes to the existing framework 
and a clearer delimitation of competences between the member states 
and the EU. 
These three big speeches on Europe marked a start to the debate that 
led to the Laeken Declaration on the future of Europe by the heads of 
state and government in December 2001. The Laeken European Coun-
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cil called a Convention on the future of Europe in order to make pro-
posals for starting points for discussions at the next intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) (European Council, 2001). Notably, the Convention 
was not tasked with developing a draft constitution. Considering the 
complexity of the institutional architecture of the EU, and the prospect 
of 10 members joining, the Laeken text included many questions for 
the members of the Convention to reflect on. For example, it included 
a question on how to ensure the synergy of the Commissioner for for-
eign relations and the High Representative. Nevertheless, the three big 
speeches at the turn of the century showed that there was yet no joint 
idea about how to design the future of the common EU foreign policy. 
Ideal-type convention or an intergovernmental summit in disguise 
The idea of the Convention was to escape the old methods of treaty 
revisions marked by summit diplomacy. Consequently, the design of 
the Convention was crafted to allow for more inclusiveness, transpar-
ency and deliberation. But was it set to be an ideal-type convention like 
the Philadelphia Convention that created the United States Constitu-
tion, or did national-based bargaining take over and transform the 
Convention into a proxy European summit akin to the Nice 2000 ‘night 
of the long knives’? To a large degree the design, aim and working 
method of the Convention goes back to the high ambitions of its presi-
dent, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (see also Norman, 2003). Giscard 
d’Estaing did not hide his ambition when he addressed the Convention 
plenary for the first time (Giscard d’Estaing, 2002). Comparing the 
Convention with the Messina Conference of 1955, he encouraged the 
delegates to set out on a path “towards a Constitution for Europe”. He 
claimed that a convention spirit should be established, and that dele-
gates should not limit themselves to negotiate on behalf of their gov-
ernments.  
Moreover, the structure of the Convention reflected a wider, more 
inclusive approach. National representatives constituted a minority. In 
addition to representatives of the 15 member state governments, the 
Convention comprised two members of each national parliament, 16 
members of the EP, as well as two representatives of the Commission. 
In light of the future enlargement, the 10 accession countries were rep-
resented with one government representative and two members of 
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parliament, though without having the right to prevent consensus. The 
proceedings of the Convention were designed to allow for a discussion 
that was more distant from the daily routine of (often national-driven) 
politics. The Convention was divided into three phases: the listening 
phase, which was to allow for an open discussion and the build up of 
an esprit de corps, the study phase, in which members convened in specif-
ic WGs, and the drafting phase, in which the final articles were drafted 
in the plenary sessions. 
However, the composition and proceedings of the Convention did not 
lead to a situation in which the member states’ national positions were 
neglected. On the one hand, an IGC of the member states still  had to 
confirm a possible new Constitutional treaty. On the other, bargaining 
on behalf of national positions replaced the deliberations in the spirit of 
a common constitution during the proceedings of the Convention. This 
was already reflected in the choice of delegates: for instance, only a few 
of the national representatives were academics, including Finnish dele-
gate Teija Tiilikainen from Helsinki University and the initial German 
representative Peter Glotz from the University of St Gallen (Norman, 
2003: 39). In addition, the high ambitions of Giscard d’Estaing did not 
go unnoticed in the national capitals. As soon as the member states 
realised that the Convention was doing more than just reflecting on 
some proposals to the heads of state and government, and were in fact 
designing a constitutional treaty, they stepped in and tried to give their 
position more weight in the Convention:40 already in autumn, the Ger-
man and French foreign ministers Joschka Fischer and Dominique de 
Villepin replaced their lower-ranked national delegates. The UK was 
well represented from the start by Europe minster Peter Hain, who 
lobbied intensively for the British position (Norman, 2003). Apart from 
the well-documented and transparent proceedings of the WGs and 
plenary sessions, the Convention was not free from backroom discus-
sions and bilateral diplomacy (Norman, 2003). The member states, as 
the collective principal of the EU institutions, determined the final 
design of the High Representative of the Union.  
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External action in the Convention 
Europe’s ability to create a global profile turned out to be one of the 
major themes of the Convention. The WG on external action (WG 
VII) was the place for debates on the EU’s international role. The 
mandate of the group included questions for the delegates on institu-
tional aspects: How could the decision-making and coherence within 
EU foreign policy be improved? How could the post of High Repre-
sentative be improved, and should it have more power and resources? 
How should the EU’s representation be organised to exert more influ-
ence?41 The  WG  on  external  action  used  this  mandate  as  a  basis  for  
intense debate on the different options of the future institutional design 
of EU foreign policy. This debate mirrored the dividing lines and con-
troversies on the post of High Representative.   
However, it was not only purely institutional questions that were re-
garded as decisive for the EU’s international capability to act. The Con-
vention also served as a platform from which to define the future role 
and purpose of the EU. Everts and Keohane (2003: 169) observed that 
“to the extent that the Convention was about clarifying the EU’s pur-
pose, it also held the prospect of increasing its attractive potential – its 
‘soft power’”. The Convention thus also drew up a list of principles and 
objectives that common external policies should adhere to. In addition, 
the legal status of the EU in international affairs was subject to discus-
sions in the WG on legal personality (WG III). The delegates agreed on 
granting the EU a single legal personality. This was supposed to clarify 
the Union’s ability to conclude international agreements.42 Members of 
the Convention thus did not just focus on the development of the insti-
tutional framework of EU foreign policy. In the following section, 
however, the debate among delegates on the structure and processes of 
the institutional architecture will be in focus. 
Identified deficiencies 
The WG on external action identified deficiencies in the decision-
making and representation of EU foreign policy. Members expressed 
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worries about a lack of continuity. Solana came straight to the point in 
his intervention in the WG on external action: “foreign policy, in par-
ticular crisis management, is still based on personal relations and trust. 
This has to be built up through personal contacts; those cannot be 
switched every six months”.43 Delegates saw the rotating Presidency as 
a limitation to the international presence of the EU. However, internal-
ly the rotation was also seen as a problem. Continuity of the internal 
formulation of policies and interests would be hampered, as every 
member state holding the Presidency focused on its own priorities.44 A 
change of the rotating Presidency system became thus part of the dis-
cussions of the Convention.  
Many of the early input papers during the study phase of the Conven-
tion highlighted the need for the Union to be more coherent in its ex-
ternal action. The working document from the Finnish delegation was 
firm on this issue, and stated that  
“[i]n the era of globalisation, the EU is powerful only if all aspects 
of its external relations – political as well as economic – are merged 
into a single coherent policy vis-á-vis the external world.”45  
A German working document referred to additional pressure to en-
hance external coherence in light of the upcoming enlargement of the 
Union: “[f]or this it is vital that the Union speaks with one voice to the 
outside world on external relations issues”.46 Meanwhile, the division of 
the external relations into different pillars was a matter of concern, as 
expressed in the address of Commissioner for Development and Hu-
manitarian aid Poul Nielsen:  
“the present Pillar structure and the parallel existence of several enti-
ties representing the Union in various capacities and according to dif-
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ferent procedures is simply not credible, not controllable, and not ac-
countable.”47  
In general, members acknowledged that the division into different deci-
sion-making and organisational structures of the EU, as well as the 
growing number of member states, hampered the EU’s capability to 
represent a common policy. Institutionally, the “coexistence of two 
centres of gravity in European foreign policy”48 particularly manifested 
this problem; namely the separate offices of the High Representative 
and the Relex Commissioner. 
However, delegates believed that institutional improvements could only 
have limited effects without the political will of the member states. The 
input paper from the Romanian delegation pointed out that “[t]he insti-
tutional architecture and the procedural mechanisms, no matter how 
efficient would they be, cannot be a substitute for the lack of real polit-
ical will of the member states”.49 Nevertheless, some delegates believed 
that institutions can have a positive effect on the will of the member 
states to coordinate, and emphasised the  “usefulness of mechanisms 
that foster convergence of views and a sense of solidarity”.50 The lack 
of political will goes hand in hand with a lack of purpose, as argued by 
the report of the first meeting of the WG on external action. In order 
to have a common foreign and security policy, its added values, strate-
gies and objectives had to be clarified first.51 For example, the instru-
ment of common strategies – introduced via the Amsterdam treaty – 
was hardly used, and not working in the intended way.52 
The delegates also identified the EU’s visibility in the world as insuffi-
cient. The rotating Council Presidency weakened the international pro-
file insofar as the rotation interrupted the continuity of external repre-
sentation. In addition, international crises required the EU to react 
instantly, and not with the rhythm of monthly foreign minister meet-
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52 WD 21 REV 1. 
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ings. Visibility of the Union in international affairs would thus depend 
on a strong permanent representative of the Union to serve as interloc-
utor to the EU’s partners around the world.53 However, the EU’s rep-
resentation in multilateral fora was also in need of improvement.54 
Some members pointed out that a single and efficient representation in 
multilateral fora should be established, working in close cooperation 
with the delegations of the member states.55  
The assessments made during the listening and early study phase were 
fairly consistent across all delegations to the Convention. A successful 
EU foreign policy depended on overcoming the lack of continuity, 
coherence, political will, and visibility. However, the crucial and divid-
ing question was how to achieve that end (see Appendix II). The insti-
tutional design of foreign policy actors at the EU level was an integral 
step to solving these deficiencies; but as a close observer of the Con-
vention noted, “the future of the High Representative and the Com-
missioner for external affairs became a battlefield” (Norman, 2003: 
141). 
4.3. Competing models for the High Representative 
The ambitious model: a Commissioner for the CFSP 
“The High Representative must have part of his head and at least 
one leg in the Commission. But maybe he would prefer to have both!” 
(Commissioner Poul Nielsen)56  
A participant of the Convention described the initial atmosphere in 
2002 as full of ambitions,57 and  suggested  that  it  could  best  be  de-
scribed as a “constitutional moment”.58 Inspired by Giscard d’Estaing, 
the initial feeling amongst participants was not to search for the lowest 
common denominator, but to use the opportunity to build a single-
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57 Interview #40. 
58 See Ackerman (2000) for more on the term “constitutional moment”. 
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treaty framework. The ambitions with regard to organising the post of 
High Representative were high as well; however, models for the future 
High Representative varied from member state to member state. One 
crucial debate was focused on the question as to where the office of 
High Representative should be based in the institutional architecture. 
While integration-oriented countries preferred a transfer to the post to 
the Commission, other countries were rather in favour of opting for a 
High Representative that keeps his office in the Council  (see Table 
4.1).  
Individual positions   
 AT BE DE DK ES FR FI GB GR IT IE LU NL PT SE 
Position + + (+) - - (-) + - + (+) (+) + +  - 
 
Camps 
Commission (Commission) (Council) Council 
AT, BE, FI, GR, LU, NL DE, IT, IE FR DK, ES, GB, SE 
Note: “+” or “Commission” indicates that the member state was in favour of 
having the High Representative fully integrated in the Commission as a Com-
missioner for external relations. “(+)” or “(Commission)” indicates that the 
member state advocated full integration into the Commission in the long run, 
but not as part of the draft constitutional treaty. “(-)” or “(Council)” indicates 
that the member state preferred the High Representative to be based in the 
Council, though with the possibility of assigning the High Representative to a 
position in the Commission. “-” or “Council” indicates that the High Repre-
sentative should remain in the Council as a separate post. 
Table 4.1: Member states’ positions on the organisational location of the 
High Representative (based on Appendix II) 
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A paper by the representative of the EP, Elmar Brok, drew attention to 
the organisational dilemma.59 While the Commission is in charge of the 
representation of the integrated policies, the Council has its own execu-
tive structure to represent foreign and security-related policies. In order 
“to acquire the efficiency and consistency which is found, for instance, 
in the common trade policy”, the obvious choice for the EP was “for 
the tasks of the High Representative and the Commissioner for Exter-
nal Relations to be merged.”60 The fully merged post would be known 
as the Commissioner for External Relations. The solution offered by 
the EP was the full organisational integration of the CFSP representa-
tive into the structures of the Commission. The Commission supported 
this view, and also recommended a gradual integration of the post of 
High Representative into the Commission structures (European 
Commission, 2002).  
The EP was keen for this transfer of the highest CFSP office to take 
place for reasons of control and oversight over the Commission (for 
example on budget and staffing matters). Even some member state 
delegates, especially from smaller countries such as the Benelux states 
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and Finland, aimed for 
the ‘big jump’ and an integration of all foreign policy aspects into the 
Commission. As Finland’s delegate expressed in her input paper:  
“The only rational solution to the problem is to make the Commis-
sion – that already successfully represents the EU in a remarkable 
part of its external relations – the representative for the entire exter-
nal policy (except defence).”61 
The Romanian representative argued in light of a long-term federal 
vision of the EU: 
“Introducing the community method in the external action of the EU 
can be also a starting point towards an arrangement with more fed-
eral elements according to which the Commission is to become the 
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EU’s Executive […] and the Council is to be transformed into the 
European Senate.62 
However, the member states were more cautious about giving CFSP 
competences to the Commission. The delegate from Austria was more 
conservative given the concerns of some member states, and argued for 
a gradual integration: 
“[A full merger] would be the best way to ensure the consistency of 
the Union’s external activities as a whole in the context of its exter-
nal relations, security, economic and development policies. But we 
know that this option is not acceptable to all member states at the 
present time and can only be realised step-by-step in a long term per-
spective.”63 
The Austrian assessment of the situation proved to be correct in the 
end. Member states, as we will see, could not agree on fully integrating 
an EU foreign minister into the Commission. 
The intergovernmental model: a strengthened High Representative in the Council 
The high ambitions to integrate foreign policy faded early, and an ex-
change of conflicting national positions on the design of the post of 
High Representative began. For some member states, it was vital that 
the post of High Representative remained anchored in the structure of 
the Council, and not integrated into the Commission. This view was 
expressed openly by the Danish, British and Spanish delegations. 
France also had concerns regarding this solution, but left it to Britain to 
play the ‘bad cop’.64 On the one hand, these countries agreed that they 
needed strong EU institutions in the area of foreign policy. On the 
other, they believed that foreign and security policy can only be con-
ducted under close control of the member states. In the plenary debate 
on foreign policy in July 2002, the British delegate, Hain, highlighted 
the need to have a clear link to the national parliaments: 
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“The strength of Europe's foreign policy is based on its member 
states’ commitment, not on Community rules; and the legitimacy of 
Europe’s foreign policy must be based on its accountability to nation-
al parliaments. […] We need strong institutional structures at Un-
ion level. But we must also recognise that this sort of collective effort 
requires tailor-made procedures and methods of operation and a clear 
link back to national parliaments.” (Hain, 2002) 
The UK’s suggestion was to create a strengthened post of High Repre-
sentative with better mechanisms of coordination with the external 
relations Commissioner, which should remain a separate post. Together 
with Spain, the UK explained its position in more detail in a joint paper 
towards the end of the Convention:  
“Within the Council, the UK and Spain also propose the strength-
ening of the figure of the High Representative. He/she would become 
a real Minister of Foreign Affairs/External Representative of the 
Union  who,  inter  alia,  should  chair  the  meetings  of  the  Council  of  
Ministers for External Relations and participate at the Commis-
sion’s meetings where proposals concerning the Union’s external ac-
tion are to be discussed. He/she should also have at his/her own 
disposal a formal right of initiative for common foreign and security 
policy matters”65 
This suggested that the High Representative should be strengthened by 
being given a right of initiative, a role as chair of the foreign minister 
meetings, better resources, an observer status in the Commission Col-
lege meetings, and more possibilities for joint actions with its Commis-
sioner colleague.66 From a PA perspective, this position reflects the 
preference of the principal to install tight control mechanisms. A High 
Representative based in the Council, supported by the policy unit 
staffed with seconded member state diplomats, would be under ongo-
ing oversight by the national administrations. In contrast, a Commis-
sioner for CFSP would possibly have been loyal to its colleagues and 
answerable to the EP. The UK and its partners were in favour of a 
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High Representative with limited discretion, as they saw foreign policy 
as a matter deeply routed in the sovereignty and parliamentary control 
of the member states. France even proposed a strong oversight role of 
the European Council. The French proposal foresaw that the High 
Representative was answerable to the new post of a permanent Euro-
pean Council President.67 As an agent of the European Council Presi-
dent, the High Representative would have been working as the foreign 
minister of the heads of state and government. 
Moreover, the political environment of the time was a key factor. The 
recent Iraq crisis showed that the member states were still divided with 
regard to their foreign policy and views on transatlantic relations. 
Against this backdrop a highly integrated foreign policy of the EU was 
perceived as rather ambitious. The Iraq crisis, during which Solana and 
Chris Patten (Commissioner for External Relations) were seemingly 
invisible, showed how much the policy representation of the EU was 
grounded in the legitimacy provided by the member states (Everts and 
Keohane, 2003). Jose Maria Aznar, who was heading the Spanish rotat-
ing Council Presidency at that time, recalled in a speech at Oxford that 
the primary task was to achieve greater convergence of member states’ 
foreign policies: “a treaty in itself will not make a foreign and defence 
policy. Growing convergence of the member states’ foreign policies is 
necessary.” In reference to the terrorist attacks, he added, “it is a matter 
of strengthening co-ordination and co-operation among the member 
states against this threat” (Aznar, 2002). Aznar saw a strong common 
foreign policy as a matter of closer coordination, rather than integra-
tion. In short, the political argument for a High Representative embed-
ded in the Council was that a policy area, which is subject to the sover-
eignty concerns of the member states, cannot effectively be represented 
or coordinated by a community institution.  
The double-hatted compromise  
“Regardless of the enormous achievements of Javier Solana, the High 
Representative in its current capacity cannot always punch above its 
weight. Similarly, regardless of all that Chris Patten has done to 
streamline the Union’s external relations role, the Commissioner for 
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External Relations will never be a partner to foreign governments if 
his clout stops where it should begin. Establishing a double-hatted 
Foreign Policy Chief for the European Union would enable us to 
have  a  genuine  imprint  on  the  world  scene.”  (Bobby  McDonagh,  
Delegate form the Irish government to the European Convention)68 
The two opposing camps developed a compromise quite early in the 
proceedings of the Convention. How could the High Representative 
stay embedded in the Council structure, while at the same time cooper-
ating closely with the services in the Commission? The answer was to 
assign the posts of High Representative and Commissioner for external 
relations to the same person: thus, the double-hatted High Representa-
tive was born. The creation of a double hat was not a merger as sug-
gested by the EP; legally, the two posts – Commissioner and High Rep-
resentative – would stay separate and operate under either community 
or CFSP regulations.  
The idea of combining the two posts was already developed before the 
Convention. A report by a French working group on the reform of the 
European institutions presented ideas on an EU government linking 
high offices in the Council and Commission as early as 1999 
(Quermonne, 1999; Wessels, 2000). In a speech to the Assemblée Na-
tionale in Paris in October 2001, German foreign minister Fischer 
shared some ideas about the duality of the two posts:   
“Does it make sense to stick to the parallelism of the two posts? 
Wouldn’t a merger be better in order to improve the Union as an in-
ternational actor? Wouldn’t it be an excellent addition to the na-
tional foreign policies, if we strengthen this arrangement? What prac-
tical steps can we take along this path in the medium term? 
(Fischer, 2001a, author’s translation) 
Thus, Fischer had already advocated a practical arrangement to im-
prove the synergy of the two posts. The German representative Peter 
Glotz eventually introduced the concept of the ‘double hat’ in the name 
of the German government at the plenary meeting on EU foreign poli-
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cy in July 2002 (Matl, 2003).69 Instead of merging the two posts, the 
contribution stated that the function of the Vice-President of the 
Commission and the High Representative should be attributed to one 
person.  
A German input paper went more into detail. Although, in the role of 
External Relations Commissioner, the High Representative would be 
part of the College of Commissioners, “the apparatuses would remain 
separate, also the different decision-making procedures for the different 
competences would remain unchanged”. 70 Germany took up the sug-
gestions of UK and Spain and also argued for a strengthening of the 
post of High Representative, by incorporating the position of perma-
nent chair of the foreign minister meetings on external action, as well as 
a right of initiative in matters of CFSP. The personal unification of the 
two posts would promote the visibility of the Union “below the level of 
the European Council”. The suggestions aimed to strike a balance: on 
the one hand they gave the member states a sense of power over the 
office as in matters of CFSP it would remain purely answerable and 
under the control of the member states. On the other hand, the mem-
ber states deliberately granted the incumbent discretion, since, as a part 
of the College of Commissioners, the member states would have less 
control the incumbent’s activities.  
The Franco/German paper on institutional questions, which represent-
ed a deal between the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, and 
French President Chirac, gave the double hat the final endorsement.71 
The document in general secured the compromise on the institutional 
architecture towards the end of the Convention. It specified the nomi-
nation of the incumbent (qualified majority of the European Council 
and approval of the Commission President), as well as the idea of a 
service comprising units of the Council Secretariat and personnel of the 
Commission, which would work in close cooperation with the national 
foreign ministries. Meanwhile, smaller member states protested against 
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the Franco-German proposal of a permanent President of the Europe-
an Council. In their eyes, this post shifted the balance towards a more 
intergovernmental EU (Norman, 2003). In comparison, the double-
hatted High Representative was generally seen as a reform that would 
ensure coherence between the EU’s external instruments, without inte-
grating CFSP in the Commission. However, the practicality of this ap-
proach was questioned. 
An impossible job? 
The ‘double-hatted’ design of the High Representative was criticised. 
Revealingly, the office-holders of the two posts, Solana and Patten, 
argued against the impossible job description. Chris Patten pointed out 
that the incumbent of the two jobs will have an enormous workload, 
and argued in favour of establishing synergies between the two separate 
posts.72 Javier Solana was concerned with the additional complexity and 
disarray of responsibilities that a combination of the two posts would 
bring: 
“We are only successful if the Council delegates responsibility clearly, 
and if effective internal co-ordination is assured. The Commission 
and High Representative have distinct responsibilities: merging these 
functions would, in my view, create more confusion than synergy. 
Chris and I have shown that close co-operation and partnership can, 
and do, produce results.” (WD 8) 
It was a widely shared concern that the workload of the incumbent of 
the post would be almost impossible for one person to handle. In order 
to create the new centre of gravity, a long list of jobs for the High Rep-
resentative had been accumulated. These included, in addition to the 
Commissioner’s and High Representative’s job, the chair of the external 
affairs Council formation, head of the new diplomatic service, and rep-
resentation of the CFSP towards the EP. The German delegation, the 
co-inventors of the double hat, addressed these concerns: 
“In order to ensure that the ‘double hat’ is able to perform his office 
effectively, he or she would have to be able to rely on an efficient sub-
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structure consisting of […] two deputies – one for Commission af-
fairs who could represent him or her and have the right to vote in the 
College in his or her absence (amendment of the Commission’s rules 
of  procedure,  if  necessary),  and  one  in  his  or  her  capacity  as  High  
Representative who could, in particular, represent the ‘double hat’ as 
chairman of the PSC, and in exceptional cases also in the General 
Affairs Council (External Relations). These deputies should be ap-
pointed by the ‘double hat’ and approved by the Council (by quali-
fied majority) and by the Commission President.” (WD 17) 
Germany wanted to create deputies for each of the two heads, who 
would obtain their political accountability via approval granted by the 
Council and the Commission President. While separate deputies were a 
possible solution to the heavy workload, the suggestion clearly shows 
the  persisting  duality  of  the  post  and  of  the  legal  frameworks  of  EU  
foreign policy. In the end, a system of deputies did not make it into the 
final-draft constitution. The delegates did not want to overload the text 
with detailed provisions, as that would have harmed its constitutional 
character and simplicity. The question of deputies was postponed for 
the implementation of the treaty.73 
Another matter of concern was the future relations of the double-
hatted High Representative with the Commission. The British repre-
sentative, Hain, was concerned about who would mediate a disagree-
ment between the Commission and the Council.74 Sweden felt that the 
double hat “would blur the lines between the Council and the Commis-
sion, while what we need is enhanced synergies between these two, 
clearly distinct, institutions”.75 Finland voiced concerns about issues of 
accountability and the institutional balance of the EU. The new system 
made the institutional structure complex rather than simple, which was 
the initial task of the WG: 
“How could this person – accountable for a part of his/her duties to 
the Council – take part in the collective policy formulation in the 
Commission and share the collective parliamentary responsibility for 
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this policy? […] A third risk is that of the gradual intergovernmen-
talisation of that part of external relations, which is currently success-
fully managed through the Community method. Last but not least, 
creating such a dual position would hardly correspond to the task of 
simplification of the EU’s political structures that the Convention is 
provided with.”76 
Concerns on the double-hat structure were not ironed out completely 
in the proceedings of the Convention, but were postponed to the sub-
sequent IGC. At the end of 2003, the Italian Council Presidency, which 
presided over the IGC, circulated a questionnaire in order to allow 
member states to express their concerns.77 The IGC mainly addressed 
the role of the High Representative in the Commissioners College and 
as the permanent chair in the Council (for a discussion of the IGC, see 
Grevi et al. 2005).78 The IGC agreed that the High Representative 
would get full voting rights in the Commission College. The Commis-
sion President would only be able to ask for the resignation of the High 
Representative in the Commission in agreement with the European 
Council. Member states clearly spelled out the duality of the double hat 
by pronouncing that the High Representative is only bound by Com-
mission procedures when carrying out Commission responsibilities. 
They also discussed the question of whether the High Representative 
should chair the Council formation on foreign affairs (see the following 
section). As Grevi et al. (2005: 67) observed,  
“[T]he IGC was inevitably characterised by an intergovernmental 
backlash. Countries like the UK and, though much less openly, 
France worried that the new position might escape their rather com-
fortable control exercised on the activity of the High Representative.”  
However, concerns regarding the workload and the additional complex-
ity of the foreign policy set-up were not addressed. The deliberations of 
the IGC clarified, once again, the strict duality of the role of the High 
Representative: in CFSP the High Representative would act under the 
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mandate of the Council; as Commissioner the same independence from 
the member states would be enjoyed as that granted to the other 
Commissioner.79  
4.4. Opportunities in the making and shaping of decisions 
Decision-making in the CFSP 
The design of the decision-making and decision-shaping procedures in 
EU foreign policy was another focus of the debates in the WG on ex-
ternal action. The procedures that stipulate how decisions are formulat-
ed and taken are a crucial factor in evaluating the discretion of the High 
Representative. While an organisational integration of EU foreign poli-
cy into the Commission structure was one of the options discussed, a 
full integration of the decision-making procedures was never tabled. No 
delegate suggested incorporating CFSP decisions under the same rules 
as in community matters, where decisions are initiated by the Commis-
sion and can often be taken by qualified majority. The delegates dis-
cussed in the WG on external action the notion that:  
“external action covered a wide range of policy areas, that some areas 
were more subject to divergent national views than others, and that 
certain policy areas were more adapted to legal instruments and regu-
lation than others. This required different arrangements and proce-
dures in EU decision-making and implementation. This was partic-
ularly true in relation to crisis management and defence issues.”80 
It was the shared view of the delegates that a one-size-fits-all approach 
could not be applied to EU foreign policy making. This was especially 
true  for  all  questions  of  defence  matters;  here,  all  parties  agreed  that  
unanimity had to stay the rule. As Commissioner Nielsen put it:   
“The only area where I still believe with some justification member 
states should maintain their national prerogatives is sending their 
sons and daughters into war. This in my view is such a sensitive is-
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sue that unanimity (and constructive abstention) could be defend-
ed.”81 
Nevertheless, delegates discussed the idea of introducing more possibil-
ities for QMV on foreign policy issues (see Table 4.2). Delegates that 
argued against QMV referred to the special nature of foreign policy as 
“a core issue to national sovereignty” and is “not an issue upon which 
one could vote”.82 Member states need to find consensus. On the other 
hand, proponents of QMV argued that the capacity of the EU to act 
could be increased. An enlarged Union would face “the risk of ‘CFSP 
inertia’”;83 thus, qualified majority should be the general rule.84 In  his  
address to the WG, Patten hinted at the fact that the qualified majority 
approach had hardly ever led to a situation where member states were 
outvoted; rather, “the mere existence of the possibility of voting en-
couraged member states to try to arrive at a consensus”.85 However, the 
British delegation voiced concerns that in the case of a decision reached 
by qualified majority, the internal disagreement among member states 
would be displayed to third countries, “thus rendering CFSP less effec-
tive”.86 
Individual positions   
 AT BE DE DK ES FR FI GB GR IT IE LU NL PT SE 
Position + + + + - (+) + - (+) (+) (+) + + - (-) 
 
Camps 
QMV except defence QMV with safe-
guards 
QMV only as ex-
ception 
No additional 
QMV 
AT, BE, DE, DK,  FI, 
LU, NL 
FR, GR, IT, IE SE ES, GB, PT 
Note: “+” or “QMV except defence” indicates that the member state was in 
favour  of  introducing  QMV as  the  general  rule  for  the  CFSP except  for  de-
fence  matters.  “(+)”  or  “QMV  with  safeguards”  indicates  that  the  member  
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state advocated QMV as the general rule in CFSP matters, however with pos-
sibilities to prevent or prolong a vote when certain criteria are met. “(-)” or 
“QMV only as exception” indicates that the member state preferred unanimity 
to stay the rule and to introduce additional exceptions to which QMV applies. 
“-” or “No additional QMV” indicates that no further possibilities for QMV 
should be introduced in matters of foreign policy. 
Table 4.2: Member states’ position on QMV (based on Appendix II) 
The delegates continued to discuss other tools to allow for more flexi-
ble decision-making. How could coalitions of member states move 
ahead, if not all member states were on board? Delegates discussed the 
use of constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation. Under con-
structive abstention, a member state can abstain from voting without 
blocking the final decision. During the discussions, it was seen as im-
portant that the abstaining member state should be prevented from 
taking contradictory unilateral actions. In addition, enhanced coopera-
tion was part of the discussion. Enhanced cooperation allows a group 
of member states to advance their cooperation using EU structures, 
and within the framework of the treaty, without forcing all member 
states  to  join.  The  system was  already  extended  to  CFSP  in  the  Nice  
Treaty, but was never applied.  
In the end, a qualified majority rule did not make it into the draft con-
stitution, nor, subsequently, into the Lisbon Treaty. Although the Fran-
co-German paper towards the end of the Convention recommended 
qualified majority,87 the treaty texts listed unanimity as the rule. Howev-
er,  some exceptions were made:  for  example,  a  qualified majority  was 
enough when decisions were made on the basis of an initiative of the 
High Representative following a specific request of the European 
Council, or when deciding on a mandate for an EUSR. In any case, the 
member states  could still  prevent  a  vote  if  they stated vital  reasons of  
national policy. If the High Representative could not broker a com-
promise, the Council could refer the issue to the European Council. A 
passarelle clause stated that the European Council could decide to in-
troduce further options for QMV.  
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The qualified majority approach did effectively not make it into the new 
Treaty, especially majority voting on defence issues was completely 
ruled out. However, new rules for constructive abstention allowed for 
more flexibility at EU level. In addition, the model of enhanced coop-
eration was made applicable in CFSP and CSDP, though it required a 
unanimous decision to be set up (see Cremona, 2009). In defence, per-
manent structured cooperation was introduced as a possibility for a 
group of member states to go ahead and work more closely on com-
mon defence capabilities.  
Changes in the decision-making rules were marginal. In general, the 
High Representative needed to seek a consensus of all member states in 
order to enforce policies. This characteristic of EU foreign policy huge-
ly predefined the level of discretion of the High Representative. It 
would be difficult for the High Representative to follow a separate 
agenda, when consensus with all of the member states was required. 
Disagreement between a member state and the position of the High 
Representative would have effective control mechanisms and stop the 
High Representative from implementing or representing an unwanted 
position.  
Right of initiative 
Delegates in general agreed that the High Representative should receive 
a right to table policy initiatives in the Council (see Table 4.3). Howev-
er, some delegates addressed open questions on how a right of initiative 
would be implemented. First, delegates felt that clarification was needed 
on how a High Representative’s right of initiative could be reconciled 
with the Commission’s right of initiative in community matters. As-
sessment was needed on whether the scope of the right of initiative 
should also touch on community matters in the hand of the Commis-
sion, such a trade or development. The possibility to table proposals in 
matters of CFSP was uncontested among delegates, as this was seen as 
a major possibility to strengthen the office.88 Moreover, delegates sug-
gested also granting right of initiative in the area of Commission com-
petences in order to promote coherence between the different external 
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activities of the EU. Solana argued for a comprehensive right of initia-
tive, especial with regard to crisis-management: 
“Any such proposals, especially in the framework of crisis manage-
ment, should encompass the possibility and capability to mobilise the 
whole spectrum of instruments at the disposal of the Community and 
of the member states: from humanitarian aid to police; from electoral 
observation to military assets.”89 
Commissioner Nielsen even suggested extending the right of initiative 
to internal community policies that have external effects: 
“[…] this initiative must be able to call on all external elements of 
our policies, be it trade, agriculture, industrial policy, research, 
health, and the social policy, which are part of the so-called first pil-
lar of the European Community.”90 
Nielsen wanted to create a  “centre of gravity which is in control of the 
policy initiative”.91 However, a right to make initiatives in various areas 
of Commission competence raised concerns with regard to the standing 
of the High Representative in the College of Commissioners. In prac-
tice, the foreign policy chief would need an elevated position in the 
College, which was usually characterised by the equality of its members. 
Furthermore, the established procedure in the College was to decide on 
policy initiatives in consensus. As a member of the Commission, should 
the new High Representative have the possibility to table proposals 
without support from colleagues? The strict duality of the double hat 
once more provided an answer to these questions. The suggestion of 
the delegates was that the High Representative would be able to table 
initiatives without prior approval from the College of Commissioners 
only in the area of the CFSP.92 In other areas of external action, how-
ever, the High Representative would need to table a joint initiative to-
gether with the Commission.  
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Individual positions   
 AT BE DE DK ES FR FI GB GR IT IE LU NL PT SE 
Position 
 
+ + + + + + (+) +  (+) + + +  (-) 
 
Camps 
Right of initiative CFSP With Commis-
sion 
Commission No right of initia-
tive 
AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, 
IE, LU, NL 
FI, IT SE  
Note: “+” or “Right of initiative CFSP” indicates that the member state was in 
favour of granting the High Representative a right of initiative in CFSP, which 
can be exercised without involvement of Commission. “(+)” or “With Com-
mission” indicates that the member state advocated a right of initiative for the 
High Representative which can be exercised only together with the Commis-
sion. “(-)” or “Commission” indicates that the member state preferred to keep 
the right of initiative in CFSP matters with the Commission. “-” or “No right 
of initiative” indicates that neither the High nor the Commission should have a 
right of initiative in CFSP matters. 
Table 4.3: Member states’ positions on right of initiative in CFSP (based 
on Appendix II) 
The Irish and Finnish delegates were concerned about the idea that the 
right of initiative, as well as the chairing of foreign ministers meetings, 
were to be assigned to the High Representative. The possibility of the 
High Representative to table an initiative and chair the subsequent de-
liberations would represent an unusual concentration of tasks and pow-
er. Furthermore, it could lead to a conflict of roles.93 Nevertheless, the 
Finnish and Irish delegates did not question the right of proposal of the 
High Representative. They wanted the job of chairing the Council to 
remain with the rotating Presidency, not least in order to keep the pres-
tigious and influential role in the hands of their foreign ministers. 
Chairing 
The introduction of permanent presidencies in the Council was a mat-
ter of concern for small and medium-sized member states such as Fin-
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land, Sweden and Ireland. For these countries, the rotating Presidency 
represented a chance to upload their priorities on the EU agenda and 
boost their international profile (see Table 4.4). The rotating Presidency 
was an illustration of equality among member states, despite the differ-
ing levels of resources and capabilities (Finnish Ministerial Committee 
for  EU-Affairs,  2003).  Meanwhile,  Finland  and  Ireland  were  of  the  
opinion that the concentration of competences of the High Representa-
tive, which included a right of initiative, the chairing of the decision-
making body, as well as the implementation of CFSP policies, was unu-
sual for a balanced political system. The community method should 
serve as an example for the organisation of CFSP, where the Commis-
sion plays the role of an executive, while the rotating Presidency heads 
the Council as the legislative body. In addition, the rotating Council 
Presidency was a source of legitimacy for the High Representative and 
functioned as a bridge between the member states and the foreign poli-
cy chief.94 This group of countries also saw the need for more continui-
ty of the agenda-management of the EU foreign policy. However, they 
argued for a strengthening of the team presidencies and joint Presiden-
cy programs as a means to establish longer planning horizons 
(EUCON, 2003). 
Individual positions   
 AT BE DE DK ES FR FI GB GR IT IE LU NL PT SE 
Position 
 
+ + + -/+ + + - +  + - + +  - 
 
Camps 
External relations chair   No chairing 
AT,  BE,  DE,  ES,  FR, 
GB, IT, LU, NL 
FI, IE, SE 
Note: “+” or “External relations chair” indicates that the member state was in 
favour of giving the chaor of the foreign affairs minister meetings to the High 
Representative. “-” or “No chairing” indicates that the High Representative 
should not be the permanent chair of a Council formation. 
Table 4.4: Member states’ positions on chairing in the Council (based on 
Appendix II) 
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Nevertheless, the smaller member states did not form a united front on 
the issue. The Benelux countries preferred an extended role of the 
Commission in the Council to the effect that the Commission should 
chair the general affairs formation and the HR/VP of the Commission 
should chair the foreign affairs formation (Benelux, 2002). All of the 
bigger member states were in favour of introducing a permanent 
chairmanship in the area of foreign affairs. With Javier Solana, they had 
a prominent advocate of the idea: 
“A permanent Chair for the External Relations Council is neces-
sary. [Better representation and policy initiation] could be achieved if 
– as many have proposed – the High Representative were to be des-
ignated as this permanent chair. It would greatly simplify external 
representation practices, and it would inevitably imply a right of ini-
tiative or proposal, alongside the prerogative of organising and steer-
ing the Council’s work. Furthermore, it would de facto (if not de ju-
re) ensure better planning and more consistent preparation of policy 
initiatives, including mobilisation of member states’ and Commis-
sion’s assets and resources.”95 
A majority of member states strongly supported the High Representa-
tive of the Union as the permanent chair of the foreign minister meet-
ings, and included the provision in the draft constitution and in the 
Lisbon Treaty. In addition, the permanent chair should preside over a 
dedicated Foreign Affairs Council formation that would deal exclusively 
with external relations. The reform of the Council formations already 
started with the Seville European Council, which cut the number of 
formations from 16 to nine (European Council, 2002). However, the 
drivers of that time, Spanish Council President Aznar and Secretary of 
the Council Solana, failed to convince smaller member states to split 
external affairs from the general affairs Council formation (Powell, 
2002). The Seville European Council could only agree that general and 
foreign  affairs  would  be  dealt  with  at  separate  meetings  with  separate  
agendas. However, in the Convention, the introduction of a separate 
Foreign Affairs Council was broadly supported. The change seemed 
necessary in light of the overall package of institutional reforms, and 
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member states shared the perception that the efficiency of the Council’s 
work had to be improved (Norman, 2003). 
Conclusion 
At the heart of the European Convention was the question of how to 
improve the efficiency and visibility of Europe’s foreign policy project. 
Many of the interventions during the proceedings aimed at institutional 
solutions to better organise collective behaviour of the member states. 
In accordance with the PA literature, the member states designed an 
EU-level agent that would take over the implementation of common 
tasks. However, the design of the High Representative of the Union 
cannot only be seen as a well-crafted invention following only func-
tional considerations of the delegates. The European Convention, de-
spite having different initial aspirations, became a place at which dele-
gates deliberated on the basis of national positions on the future institu-
tional architecture of the Union. The ‘multi-hat’ of the High Repre-
sentative was a typical compromise among EU member states with 
different preferences on the institutional architecture. The question was 
not whether the High Representative should be strengthened, but how. 
The member states disagreed on the question of how to apply the 
community method, or the intergovernmental method to the office of 
the new EU foreign policy chief.  
The different models of the member states concerning the post did not 
lead to a lowest common denominator design. On the contrary, in or-
der to meet the sovereignty- and efficiency concerns of the member 
states, the post was equipped with competences in the CFSP, as well as 
in the Commission’s external relations, while member states stressed 
that both spheres would retain their distinct character and decision-
making framework.  
Hence, the compromise pleased all member states to a certain extent. 
Member states that were rather sceptical about losing sovereignty to the 
EU level pointed out that political decision-making was kept separate 
and under full control of the member states. The integrationist member 
states could point to the fact that EU foreign policy was more efficient-
ly organised with a centre of gravity for its decision-making. The new 
set-up comprised strong elements of member states’ control, as the 
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continuity of the intergovernmental CFSP set-up allowed member 
states to veto, and thus sanction, deviant behaviour of the High Repre-
sentative. Member states also ensured that the double posting of the 
office-holder as Commission Vice-President would not entail a transfer 
of competences to the EU level, or even give the Commission the 
chance to become one of multiple principals of the High Representa-
tive. The Lisbon Treaty states that, with respect to the responsibilities 
as Vice-President of the Commission only, the “High Representative 
shall be bound by Commission procedures” to the extent that this is 
consistent with his duties in CFSP matters and as Foreign Affairs 
Council chair.96 Two declarations within the Lisbon Treaty (13 and 14) 
highlight the fact that the creation of the High Representative and the 
EEAS would not affect the responsibilities, power and legal basis of 
member states in relation to their conduct regarding foreign policy and 
diplomatic bilateral and multilateral relations. 
However, the arrangement opened up the possibility for agent competi-
tion between the High Representative and the Commission. As Piris 
(2010: 248) noted,  
“[T]he treaty gives the High Representative a co-ordinating role in 
the Commission (Art 18(4) TEU), but it does not give him/her, 
ipso facto, the legal power to impose his/her decisions on his/her col-
leagues in the College. Moreover, the President of the Commission 
might also wish to play a leading role in co-ordinating the external 
policies of the College.”  
The Lisbon Treaty thus built a potential tension into the relationship 
with the High Representative’s colleagues in the Commission, as it did 
not equip the High Representative with the necessary hierarchical com-
petences with which to fulfil the coordinating role.  
The compromise fulfilled the important function of keeping all mem-
ber states attached to the aim of further developing Europe’s foreign 
policy architecture. However, it cannot be evaluated on the basis of the 
Treaty articles alone, if the new powers of the post of High Representa-
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tive also implied that the incumbent would gain discretion to shape EU 
foreign policy. The following chapters will look more closely at the 
processes and interactions between the High Representative, the mem-
ber states, and the Commission in particular cases. 

 
 
5. Creating the EEAS: how and why member 
states lost control 
 
“My legacy will be the setup of the EEAS,” was the response of Cathe-
rine  Ashton  at  a  conference  in  Brussels  in  early  2013,  when  she  was  
asked what she would be remembered for (Ashton, 2013a). Undoubt-
edly, the creation of the new service was one of the greatest achieve-
ments during her term. Brokering a deal in the face of fundamentally 
different interests of the member states, the Commission and the EP 
within less than a year was a remarkable achievement. However the 
question remains as to the extent of discretion the High Representative, 
who formally proposed the basic organisation and functioning of the 
service, had over its design.  
This  chapter  suggests  that  in  the process  of  setting up the EEAS,  the 
member states lost control over its final design. The process leading up 
to the decision on the EEAS was characterised partly by conflicting 
preferences of member states on the organisation and scope of the 
service. Furthermore, the member states had limited possibility to over-
see the complex planning processes and thus to control the proposed 
architecture of the service that was developed by the High Representa-
tive in cooperation with the Commission. As a consequence, the High 
Representative had unintended discretion over the design of the EEAS 
in some instances. This chapter suggests that a crucial factor in explain-
ing how and why member states lost control over the set-up of the 
EEAS was the cooperation between the High Representative and the 
Commission in drafting the building blocks of the service. In the con-
text of the ambitious timeframe of the process, the member states had 
difficulties realising their preferences in the set-up. Despite the EP’s 
claim of having had a major influence on the structure of the EEAS, it 
is shown that its influence has been rather marginal when it comes to 
the general design and functioning of the service.  
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5.1. Member states’ groundwork  
The service in the Convention 
The EEAS – just like the post of High Representative – has its basis in 
the Convention on the future of Europe. The creation of a service ded-
icated to the management of the EU’s external activities directly fol-
lowed from the logic of the post of the double-hatted High Representa-
tive. If a foreign policy chief were to be tasked with various aspects of 
agenda-management, as well as representational tasks, the available 
resources at the chief’s disposal should be adequate. In addition, the 
idea  at  the  time  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  growth  of  parallel  foreign  
policy structures in the Commission and in the Council Secretariat. 
Needless to say, the members of the European Convention in favour of 
keeping the posts of High Representative and Relex Commissioner 
separate saw only limited possibilities for a joint administrative body. 
Only a joint press service or a joint strategic unit could, for example, 
help to improve the synergies of two separate posts.97 But even the 
proponents of the double hat, such as Germany, did not have a clear 
vision of the EEAS at the start. For example, the German delegation 
outlined a divided structure for the High Representative: it should be 
assisted by DG Relex in its role as Vice-President of the Commission, 
and by a consolidated ‘European Foreign Policy Unit’ that combined 
the foreign policy desks of the Council Secretariat and also comprised 
seconded national diplomats. Only a joint cabinet should ensure “the 
practical coordination of the two substructures”.98 
However, such a minimalistic version did not seem to be a solution to 
inefficiencies of the duplicated representational system itself. While at 
that time the Commission had 123 delegations around the world, its 
portfolio did not extend to political and diplomatic tasks within the 
CFSP. Meanwhile, the Council had already established two liaison of-
fices in New York and Geneva next to the Commission delegations, in 
order to ensure continuity of the Council’s work within the UN. The 
delegates at the Convention thus aimed to eliminate duplications, which 
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had grown in and outside Brussels. Having different people working on 
the same issues just across Schuman roundabout did not seem effec-
tive. The final paper of the WG on external relations stated that a “large 
consensus” emerged on the idea of an EEAS. 99 Under the authority of 
the High Representative, the service should comprise staff from the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat, as well as seconded national 
diplomats. Commission delegations would become EU delegations, and 
would be answerable either to the Commission (on its portfolios) or to 
the High Representative (on CFSP). The Franco-German paper on 
institutions gave the final endorsement to this idea, reiterating the posi-
tion of the working group.100 It was agreed that a common service 
would be built based on the resources of the Commission and Council 
Secretariat, in support of the High Representative and with delegations 
around the world. Consensus at this point suggested that the architects 
of the EEAS did not anticipate how difficult its creation would be.  
First consultations on the service 
The basic elements of setting up the EEAS were enshrined in the Con-
stitutional and Lisbon Treaties: a service would be created to assist the 
High Representative, and would comprise staff from the Commission, 
Council Secretariat and seconded member state officials. The member 
states delegated the task of answering the detailed questions regarding 
the structure, as well as scope, of the service to the High Representa-
tive. The High Representative had to table a proposal for a Council 
decision, which also needed the consent of the Commission. In addi-
tion, the EP had to be consulted.101 
Judged only on this treaty basis, the mandate to the High Representa-
tive was short on details and deliberately granted discretion to the High 
                                                   
99 See CONV 459/02. Some of the member states also voiced their concerns. The 
creation of EU delegations, which, in contrast to the Commission delegations, would 
also represent and coordinate EU positions on political aspects of foreign policy, was 
seen by some members as a strong and premature move, considering that the new 
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delegations on the ground (WD 21 REV 1). 
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Representative over the design of the EEAS. However, the treaty basis 
does not tell the whole story on the EEAS mandate: the member states, 
together  with the EU-level  actors,  started to work on the EEAS deci-
sion long before the Lisbon High Representative came into being. They 
started to outline more than the basic structure, and went into details 
on the mandate of the High Representative. The first planning and 
consultations started in late 2004. Still anticipating ratification of the 
Constitutional treaty, the December European Council tasked Com-
mission President Barroso and High Representative Solana to under-
take a first stocktaking exercise of the member states’ positions on the 
EEAS in order to propel planning for the service.102  
Two points were controversial at that time. First, the organisational 
positioning of the new service was not clear. The member states had 
already intensively discussed the positioning of the post of High Repre-
sentative during the Convention on the future of Europe, and dis-
missed the idea of integrating the role into the Commission (see Chap-
ter 4). However, the EEAS could theoretically be placed in either of the 
two bodies (Commission or Council), or could remain separate. The 
EP started lobbying for an ambitious solution: the “EEAS should be 
incorporated, in organisational and budgetary terms, in the Commis-
sion’s staff structure” (European Parliament, 2005). The member states 
disagreed, and arrived at a broad consensus that the service should have 
a sui generis character, meaning that it should not be a new institution, 
“but a service under the authority of the Foreign Minister, with close 
links to both the Council and the Commission”.103 
Second, the scope of the service was wide open. A “minimalist version” 
(Duke, 2009) would comprise only a small service that would mainly be 
in charge of CFSP/CSDP. The Policy Unit and DG E from the Coun-
cil Secretariat would constitute the biggest part of the service, together 
with the policy unit from the Commission’s DG Relex. As Duke (2009) 
suggests, this version was subject to doubts about whether the man-
                                                   
102 In a joint effort, the Presidency, the Commission and the Council Secretariat held 
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power of the service was enough to support all functions of the High 
Representative. However, this small shuffling of posts would have elim-
inated the risk of major competition between the Commission and the 
EEAS about external action competences. A “maximalist version” 
(Duke, 2009) was to move a broad spectrum of the foreign policy port-
folio to the EEAS, including the DGs of the Commission, which deal 
with development cooperation, enlargement and the neighbourhood. 
Only trade, as an exclusive competence of the Union, as well as human-
itarian aid, would have stayed in the Commission. The 2005 report 
concluded that a broad approach was necessary in order to avoid dupli-
cations, and the most likely solution would be somewhere in the middle 
between the minimalist and the maximalist version.104 
The preparatory work from 2005 further defined the mandate of the 
High Representative with regard to the creation of the service. The 
member states successfully aggregated their preferences on two points. 
First, it was clearly stated that the EEAS should have a sui generis charac-
ter, and hence be outside the Commission. Second, the member states 
– although not clear about the details – stated that they were in favour 
of a broad EEAS portfolio. With this more detailed definition for the 
creation of the service, the High Representative did not necessarily lose 
discretion over its design. On the contrary, a sui generis and comprehen-
sive service gave the High Representative more options with which to 
design the new structures. However, it also posed the question of how 
the High Representative would interact with the Commission and its 
overlapping competences in development aid, neighbourhood, and 
enlargement, as well as humanitarian aid. Would the interaction be-
tween these EU level agents be marked by competition or cooperation?   
All progress stalled in summer 2005. The negative referendums in 
France and the Netherlands halted the debate, and preparation re-
mained stalled for years to come. A senior official recalled that “people 
could not be seen working on the EEAS before the Lisbon Treaty was 
ratified in all member states”.105  
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The Swedish Presidency 
Only the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty spurred preparations for 
the set-up of the EEAS. During the Swedish Council Presidency of late 
2009, the EEAS was back on the agenda. Catherine Ashton was only 
nominated at the end of 2009 and thus could not influence the initial 
preparations. The basic scope and structure of the service was designed 
without the High Representative’s input. The member states, the 
Commission and the EP did not wait until the day of the nomination of 
the High Representative to start working on the EEAS design.  
The main document that manifested these efforts is the report of the 
Swedish Presidency to the October 2009 European Council.106 It pre-
sented the results of preparatory work by the Presidency, together with 
the other member states, the Commission and the Council Secretari-
at.107 The Swedish Presidency was seen as a success with regard to the 
EEAS preparations (Murdoch, 2011).While the positioning and the 
scope of the service had not been entirely determined after the 2005 
consultations, the Swedish Presidency made progress on both issues. 
The service should be a “service of a sui generis nature separate from the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat”,108 with autonomy over its 
budget and staffing, and with the High Representative in charge. 
With respect to the scope of the service, the Swedish report foresaw 
that development cooperation, trade, as well as enlargement, should 
stay within the Commission.109 However, single geographic and themat-
ic desks were to be created in the EEAS and concentrate the resources 
in the Commission and the Council Secretariat.110 Regarding the con-
troversial transfer of crisis-management structures to the EEAS, the 
report suggested that they should be included in the hierarchy of the 
new service. However, the member states had become more cautious 
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http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf. Referred to 
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about the incremental integration of these core aspects of national sov-
ereignty after the shock of the negative constitutional referenda. Hence, 
when deciding on the Lisbon Treaty they included a declaration speci-
fying that the provisions of the treaty on the CFSP would not have an 
impact on the formulation and the international relations of the mem-
ber states’ foreign policies, and would not enhance the competences of 
the Commission or the EP.111 Acknowledging these concerns of the 
member states, the Swedish report made it clear that the CSDP struc-
tures in the EEAS should be placed under the direct authority of the 
High Representative.112 
As a consequence of having a separate institutional structure for the 
service, and given that some of the portfolios would remain within the 
Commission, a clear need arose to carefully consider the issue of coor-
dination between the EEAS and the Commission in these policy fields. 
In terms of the financial instruments (such as neighbourhood and de-
velopment policy), “the EEAS (single geographic desks) should play a 
leading role in the strategic decision-making”.113 However, it remained 
open as to exactly where the programming chain would be cut, and 
where the Commission would take charge of the implementation of the 
instruments.114 In general, it was agreed that there should be close co-
operation between the High Representative and the Commissioner 
responsible for the programming, including jointly prepared deci-
sions.115 Apart from the programming of the external instruments, the 
Swedish document highlighted that the EEAS services and the Com-
mission services for external responsibilities and for internal responsibil-
ities with significant external implications should establish effective 
consultation procedures.116  
The work of the Swedish Presidency of 2009 had a positive effect on 
the member states’ capability to aggregate their preferences. With the 
Lisbon Treaty not yet in place, the member states and, in particular, the 
rotating Presidency were in full control of the process and had no im-
                                                   
111 Declaration 14 to the Lisbon Treaty. 
112 Indent 7, Swedish Presidency report. 
113 Indent 9, Swedish Presidency report. 
114 Indent 9, Swedish Presidency report. 
115 Indent 10, Swedish Presidency report. 
116 Indent 13, Swedish Presidency report. 
122     The constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy 
 
 
mediate deadline to meet. The Swedish Presidency succeeded in ensur-
ing an agreement on basic points of the EEAS design. By further defin-
ing the organisation of the EEAS, any risk of unintended discretion for 
the High Representative over the set-up of the service was limited. 
However, more importantly, the member states agreed that the High 
Representative, supported by the EEAS, should have competences in 
coordinating a wide range of external activities of the EU. This set the 
stage for intense negotiations between the High Representative and the 
Commission on how to delimitate the competences of their administra-
tions.  
The EP’s vision of the service differed from that of the member states. 
In  October  2009,  the  EP  issued  the  so-called  “Brok  report”  on  the  
institutional functioning of the EEAS.117 The main point expressed in 
the parliament’s position was again to incorporate the EEAS in the 
Commission’s administrative structure. In general, the EP wanted to 
prevent the Community-based aspects of EU’s external action from 
moving under the umbrella of the EEAS, and thus away from the con-
trol of the Parliament. DGs dealing with issues such as trade, enlarge-
ment and development, as well as externally oriented units of the DG 
for Economic and Financial Affairs were to be administrated under a 
specific model that allowed them to retain their integrity. While the 
EP’s preferences before the Lisbon Treaty came into force were not in 
line with those of the member states, it remained to be seen as to which 
position the new High Representative and Commission would take.  
5.2. Cooperation between the Commission and the High Repre-
sentative 
The nomination of Ashton and her portfolio 
After Catherine Ashton was nominated as the first High Representative 
of the Union under Lisbon rules in December 2009, the path on which 
the EEAS should develop, and the main scope of the service, seemed 
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to be mostly set. However, the member states had yet to face tough 
negotiations with the Commission. Up to that point, the member states 
were in control of the set-up of the office of the High Representative. 
After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the interaction of the High 
Representative with the Commission had unintended effects on the 
discretion of the new agent. It turned out that, despite overlapping 
competences, the High Representative and the Commission President 
were in agreement on the shape of the new service; however, their 
preferences did not match the views of the member states. 
At  first  sight,  it  is  surprising  that  the  High  Representative  and  the  
Commission President would agree on the organisation of the EEAS 
and its relations towards the Commission. Bureaucratic tension is in-
built within the institutional set-up of the two posts (Erkelens and 
Blockmans, 2012). On the one hand, the President of the Commission 
has a primus inter pares position in the College as due to being able to 
“reshuffle the allocation of […] responsibilities during the Commis-
sion’s term of office”, while other Commissioners should “carry out the 
duties devolved upon them by the President under his authority”.118 On 
the other hand, the High Representative is also provided with an en-
hanced position within the College of Commissioners on the basis of 
the Treaty, due to a responsibility to coordinate the external relations 
portfolios within the Commission.119 This is a clear sign of overlapping 
competences, and raises the question of who is in charge of coordinat-
ing Commission activities in the field of external relations. 
However, instead of competition between the two actors, a pattern of 
cooperation developed that featured strong leadership by Commission 
President Barroso. One reason for this was the beneficial position of 
the Commission President at the start of the term, which set the tone 
for further cooperation. The Commission President was the first nomi-
nation settled by the European Council in December 2009. The Treaty 
stipulates that the President of the Commission has to give consent to 
the designation of the High Representative.120 However, Barroso played 
an even more defining role than the Treaty would formally suggest. The 
                                                   
118 Art. 248 TEU. 
119 Art. 18 (4) TEU. 
120 Art. 18(1) TEU. 
124     The constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy 
 
 
fact that Catherine Ashton became High Representative of the Union, 
after David Miliband refused the job, goes back to a proposal by Barro-
so,  who  arguably  saw  his  chance  to  install  a  Vice-President  with  less  
political clout and standing (Barber, 2010; Howorth, 2011). Thus, Bar-
roso was the ‘Queenmaker’.  
In a second step, Barroso used his competence to define the Commis-
sioner portfolios to pave the way for future cooperation with the High 
Representative. He had the right to nominate his team and define their 
portfolios inter alia by sending out mission letters to his College of 
Commissioners.121 Instead of giving the neighbourhood portfolio to the 
HR/VP, he assigned this responsibility to Štefan Füle, who became 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood policy. In his 
mission letter, Barroso argued for a division of labour between the two 
posts, but also synergies “which could be offered by close cooperation 
between you [Štefan Füle] and the High Representative/Vice-
President”.122 However, many commentators saw this as a pre-emptive 
strike to diminish the power of the EEAS and the High Representative, 
and retain the Commission’s power over the heavy neighbourhood 
portfolio (see, for example, Behr et al., 2010).  
High Representative Ashton, facing criticism in her nomination hearing 
in the EP for abandoning the neighbourhood, contradicted an interpre-
tation that would see her in competition with the Commission Presi-
dent:  
“I worked together with the President of the Commission on the pro-
posals that he has put forward. […] When you have the role that I 
have [...] that covers a huge amount of the landscape, […] we have 
to be very clear about how we implement the policies that we have. 
Therefore, what we have done within the cluster of Commissioners 
that work with me, we have designated particular responsibilities. 
[…] Having a Commissioner who is working with me in order to 
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support this strategy means that we will develop an expertise in the 
neighbourhood in a way that – with all the responsibilities I have – 
I simply could not do.“123 
Here, it became obvious that the High Representative and the Commis-
sion President were ‘partners in crime’, much to the displeasure of the 
member states. In February 2010, staff involved in the international 
climate change negotiation and the energy task-force were transferred 
from DG Relex to the Climate Action DG, and DG Energy. Conse-
quently, they were no longer part of the to-be-established EEAS. While 
the Commission argued that the staff were necessary to the functioning 
of the DGs, the member states were frustrated: “member states’ diplo-
mats said that the move was made to insulate the units from the pull of 
the  EEAS.  They  believed  that  the  EEAS needs  staff  dealing  with  the  
external dimensions of internal policies” (Vogel, 2010). The member 
states had a different, more comprehensive, understanding of the 
EEAS, which was not in line with that of the Commission President 
and High Representative. However, the two EU-level agents agreed, 
and closely cooperated in the following set-up of the EEAS; they were 
thus able to gain unintended discretion. 
The Relex group of Commissioners 
The degree to which the High Representative accepted, or at least gave 
way to, the Commission President’s reading of the Lisbon Treaty was 
far-reaching. For example, Barroso used his power as President to pro-
tect the Commission’s influence over the external Commission portfo-
lios, even though the job of coordinating the Commission’s interna-
tional activities was given to the High Representative as Vice-President 
of the Commission.124 In  a  note  sent  on  22  April  2010,  Barroso  in-
formed Commissioners on the composition of groups of Commission-
ers (Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012). Catherine Ashton was put in 
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events/video?event=20100111-1531-SPECIAL. 
124 Art. 18 (4) TEU. 
126     The constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy 
 
 
charge of the Relex group.125 On paper, being in charge of this external 
group of Commissioners put the High Representative in a position to 
fulfil a coordinating role in the Commission. However, the note to the 
Commissioners also included important powers for the Commission 
President and its administration:  
· “Each group will work on the basis of a mandate from the President 
setting out the purpose of the group and the product(s) to be delivered. 
· The President’s Cabinet and SG will participate in all groups. The 
Cabinet/Service of the lead Commissioner will prepare papers for discus-
sion in the groups. Meeting reports, agendas and organisation will be 
done by the SG.  
· The President can decide to attend any meeting, which he will then chair.  
· These groups will not take decisions but one of their tasks will be to 
prepare for collegiate discussion/decision.”  
(Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012) 
The Commission President and the Commission Secretariat thus kept 
important prerogatives and effectively had power over the agenda, as 
well as the chair. The group was also stripped of its power, as it could 
not take any decisions on its own but needed to refer to the College of 
Commissioners. Even though this note also applied to the other groups 
of Commissioners, the fact that it was applicable to the Relex group is a 
special case, as it directly touched on the High Representative’s right to 
coordinate external Commission portfolios.  
Catherine Ashton lost authority in the bureaucratic tension that arose 
with the Commission President, which itself was a consequence of the 
ambiguity of the Lisbon Treaty. However, legal commentators were of 
the opinion that the treaty was fairly clear on who should have the 
power to coordinate. While the Commission President had the overall 
power to structure the Commission and the division of portfolios with-
in it, he had to take into account the High Representative’s responsibil-
ity to coordinate the external relations (Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012). 
The Commission President arguably overused the rights he was given 
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by the treaty at the cost of the High Representative. However, there 
was no recorded opposition from the High Representative. The upper 
echelons of the Commission and the High Representative closely coop-
erated, to the disadvantage of the member states – in particular in the 
upcoming negotiations on the EEAS. 
The ‘Ashton group’ on the EEAS decision 
Close cooperation with the Commission on the set-up of the EEAS 
continued, at least during the first period of the ‘Ashton group’. Nego-
tiations in Coreper126 had already begun prior to the nomination of the 
HR under the Swedish Presidency. In a report by Coreper to the Octo-
ber 2009 European Council, a taskforce of 15 to 20 people coming 
from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the member states 
was envisaged (Helwig, 2013). The idea of a high-level group led by the 
High Representative also made it into the Swedish Presidency report on 
the EEAS.127 However, Catherine Ashton did not directly take up this 
approach. In the beginning, she wanted to be closely involved in the 
process herself, instead of delegating the task to a working group.128 To 
that end, she held regular meetings with representatives of the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission, as well as of the three permanent rep-
resentatives of the trio Presidency. This ‘Ashton group’ comprised 13 
members, and was taken up by the media as a “high-level group” 
(Rettman, 2010a). Indeed, the list of participants reads like a who’s-who 
of the Brussels lawyer- and foreign policy elite (see Table 5.1). The EP 
was – to its displeasure – initially not represented, but was allowed to 
send an observer from mid-February. 
The working group theoretically represented a forum in which the ten-
sions between the member states and the Commission could be dis-
cussed and levelled out. However, this was not the case in practice. 
According to one of the participants, the workings of the group led to 
an “institutional clash”,129 meaning a conflict between the preferences 
of the Commission and the member states. The member states had a 
                                                   
126 The discussions took place in Coreper II, at the level of the permanent representa-
tives.   
127 Indent 34, Swedish Presidency report. 
128 Interview #41. 
129 Interview #36. 
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disadvantage in this set-up, as they had loose ongoing control of the 
process. While the member states were involved though representatives 
of the Council Presidency, it might be questioned how much influence 
in the process they actually had. First, the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat brought a significant amount of institutional- and policy 
expertise to the table. In addition, the ambassadors of the Presidency 
were muted by a proviso adopted by the committee in its first session 
which stated that they take would part “on an individual basis and 
[would] not represent or speak on behalf of Coreper” (Rettman, 2010a).  
 Name Position 
Commission 
 
João Vale de Almeida 
Catherine Day 
Patrick Child 
James Morrison 
Luis Romero Requena 
 
Director-General of DG Relex 
Secretary-General 
Director of the External Service 
Head of Ashton’s Cabinet 
Director of Legal Service 
Council Pierre de Boissieu 
Jean-Claude Piris 
Robert Cooper 
Helga Schmid 
Secretary-General of the Council 
Director of the Council Legal Service 
Director-General for dg e 
Head of the Policy Unit 
 
Member states 
(Trio  
Presidency) 
Luis Romero Requena 
Carlos F. A. Minuesa 
Jean de Ruyt 
Gábor Ivan 
Permanent Representative to the EU, Spain 
PSC ambassador, Spain 
Permanent Representative to the EU, Belgium 
Permanent Representative to the EU, Hungary 
Table 5.1: The ‘Ashton group’ on setting-up the EEAS 
Commission and High Representative versus member states 
The Coreper meetings in early 2010 were characterised by an omni-
presence of the Commission Secretariat/High Representative’s cabinet 
team, represented by Catherine Day (Secretary-General of the Commis-
sion) and James Morrison (Head of Ashton’s Cabinet). At the end of 
January, the two presented a common proposal with the backing of 
Commission President Barroso, which would have – if realised – 
fenced-off important Commission powers vis-à-vis the EEAS. The 
essential part of this proposal was to keep the programming staff and 
responsibility of the European Development Fund (EDF), including 
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geographic desks dealing with the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) 
countries, almost completely in the Commission. However, the Devel-
opment Cooperation Instrument (DCI) would have been split, with the 
strategic stages of the programming going to the EEAS. This would 
have meant a division of the programming of the EDF and DCI, and 
kept parallel geographic desks in the Commission and the EEAS. The 
EDF would have been solely under the umbrella of the Commission. 
Only the ‘pen’ for the general strategic picture, for example for the 
drafting of geographically specific strategies, would have been given to 
the High Representative. 
The Commission/High Representative proposal clashed with the posi-
tion of the member states. The argument set forth by Barroso and Ash-
ton was that the proposal would ensure a division of the workload be-
tween Ashton and the other Commissioners. Coherence would be en-
sured by the High Representative’s coordinating function in the Com-
mission. Almost all member states saw this as an incorrect reading of 
the Lisbon Treaty,130 and as being in sharp contrast to their position 
paper under the Swedish Presidency. According to them, resources and 
strategic oversight over development cooperation had to be transferred 
to the EEAS, which would then support other Commissioners. This 
move would guarantee coherence and avoid duplication. The pro-
gramming cycle of instruments would be split between the strategic 
stages (EEAS) and the implementation stages (Commission), as agreed 
in the text from the October 2009 European Council. In the end, the 
member states agreed on this position in the final Council decision. 
Even though the Commission and the High Representative cooperated 
in this matter, they did not get their position through. Member states 
had the aligned preference to strengthen the EEAS on strategic ques-
tions of development policies. They prevented their EU-level agents 
from obtaining unintended discretion, and set up a division of labour in 
which the EEAS would have almost nothing to say on the major part 
of the development cooperation budget. 
The days of the “Ashton group” were in general demanding for the 
member states, in terms of control over the process of setting up the 
EEAS. The Spanish Presidency – not being the proposing body and 
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confronted with conflicting preferences of the member states – had a 
limited role in the discussions compared to the previous Swedish Presi-
dency. Only limited information passed from the Ashton group to the 
Permanent Representatives. Papers that would build the basis of the 
EEAS decision (on the vision, the basic elements, and the organisation-
al chart) were delayed several times.131 Coreper was confronted with 
changing interlocutors from the ‘Ashton group’, with a bias towards 
Commission representatives that could assertively promote their read-
ing of the treaty. 
By the end of February, the mood in Coreper was severely subdued and 
member state representatives were concerned with the speed and for-
mat of the process.132 The deadline set by the October 2009 European 
Council for the end of April 2010 was approaching. The member states 
were facing a risk that the EEAS would fail to be established in the way 
that they had envisioned it. They had to regain control over the pro-
cess, and be more involved in the planning. As a consequence, Poul 
Skytte Christoffersen (former permanent representative to the EU, 
Denmark) was appointed by Ashton as her special advisor on the set-
ting-up of the EEAS. 
5.3. Towards the March draft 
Christoffersen group: member states back in the game 
The nomination of Christoffersen marked a major improvement in the 
position of the member states. From this point onwards, Coreper 
would have a single interlocutor for the EEAS set-up. In addition, 
Christoffersen understood the working of the group and the positions 
of the member states very well. He could be trusted, as he had been 
part of Coreper as the Permanent Representative of Denmark between 
1995–2003, and again in 2009.  
Christoffersen took over the work on 1 March 2010. He put together 
his own taskforce with a limited number of people from the Commis-
sion and Council Secretariat.133 As the starting point, he went back to 
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the blueprint discussed during the Swedish Presidency and endorsed by 
the October European Council 2009. The member states welcomed 
this reset, as the October European Council decision was much closer 
to their position than the later joint Commission/High Representative 
proposals. The blueprint foresaw, in part, a ‘maximalist approach’. Un-
like ‘normal’ foreign ministries, the EEAS would have a broad scope of 
foreign policy instruments at its disposal, ranging from strategic direc-
tions of financial instruments (including development) to crisis-
management structures.  
The member states first focused on the immediate question of the 
pending nominations of heads of delegations.134 Christoffersen and his 
team then started working on a draft of the main structure and organi-
sation of the service. He worked together with Christian Leffler from 
the European Commission and the Head of Ashton’s Cabinet, James 
Morrison. The latter was especially responsible for organising the 
agreement with the Commission on the financial and staff regulations 
and the first budget, which was placed within the remit of the Commis-
sion’s right of initiative. In a speech at Maastricht University, Christof-
fersen recalled the enormous task he was confronted with:  
“[…]  a  lot  of  people  were  telling  me  that  my  job  would  be  fairly  
simple: just take the establishment plan of a normal foreign ministry, 
do a bit of mingling here and there and you have the structure for a 
European foreign ministry. But the fact is that a European foreign 
ministry is very different from national foreign ministries.” 
(Christoffersen, 2011) 
                                                   
134 The discussion was especially triggered by the nomination of the Head of Delegation 
in Washington by the Commission President. The Commission was of the opinion that 
the old rules, which saw the Commission in charge of nominations, should continue to 
be valid until the EEAS decision was adopted. However, the member states wanted to 
be more closely involved in the nominations. They agreed that internal nominations, 
like the head of the Washington delegation, should be an emergency solution only, and 
be enacted with the involvement of the member states. Except for one other urgent 
nomination, the Head of Delegation in Kabul, all other nominations were postponed 
until later that year. 
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On 25 March 2010, Catherine Ashton presented to Coreper the draft 
EEAS Council decision written by Christoffersen and his team.135 
The March draft represented a more elaborate version of the draft from 
October. The delimitation of competences and means of coordination 
between the High Representative and the EEAS were the main focus 
points for the member states. In this regard, Christoffersen and his 
team worked out a balancing act between the Commission and the 
member state positions. However, its wording was in many ways still 
contested. Key issues included the programming of financial instru-
ments and the work of the Union delegations and their heads. 
The programming of the financial instruments largely followed the 
October 2009 European Council report as demanded by the member 
states. The early Commission draft that foresaw a much stronger posi-
tion for the Commission was abandoned. Strategic programming steps 
of the DCI, as well as of the EDF, would be done from the single geo-
graphic desks of the EEAS, while implementation would remain in the 
Commission.136 The solution presented allocated the first three stages 
of the programming to the EEAS and the last two stages to the Com-
mission. This result was an ambitious one, and the solution arose from 
the fact that stages two and three were naturally linked, and had to be 
performed by one entity.137  
While this solution represented a significant step towards the position 
of the member states, a broad coalition (including France, UK, Finland, 
and Belgium as well as a coalition of 10 other member states headed by 
Malta)  wanted  the  High  Representative  and  the  EEAS  to  have  a  
stronger role in the general coordination of the process.138 The March 
draft still foresaw that the management of financial instruments would 
be in the hands of the Commission, while the High Representative and 
the EEAS would only “contribute […] to the programming and man-
                                                   
135 “Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION of (date) establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service (25 March 2010)”, available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/eeas_draft_decision_250310_en.pdf. Referred to hereafter 
as the EEAS decision March draft. 
136 Art. 8 EEAS decision March draft.  
137 Interview #41. 
138 Background discussions with the author. 
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agement of the financial instruments”.139 At the request of the member 
states, the following sentence was added to the article of financial in-
struments in the final decision:  
“The High Representative shall ensure overall political coordination 
of the Union’s external action, ensuring the unity, consistency and ef-
fectiveness of the Union’s external action in particular through the 
following external assistance instruments […]..”140  
The above-mentioned member states would have preferred the High 
Representative to have full responsibility for financial instruments, 
instead of the ambiguous “overall political coordination”. However, it 
was hardly possible for them to make additional changes. The wording 
of the article was agreed language at the highest level of the Commis-
sion with the backing of the High Representative. The text also stood a 
good chance of being accepted by the EP, and the member states 
themselves had different views on the political independence of devel-
opment cooperation instruments.141 Moreover, the Spanish Presidency 
choked off further discussion on the article, as it wanted to obtain po-
litical agreement on the EEAS during its term.142  
The Commission and the High Representative cooperated to the effect 
that the member states had difficulties keeping the process under con-
trol. The agreement first made between the two EU-level agents was 
difficult for the member states to alter: the Commission would manage 
the programming, while the High Representative would ensure overall 
coherence. The geographic desks would move to the EEAS (as re-
quested by the member states), but would remain “under the responsi-
bility of the Commissioner responsible”143 for the programming. Deci-
                                                   
139 Art. 8(1) EEAS decision March draft. 
140 Art. 9(2), “Council decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and func-
tioning of the European External Action Service”, available at: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_decision_en.pdf. Referred to 
hereafter as the EEAS Council decision. 
141 Interviews #10, #25, #41. 
142 Interview #36. 
143 This  is  the final  wording of Art.  9(4)  and 9(5)  of the EEAS Council  decision.  The 
wording of the earlier March draft was even more pronounced, and put the EEAS 
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sions would be presented jointly by the Commissioner and the High 
Representative to the College of Commissioners. In short, the member 
states realised their preference for having single geographic desks in the 
EEAS, but the Commission obtained control over them. 
Also  in  play  were  issues  relating  to  the  CFSP  budget,  the  Instrument  
for Stability, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Coun-
tries, and the Communication and Public Diplomacy, and Election 
Observation Missions. Article 7(3) of the March draft stipulated that all 
of these would stay within the remit of the Commission, but under the 
authority of the High Representative as its Vice-President. During the 
negotiations, the Spanish Presidency preferred the EEAS to have a 
stronger role in the administration of the budget. The solution was to 
physically include the Commission unit in the new service.144 
Another point of concern for the member states was the role of the 
heads of delegation in the March draft. They were given a broad man-
date to ensure the coherence of EU foreign policy on the ground. Arti-
cle 5(2) ensured that the overall coordinating power over Union matters 
remained with the Head of Delegation. The Head of Delegation would 
have  “authority  over  all  staff  in  the  delegation,  whatever  their  status,  
and for all its activities”,145 and thus hold authority over the Commis-
sion staff in the delegation as well. In addition, delegation heads would 
be accountable to the High Representative “for ensuring the coordina-
tion of all actions of the Union”. This also included integrated aspects 
of external policies, and the representation of common positions of the 
member states.  
The wording of the article was contested by the member states.146 In-
stead of giving responsibility for the coordination of potentially inco-
herent instructions from Brussels to the heads of delegation, the mem-
ber states wanted coherent positions between the EEAS and the 
Commission to have already been achieved in the headquarters. At the 
request of the member states, paragraph 13 was added to the recitals of 
                                                                                                            
structures under the “direct supervision and guidance” of the responsible Commission-
er (Art. 8(4), Art. 8(5) EEAS decision March draft). 
144 Interview #41. See also Art. 9(6) EEAS Council decision. 
145 Art. 5(2) EEAS decision March draft. 
146 Background discussions with the author. 
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the decision, stating that if the “Commission will issue instructions to 
delegations, it will simultaneously provide a copy thereof to the Head 
of Delegation and to the EEAS central administration”.147 A  large  
group of member states, including Italy and France, wanted a more 
ambitious coordination mechanism, but the High Representative agreed 
on the above-mentioned mechanism with the Commission, and did not 
see a problem in the fact that instructions to the Head of Delegation by 
the Commission and the EEAS could be contradictory.148 The member 
states were thus forced to retreat on this position. 
Shuffling of units 
In the spirit of the Swedish Presidency report, which called the EEAS a 
“service of sui generis nature”,149 the new draft decision foresaw the 
EEAS as a “functionally autonomous body”.150 As such, the EEAS 
would not be an institution, but would share similar characteristics, 
such as its own budget. Nevertheless, the EEAS also had many features 
of a Commission DG, as it was tasked to “take part in the preparatory 
work and procedures relating to acts to be prepared by the Commission 
[related to the external action of the Union]”, and enter into service-
level arrangements with relevant services of the Commission.151 As 
described above, in matters of programming of financial instruments 
EEAS units were also under the direct responsibility of one of the 
Commissioners.  
The line between the Commission and the EEAS was thus very 
blurred. The annex to the EEAS Council decision, which specified 
which units would move from the Commission to the EEAS, was still 
blank. However, the discussions between the two entities and the 
member states led to the shared opinion that the Commission would 
see a transfer of its DG Relex as a whole, and the parts of DG 
DEVCO that were responsible for the strategic programming of finan-
cial instruments. For the member states, as well as the EP, the annex 
was a major prerequisite to political backing for the decision. While the 
                                                   
147 Recitals, paragraph 13, EEAS Council decision. 
148 Background discussions with the author. 
149 Indent 16, Swedish Presidency report. 
150 Art. 1, EEAS decision March draft. 
151 Art. 3, EEAS decision March draft. 
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building blocks of the service were more or less clear, an open question 
was whether the support structures of the Commission (such as legal or 
language services) would move as well. However, as these were largely 
centralised within the Commission structures, it became clear that they 
could not be moved, and that the EEAS would have to enter into ser-
vice-level arrangements with the Commission instead.  
With respect to the transferred structures of the Council Secretariat, the 
March draft stated that the EEAS should include:  
“the crisis management and planning directorate, the civilian plan-
ning and conduct capability, the European Union Military Staff 
and the European Union Situation Centre, placed under the direct 
authority and responsibility of the High Representative in her capaci-
ty as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Poli-
cy.”152  
It thus followed the wording of the Swedish Presidency report from 
October 2009. Some member states were still concerned with the ques-
tion of coordination with the other units of the EEAS. On the one 
hand, it was thus agreed that matters of CSDP would be excluded from 
the consultation with the Commission;153 on the other, most member 
states shared the view that the crisis-management structures needed to 
find working methods in order to coordinate with the geographic units 
of the EEAS. The final decision thus included a sentence stating that 
“[f]ull coordination between all the structures of the EEAS shall be 
ensured”.154 It  was  also  perceived  at  that  time  that  details  of  crisis-
management coordination should not be part of the decision, but had 
to develop over time.155 As the member states could not agree on the 
specific design the EEAS structure, deliberate discretion for the High 
Representative opened up to decide on the way in which the service 
should be organised. 
                                                   
152 Art. 4(3), EEAS decision March draft. 
153 Art. 3(2) EEAS Council decision. 
154 Art. 4(3) EEAS Council decision. 
155 Interview #19. 
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Ashton’s EEAS vision 
Many details on the EEAS decision, such as methods of coordination, 
procedures and wording, were determined via technical discussions 
between member state representatives and the Commission. However, 
Catherine Ashton had her own particular view on the structure of the 
EEAS. She initially outlined this to permanent representatives in a 
meeting on 21 April 2010, just ahead of the General Affairs Council 
that gave political backing from the member states to go ahead with the 
draft on 26 April 2010.156 A personal exchange was also beneficial to 
ease the concerns of certain member states (particularly Germany) over 
the influence of the UK in the setting-up and staffing process, as well 
as concerns over the delayed organisational chart (Rettman, 2010b). 
The organisational vision for the EEAS of Catherine Ashton was one 
of a classical corporation. The centrepiece was a corporate board struc-
ture at the top of the service. In analogy to a corporate structure, the 
EEAS would be run by an ‘Executive Director’ (here Secretary-General 
of the EEAS), assisted by two ‘Managing Directors’ (here two deputy 
Secretary-Generals). One of the deputies would be in charge of the 
political affairs of the service, while the other took care of crisis-
management. Both of the deputy Secretary-Generals would have the 
possibility to bring all aspects of the service together in performing 
their respective tasks, and thus provide coherence at the top of the 
service and avoid a tube structure. Below this top-level structure would 
be several geographic and thematic Directorates, which would ensure 
coherence via close coordination.157 
On the question of her deputies, Catherine Ashton was hesitant to 
install a new system. She was unwilling to come up with a solution to 
an organisational problem that years of preparatory work have not been 
able to settle.158 Her representation in the EP was particularly central in 
this regard. With the MEPs asking for representatives on a political 
level, the foreseeable solution was to task the foreign minister of the 
Presidency (or other member states) and Commissioners with this role. 
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The Secretary-General of the EEAS and its deputies might be used for 
reporting to the EP as well, if the MEPs accepted them. 
Even though the member states were not convinced by the overall 
structure of the service, there was no open opposition in the Coreper 
meetings. Informally, however, the establishment of a Managing Direc-
tor for Crisis Response – additionally to the already existing crisis-
management capabilities – raised eyebrows among the member 
states.159 Without a fully sketched-out organisational chart, and with the 
political pressure related to getting ahead in the process, the member 
states did not table amendments. In anticipation of the following dis-
cussions with the EP and the attention of the media, backing from the 
General Affairs Council was needed in order to ensure political mo-
mentum.160 The costs of arriving at no decision became to high and the 
member states needed a declaration expressing their ability to agree on 
the structures of the new service.  
In any case, the declaration by the General Affairs Council in the fol-
lowing days did not yet carve the EEAS decision in stone, but enabled 
the process to move forward. A large coalition of member states (in-
cluding Germany, Italy, and a coalition of 10 member states headed by 
Austria) threatened at the last minute to veto a declaration of the Gen-
eral Affairs Council without a concrete way in which to reach a one-
third quota of member state officials in the new service. However, the 
26 April meeting succeeded in the end, and the member states gave 
political backing to the draft by Ashton, Christoffersen, and his team. 
Now the political discussions with the EP could start. 
5.4. MEPs flex their muscles 
The EP’s wildcard 
According to Art 27(3) TEU, the EP did not formally have to agree to 
the Council decision on the EEAS. However, MEPs threatened to veto 
the financial and staff regulations of the new service, and thus an 
agreement could only be reached by “de-facto co-decision” (Drieskens 
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and Schaik, 2010: 2). The EP’s strong stance did not come as a surprise, 
as  this  was  already  signalled  in  the  ‘Brok  report’  of  October  2009,  
which reiterated the EP’s “determination to exercise its budgetary pow-
ers to the full in connection with these institutional innovations”.161 
Therefore, Christoffersen and his team already had informal contacts 
during their preparation of the draft decision.162 However,  the  MEPs  
felt that their views were not taken into account in the EEAS decision 
March draft, which they criticised immediately after its release 
(Verhofstadt, 2010). The EP conference of Presidents confirmed that 
the various aspects of the EEAS decision would be treated as a package 
(European Parliament, 2010a). 
In a non-paper by Elmar Brok (EPP) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE), 
the EP clearly outlined what it had in mind, which resonated with pre-
viously held views (Brok and Verhofstadt, 2010). The document high-
lighted that the set-up of the EEAS must be “a logical extension of the 
acquis communautaire in the sphere of the Union’s external relations”. As 
the EEAS can neither be an institution as defined by the Treaties, nor 
an agency or office, the EEAS has to be a service linked to the Europe-
an Commission. Only this link would ensure the coherence of EU ex-
ternal activities, the political accountability of the service and the 
preservation of the “Community Model”. 
Political accountability was especially underlined in the document. Giv-
en the various tasks of the High Representative, a number of politically 
accountable deputies had to be established. The EP had a six-people-
strong EEAS leadership group in mind. With regard to Commission 
policies, this group would consist of the three Commissioners for 
Neighbourhood, Development and Humanitarian aid; concerning the 
foreign policy competences of the High Representative, the group 
would contain three politically accountable deputies in charge of bilat-
eral, multilateral and crisis-management issues.163 The idea of the MEPs 
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using Art. 33 TEU on EU Special Representatives: “The Council may, on a proposal 
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
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was that this set-up would ensure coherence in the various aspects of 
the EU’s international activities, as the group would always have to be 
consulted before a proposal went out to either the Commission College 
or the Council.164 Hearings of the Heads of Union delegations, as well 
as regular reporting by the High Representative, would ensure political 
accountability to the EP. 
On the question of how to organise the programming of the financial 
instruments, especially concerning neighbourhood and development 
policy, it appeared that the EP was internally divided.165 One side made 
the argument that a strong and coherent foreign policy could only be 
achieved by assigning the preparation of strategic decisions to the 
EEAS, while the Commission would only be responsible for the im-
plementation. Brok and Verhofstat thus argued that “[a]ll the external 
assistance instruments except for the Pre-Accession Instrument should 
be programmed within the EEAS”, and only implemented in the 
Commission. On the other hand, the development committee in the 
EP wanted to avoid development objectives becoming subordinate to 
foreign policy interests if competences were to be concentrated in the 
EEAS.166 In  the  subsequent  negotiations,  the  EP  was  thus  in  a  weak  
position to alter the already balanced compromise of the member states 
and the Commission on the division of labour in financial program-
ming.  
Quadrilogue and its outcome 
Based on these positions, the MEPs immediately criticised the proposal 
drafted by Ashton’s team, and her vision of strong corporate leadership 
by the EEAS. Ashton’s March proposal included a Secretary-General 
of  the  EEAS,  which,  according  to  the  text,  would  “take  all  measures  
necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the EEAS, including its 
administrative and budgetary management”.167 In the eyes of the MEPs 
“the proposed structure with an omnipotent secretary-general and dep-
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Representative.”  
164 Interview #23. 
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uty secretary-generals does not provide the politically legitimised depu-
ties that the High Representative needs in order to do her job properly” 
(Verhofstadt, 2010). Politically accountable deputies thus became a 
major claim of the EP, alongside other measures that would improve 
political accountability, such as hearings of senior postings. In addition, 
the EP kept insisting on having the EEAS closely linked to the Com-
mission. Even though this demand was rejected every time it came up, 
the EP asked to have the EEAS as a DG of the Commission. However, 
some officials of the Parliament involved in the negotiations saw this 
move as a “bargaining chip”, which would at least ensure that the EP 
had Commission-like scrutiny rights over the EEAS budget.168 
In order to solve the issues with the EP, the parties convened in the so-
called quadrilogue meetings, which took place between April and July 
2010.169 The four parties involved were the HR special advisor Chris-
toffersen (and at the last meeting also HR Ashton) and representatives 
of the Commission, Spanish Presidency, and the EP. 
Different interpretations of the significance of the quadrilogue process 
and its outcome exist. The dividing line in those meetings was between 
the member states and the MEPs. According to the EP, the March 
draft was an attempt by the member states to control foreign policy to 
their liking, thereby blocking political accountability and taking control 
over integrated aspects of foreign policy. Only the EP’s intervention 
safeguarded a communitarian and politically accountable service (see 
also European Parliament, 2010b).170 The media happily picked up on 
this version, and portrayed the meetings as a ‘turf war over the EEAS’ 
(Mahony, 2010; Vogel, 2010). 
                                                   
168 Interviews #23, #25. 
169 The initial meeting took place in the Council building and was perceived as subop-
timal by the three EP representatives Elmar Brok, Guy Verhofstadt, and Roberto 
Gualtieri. The EP delegation perceived it as unfavourable that the HR representative 
Christoffersen was seated between the permanent representative from Spain and a 
representative of the Council legal service (Interview #25). The representative of the 
HR/VP, which is neither strictly Council- or Commission-owned, was seated in the 
Council negotiation camp. As they feared that this would influence the outcome of the 
negotiations towards a stronger position of the member states, the seating was changed 
from the initial meeting onwards, and Christoffersen was seated independently on a 
four-sided table at the next meeting that took place in the parliament building. 
170 Interviews #16, #23, #25. 
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The member states’ view was quite the opposite. After tedious and 
technical discussions with the Commission, the member states were 
happy to have found a compromise that represented an acceptable 
institutional balance. The negotiations with the EP were necessary, but 
discussions for the member states seemed more like a psychological 
and political exercise, which ensured that the MEPs were included in 
the process. The quadrilogue was thus not a ‘big institutional battle’, 
nor did the member states or the High Representative give in to any 
significant extent.171 
Looking at the observable outcome of the proceedings, the actual result 
lies somewhere in the middle. In many instances, the EP found it could 
implement changes to the wording of the articles, which clarified re-
sponsibilities, helped to avoid misunderstandings, but did not change 
the broad line agreed beforehand. A point that was clarified was that 
the EEAS would, in budgetary terms, be treated like an institution, with 
full budgetary oversight by the EP. The operational budget would thus 
stay in the Commission budget, while the separate administrative budg-
et would be under the control of MEPs (Erkelens and Blockmans, 
2012; European Parliament, 2010b). In addition, the article on the 
planning of the financial instruments was worded in greater detail. 
Some authors have suggested that the new wording and the mentioning 
of the EEAS in ensuring the coherence of the overall programming 
goes mainly back to the initiative of the EP (Erkelens and Blockmans, 
2012); however, the above Coreper discussions suggest that the initia-
tives of the member states had a more direct impact on the outcome.  
Given the late stage of the negotiations of the member states and the 
Commission on the EEAS, the two claims of the EP – that is, keeping 
the EEAS inside the Commission and having politically accountable 
deputies for the High Representative – were “non-starters”.172 Howev-
er,  the EP was willing to give in  on these positions in  exchange for  a  
strong text on the political accountability of the service. This fallback 
position was initiated by MEP Elmar Brok, and can be considered the 
EP’s main achievement in the quadrilogue (Brok, 2011).   
                                                   
171 Interview #41. 
172 Interview #41. 
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Enhanced political accountability  
The EP achieved greater political accountability mainly through a decla-
ration on political accountability by the High Representative173 that 
would become “the reference document […] for the cooperation of the 
foreign policy executive with the Parliament” (Helwig et al., 2013: 51).  
As politically accountable deputies were an impossible demand made by 
the EP, the declaration on political accountability foresaw that the High 
Representative would be replaced, either by a Commissioner (for exclu-
sively or prevailingly Commission competences) or a member of the 
rotating trio Presidency (for CFSP).174 On a political level, the civil 
servants of the EEAS were rejected as interlocutors. This result reflect-
ed opposition to the idea of the High Representative having strong 
autonomous leadership at the top of the EEAS, and being capable of 
ensuring the management and representation of the Brussels headquar-
ters (see above; EurActiv, 2010). In order to ensure the EP’s consent, 
the half-sentence stating that the Secretary-General “shall represent the 
EEAS”  was  deleted  from Article  4(1)  of  the  EEAS Council  decision.  
Part of the overall deal was also to ensure the frequent presence in the 
EP of the High Representative.175  
In addition, the EP managed to be consulted in more cases and at earli-
er stages of the decision-making processes and planning of the EEAS. 
Until that point, the EP was only ex post informed of CFSP actions. The 
declaration on political accountability now significantly improved the 
EP’s position, and the EP’s views were now heard “prior to the adop-
tion of mandates and strategies in the area of CFSP”.176 The MEPs also 
ensured that the heads of delegation have to come to parliament for an 
exchange of views, after their nomination and before they start their 
                                                   
173 Declaration by the High Representative on political accountability, 8 July 2010, 
Strasbourg, available at:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0280+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#top. Referred to 
hereafter as the declaration on political accountability. 
174 Point 6, declaration on political accountability. 
175 The High Representative agreed to have the following interactions with the 
EP: 6x EP-plenary (including 2x per annum special question), 2x AFET, 1 - 2x 
Enlarged Bureau of AFET, 1x Election Coordination Group, 1x in DEVE, 1 - 
2 x Conference of Presidents. Interview #16. 
176 Point 1, Declaration on political accountability. 
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job  at  an  MEP’s  request.177 In  general,  it  was  written  down  that  the  
EEAS would have an open policy towards the EP by for example, in-
cluding a department for relations with the EP into the structure,178 and 
facilitating appearances by higher-level officials of the EEAS.179  
Next to the declaration on political accountability, arguably the biggest 
achievement of the EP in terms of ensuring the communitarian features 
of the new service was to make the EEAS budget subject to the com-
munity rules (Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012: 22ff). As a consequence 
of pressure from the MEPs, the EEAS had to “follow the same budget 
lines and administrative rules as are applicable in the part of Section III 
of the Union’s budget which falls under Heading 5 of the Multiannual 
Financial Framework”.180 In  addition,  the  MEPs  made  sure  that  all  
operational expenditures of the service remained in the Commission 
section of the budget.181  
Conclusion 
The creation of the EEAS’s basic organisation and functioning is an 
illuminating example of PA interaction. In particular, it sheds light on 
the possibility, limits and control of supranational agency. It provides a 
crucial case with which to re-examine the hypotheses developed in the 
theoretical chapter, and to test the influence of the variables. 
The conflicting preferences of the member states, according to the 
theory, resulted in unintended discretion for the High Representative 
(H1). Evidence that supports this hypothesis was found with reference 
to the set-up of the EEAS. For example, when member states had 
aligned preferences on the creation of single geographic desks in the 
EEAS that comprise the work of the DCI and of the EDF, they suc-
                                                   
177 Point 5, Declaration on political accountability. 
178 Statement given by the High Representative in the plenary of the European Parlia-
ment on the basic organisation of the EEAS central administration, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2010-0280+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#top 
179 Point 7, Declaration on political accountability.  
180 Art. 4(3a), indent 2, EEAS Council decision.  
181 Art.  8(1)  EEAS  Council  decision.  The  EEAS  decision  March  draft  only  foresaw  
parts of the operational expenditure in the Commission section of the budget (see Art. 
7(3) EEAS decision March draft).  
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cessfully sanctioned the unintended actions of the High Representative 
and made sure that all geographic desks would be transferred to the 
EEAS. However, when member states failed to align their position, the 
High Representative was given unintended discretion over the design of 
the service. For example, member states could not agree on the extent 
to which the crisis-management structures should be interlinked to 
other units within the service. They kept this part of the discussion 
open, and did not give any detailed instructions to the High Repre-
sentative. When the High Representative introduced her own vision of 
the service, including a new directorate for crisis response, the member 
states had no common position from which to alter the proposal. 
H2 suggests that loose control and oversight mechanisms of the mem-
ber states granted unintended discretion to the High Representative. 
H2 is supported by the fact that the ongoing control of the member 
states played a crucial role in the EEAS decision-making process. When 
the member states were not informed about the developments and 
details of the planning during the negotiations of the ‘Ashton group’, 
the High Representative (together with the Commission) had unintend-
ed discretion when coming up with a proposal that contrasted with the 
member states’ position. This changed after the nomination of Chris-
toffersen as the official ‘architect’ of the EEAS, as he was in permanent 
contact with Coreper.   
However, the empirical evidence also leads to a partial rejection of H2: 
the report by the Swedish Presidency on the EEAS should have ex ante 
limited the discretion of the High Representative over the design of the 
EEAS by defining the competence distribution with the Commission in 
considerable detail. Interestingly, the High Representative and the 
Commission did not feel bound to the details of the report by the 
member states, and instead made contradictory proposals.  
The set-up of the EEAS deserves a “Guinness record for speed” 
(Drieskens  and  Schaik,  2010:  1),  as  all  parties  managed  to  set  up  the  
basic outline of the EEAS within half a year. In line with H3, the time 
pressure increased the discretion of the High Representative. Often, the 
member states did not have time to make amendments to the proposal 
by the Commission. Further discussion on the difficult article on finan-
cial programming was stopped by the Spanish Presidency, which want-
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ed an agreement to be reached during its term. In April 2010, member 
states  were  ‘pushed’  to  give  their  political  backing  to  the  EEAS draft  
decision of the High Representative, as a disagreement would have 
looked weak in the eyes of the public.  
The findings of this chapter make a particularly compelling case for H4 
and the positive effect of agent cooperation on their discretion. Up to 
the start of the Lisbon Treaty, all signs from the interaction of the 
Commission and the High Representative concerning the design of the 
EEAS were hinting at competition. The EEAS and the Commission 
clearly had overlapping competences; therefore, it was surprising to 
find that no competition ensued after the Lisbon Treaty came into 
force. As mentioned by Ashton herself, she and the Commission Presi-
dent were in agreement that many resources, as well as management 
and coordination competences, should remain in the Commission. The 
member states were thus bystanders when Barroso reshuffled the 
Commissioners and their DGs to the Commission’s advantage. The 
Commission, in cooperation with the High Representative, also partly 
managed to keep some competences over financial programming in the 
Commission, despite protests from the member states. However, when 
member states could agree on a position, they made sure to reject the 
Commission/High Representative proposal. 
The EP, as the other EU-level agent, entered into the game too late to 
have a significant influence on the set-up of the EEAS, and thus did 
not have an effect on the discretion of the High Representative. This 
chapter’s findings suggest that the role of the EP in the setting up of 
EEAS has been largely overstated in the current literature (Bien, 2010; 
Brok, 2011; Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012). Political accountability 
was improved thanks to the declaration of the High Representative; 
however, changes to the basic decision of the EEAS were of a cosmetic 
nature, and none of the major points that the EP wanted to push 
through since the days of the European Convention made it into the 
text (such as politically accountable deputies, or an EEAS inside the 
Commission). An exception was the additional budgetary oversight by 
MEPs. The marginal role of the parliament was not surprising, since 
the EP was let into the decision-making process very late. The member 
states and the Commission had already found their compromise, and 
thus had a ‘first mover’ advantage. 
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In conclusion, the hypotheses are largely confirmed. Together, they 
suggest an explanation for the cause of events during the set-up of the 
EEAS. Due to conflicting preferences, limited ongoing control, agent 
cooperation, as well as time pressure, the member states, as the collec-
tive principal of the High Representative – and the fathers of the idea 
to form a common external service – lost control over the process of 
setting up the EEAS. 

 
 
6. In action: the constrained High Representative 
 
An analysis of the initial years of the revamped post of High Repre-
sentative has to be put into the challenging context of the time. While 
internally the new EEAS still had to be established and gain full work-
ing speed, the EU was externally challenged from the start with sweep-
ing changes in the southern neighbourhood. Catherine Ashton herself 
often described her experience as “trying to fly a plane while still bolt-
ing the wings on” (Ashton, 2013b: 1) Nevertheless, the evidence gath-
ered for the following analysis reveals PA dynamics that are, to some 
extent, independent from the transition phase of the EU foreign policy 
architecture. It is shown that independent long-term features of EU 
foreign policy – conflicting preferences as well as tight member state 
control – resulted in a High Representative with limited discretion.  
For a detailed analysis, the chapter is divided into a close evaluation of 
four different task areas of the High Representative.  
- As an agenda manager the High Representative oversees the deci-
sion-making process in the area of EU external action performing 
the role of Vice-President of the Commission and being in the 
chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, thereby setting, managing 
and focusing the choice of available policy alternatives and reduc-
ing the transaction costs of member-state coordination.  
- The task area of a strategist includes transformational decision-
making beyond the management of the status quo as well as the 
framing of particular policy problems in the light of long-term 
goals, thereby potentially overcoming deadlocks in the decision-
making process.  
- In international crisis situations, the High Representative has to 
perform tasks of a crisis manager in order to contain the crisis and 
seek a solution, while faced with threat, uncertainty and urgency.  
- Finally, the High Representative has to communicate the Union’s 
position to outside audiences and coordinate statements with 
member states.  
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6.1. The High Representative as an agenda manager 
“It is us [the EEAS and the High Representative] who set the 
agenda and set out what we think we should conclude and then try 
and  reach  that  agreement.  In  the  end,  this  is  about  Europe  going  
forward. It is not about me being over here and the rest of the 28 na-
tions being over there, because that is pointless.” (Ashton, 2013a) 
Before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative 
for CFSP continuously represented the EU on behalf of the rotating 
Presidency, without having the formal possibility to provide feedback 
into the policy agenda.182 Moreover, cooperation with the Commission 
was based on informal procedures. This shortcoming was tackled in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (see Chapter 4). In terms of 
agenda-management, the High Representative received the powerful 
Presidency role within the CFSP, as well as the ability to table proposals 
in this policy field. The High Representative also received a “coherence 
mandate” (Blockmans and Hillion, 2013: 10), which stipulated that the 
post would ensure the consistency of the Union and its holder would 
be responsible for the external portfolios of the Commission, as well as 
their coordination.183 This section looks at the effects of these provi-
sions  in  the  first  years  after  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  Did  the  High  Repre-
sentative have any discretion over the policy agenda implemented by 
the member states and the Commission? 
28 shadow presidencies  
Ashton, as the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, obviously played a 
role in its agenda-setting process. After all, she formally drafted the 
agenda for the meetings and worked together with the Policy Coordina-
tion Unit of the EEAS to ensure input from the various thematic and 
geographic desks of the service. The concrete agenda for the meetings 
with the member states still followed the six-month rhythm, while in-
                                                   
182 Pre-Lisbon, the High Representative for CFSP did not have the same Treaty-based 
prerogatives, such as a formal right of tabling CFSP initiatives or chairing the Foreign 
Affairs Council and its working groups. Thus Solana had to rely on the rotating Presi-
dency to take up proposals and feedback. 
183 Art. 18(4) TEU and 21(3) TEU. 
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ternally they set up a longer planning horizon of up to one and a half 
years.184  
Formally, the High Representative was managing the foreign policy 
agenda. Under the surface, however, member states kept control over 
it. The member states always had the potential to suggest items in 
Coreper for the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council, if they felt that 
certain issues should be discussed.185 However, after Lisbon it became a 
custom that Ashton received a number of letters from foreign ministers 
ahead of Council meetings in which they asked to put certain issues of 
interest up for discussion among ministers.186 Balfour and Raik (2012) 
identified the increasing efforts of small and medium-sized member 
states, in particular, to “upload” national preferences and use the EU as 
a “power multiplier”: examples of national pet-projects included the 
Swedish push for a European Institute of Peace, and the Polish cam-
paign for a European Endowment for Democracy. The High Repre-
sentative did not have the authority of the rotating Presidency, which – 
by virtue of being a fellow member state – had the power and sover-
eignty to carry through priorities, which it based on its geographical or 
historical characteristics.187 To put this more bluntly, instead of creating 
one permanent Presidency for five years, the Lisbon Treaty created 28 
shadow presidencies that all wanted to get their priorities through and 
tried to hijack the agenda in relation to that aim. 
The effect of this procedure contradicted the initial idea of a more 
streamlined agenda-management. In an attempt to fulfil the ‘shopping 
list’ of the member states, as well as of the geographic and thematic 
desks of the EEAS, the agendas for the foreign minister meetings often 
became overcrowded.188 The High Representative had limited agency in 
agenda-setting, as the member states had ex ante tight control over the 
                                                   
184 Interviews #47, #22. 
185 Interview #49. 
186 Interview #43. 
187 A study comparing several Presidencies revealed that the priorities of rotating Presi-
dencies are a product of a long process of domestic preference aggregation, and carry 
particular weight (Elgström, 2003). This point was also raised by interviewees #6, #9, 
#43. 
188 Interviews #39, #49. 
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agenda, and gave a detailed mandate to the High Representative regard-
ing what points to put for discussion.  
The discretion over the procedural control of the agenda – that is, the 
actual chairing of the minister meetings and preparatory groups – was 
also limited. The High Representative and delegates chaired the Foreign 
Affairs  Council  and  WGs,  but  within  this  task  were  not  left  with  ex-
panded capacity for autonomous action. This was not a negative feature 
of the new system, but reflected the inbuilt function of an international 
WG chairmanship, which is to broker a deal between often-conflicting 
preferences, rather than to present its own positions (Schout and 
Vanhoonacker, 2006; Tallberg, 2004). In accordance with that function, 
the EEAS adopted the view at the highest level that the WG chairper-
sons should work closely with the member state representatives.189  
The member state representatives recognised that the EEAS chairper-
sons of the various Council groups had more time to personally engage 
with the group compared to pre-Lisbon times. Being part of the bigger 
EEAS machinery for longer than six months allowed them to invest 
more in maintaining contacts with the member state diplomats, and to 
keep them up to date on the latest developments on a formal and in-
formal basis.190 This approach was actively promoted by the High Rep-
resentative: in the case of the PSC chair, she consulted every ambassa-
dor of the group before appointing Olof Skoog, who was trusted and 
well-known by his colleagues.191  
However, the Foreign Affairs Council had its own dynamics. Given its 
full agenda, High Representative Ashton reportedly tried to keep the 
meetings and discussions short. For example, she choked-off long in-
terventions of foreign ministers, and prevented the reopening of al-
ready discussed agenda-items.192 The verdict to this approach was 
mixed. Some observers saw it as a welcome change to the times of the 
rotating Presidency, where the chair would never have interrupted a 
fellow minister, which led to lengthy discussions.193 Others felt that the 
                                                   
189 Interview #18. 
190 Interviews #6, #9. 
191 Interview #9. 
192 Interviews #36, #15. 
193 Interview #36. 
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High Representative lacked a certain feel for the member states’ posi-
tions.194  
To sum up, the fact that Catherine Ashton and her aids were delegated 
permanent chairing in the area of CFSP did not have the effect of unin-
tended discretion over the foreign policy agenda. This somewhat ham-
pered the continuity and effectiveness of EU foreign policy, as member 
states tightly controlled what was discussed, and put forward a plethora 
of diverse priorities. The pre-Lisbon rotating Presidency was also a 
member state, and was thus immune from being told what to prioritise 
in the discussions. Member states knew it would be their turn to set the 
agenda, and hence refrained from excessive mutual interference in the 
agenda-management. The EEAS and the High Representative did not 
have this benefit of being seen as one of the member states and were 
thus prone to be closely controlled.195 Furthermore, the High Repre-
sentative did not have the authority of a rotating Presidency to insist on 
a streamlined agenda. However, a major advantage was smoother run-
ning of the WGs, which did not have to adjust to new chairpersons 
with varying levels of experience.196 
The Commission Vice-President hat 
How did agenda-setting take place within the Commission? Formally, 
the High Representative is “responsible within the Commission for 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinat-
ing other aspects of the Union's external action”.197 Blockmans and 
Erkelens (2012) even read from this provision that the High Repre-
sentative alone is charged with coordinating the external aspects of the 
Union within the Commission.  However, the performance of the first 
years of the service did not indicate that the High Representative was 
                                                   
194 Interview #15. 
195 Interviewees #2, #6, #7, #22, #49, who were either involved in the chairing or 
were members of a WG in the Council, described the tension within the system, high-
lighting that the Presidency, run by the EEAS and the High Representative, is seen as 
an institution that holds the power of agenda-management, which needs to be con-
trolled.  
196 Interviews #6, #9, #18, #22. 
197 Art. 18(4) TEU. 
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able to manage the Commission agenda and to coordinate the other 
Commissioners and their services.  
The set-up of the EEAS already showed, that the Commission Presi-
dent claimed a strong coordinating role in the immediate phase after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, the HR/VP still 
had possible formal ways to manage the agenda: she was able to call in 
the Commissioner group on external relations and – as the lead Com-
missioner – would have been able to circulate the discussion papers for 
such meetings. However, in reality this hardly ever happened. Up to 
December 2012 the group met five times (Helwig et al., 2013), and the 
first meeting was even a “non-meeting”, without an agenda.198 In 2013 
another two breakfast meetings were conducted on China and Syria; 
both were chaired by the Commission President, with the High Repre-
sentative playing a “leading role”.199  
While the High Representative had discretion to organise meetings, this 
opportunity was not used. In line with the theoretical assumptions of 
the bureaucratic politics approach, bureaucracies are slow to adapt to 
changes and tend to compete for competences in order to preserve 
themselves. Close observers said that the limited role of the High Rep-
resentative as Vice-President in the Commission was due to the fact 
that the High Representative joined the second Barroso Commission.200 
A Commissioner group under the chairmanship of the Relex Commis-
sioner was first tried out in the Prodi Commission (1999–2004), and 
worked reasonably well. However, Barroso changed this practice when 
he entered office in 2004 and took charge over the individual sub-
groups (Missiroli, 2007). During Barroso’s first term (2004–2009), 
Commissioner groups played a limited role and the old, top-heavy sys-
tem was carried over to the new Commission regardless of Catherine 
Ashton’s new powers.201 Another argument is that the Vice-President 
role would have been more efficient if the Lisbon Treaty had intro-
duced a smaller number of Commissioners, as well as “Junior Commis-
                                                   
198 Interview #32. 
199 Interview #48. 
200 Interviews #46, #48. 
201 Interview #46. 
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sioners”.202 The explanation thus is routed in the path-dependency203 of 
the institutional development of the Commission, and could potentially 
vary over time and under other political figures.  
Thus, in her first term, the High Representative had little discretion to 
set the agenda within the Commission. Besides the external relations 
group of Commissioners, the High Representative still had the possibil-
ity to interact with Commissioners individually. A think-tank study 
concluded that the ability for effective working relations varied across 
policy fields (Helwig et al., 2013). The cooperation with the Commis-
sioner for neighbourhood policy (Füle) was identified as a positive ex-
ample, with the High Representative and the Commissioner forming a 
“tandem”.204 In terms of cooperation, the review of European Neigh-
bourhood Policy  was rated as  a  success  (though the verdict  on its  ef-
fects was still out).205 On the other hand, coordination with the Hu-
manitarian Aid Commissioner was reportedly more challenging.206 In-
terviewees pointed out that the ‘non-political’ character of humanitarian 
aid is at odds with the idea of coordination set forth by the EEAS.207 In 
                                                   
202 Interview #48. A decision of the European Council in December 2008 stipulated 
that the number of Commissioners should remain equal to the number of member 
states. While “Junior Commissioners” were part of the draft Constitutional treaty, 
member states dropped the distinction between non-voting and full Commissioners in 
the 2004 IGC. 
203 The concept of path-dependency is not explicitly part of the theoretical framework 
of this study, however, it might bring additional insights to the evaluation of the topic. 
The basic idea behind the concept is that earlier choices for certain courses of action or 
organisational designs make other alternative options more costly, even though they 
might  be  more  favourable  at  a  later  stage  of  the  process  (see,  for  example,  Bulmer,  
1993; Pierson, 1996). In the case at hand, the decision of Barroso prior the adoption of 
the Lisbon treaty to have a centralised organisation of the Commission caused the 
development of certain working cultures and processes that could not be easily altered 
when the Lisbon treaty entered into force.  
204 Interviews #3, #48. 
205 Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, and the European Commission, A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood – A review of European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 25 May 
2011, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf.  
206 A vivid example of this is Kristalina Georgieva’s statement that a coordination of 
humanitarian aid efforts by the High Representative would only be possible “over [her] 
dead body” (Willis, 2011).  
207 Competition between the DG in the Commission and the EEAS developed when 
the EEAS established a Directorate for Crisis Management and Operational Coordina-
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general, it is questionable whether this coordination system, which re-
lied on individual cooperation between the Commissioners, instead of 
an institutionalised coordination in the external relations Commission-
ers group, represents a significant improvement in comparison to pre-
Lisbon.  
Managing the unmanageable  
The discretion for the High Representative to manage the foreign poli-
cy  agenda  is  much  lower  than  Treaty  articles  would  suggest.  Pollack  
(1997) argues that it is not enough to look only at the formal possibili-
ties of an agent to put issues on the agenda; it is also necessary to focus 
on the possibilities of other actors to amend or refuse the agenda. Tak-
ing this into account, the new Lisbon rules on agenda-management 
have a limited effect on the discretion of the High Representative. The 
member states have plenty of possibilities to amend the EU foreign 
policy agenda and, more precisely, the agenda of the Foreign Affairs 
Council. In contrast to H1, conflicting preferences among the member 
states did not lead to more discretion for the High Representative. On 
the contrary, every member state had in practice the possibility to real-
ise its preferences and to table its pet-projects.  
The High Representative might have been able to put items on the 
agenda, but she missed the often-needed authority to scrap items from 
the agenda. The time pressures (H3) of the day-by-day of foreign policy 
making only reinforced the development towards an overblown and 
unfocused agenda. A top Council Secretariat official commented, “the 
meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council became too ritualistic; they are 
not interesting anymore. Member states walk out of the door”.208 
Agenda-management is thus not only the art of introducing items to 
the schedule, but also getting the member states on board. 
Vanhoonacker and Pomorska (2013) argued that Catherine Ashton and 
the EEAS managed to build up the organisational structures necessary 
for agenda-management. However, they lacked the strategies to claim 
                                                                                                            
tion, and whose director dubbed a visit to meet the Libyan National Transitional Coun-
cil in May 2011 as a “humanitarian mission”.  Officials in the European Commission 
feared that a political use of the phrase “humanitarian aid” could endanger their work 
(Helwig et al. 2013, #33, #34). See also the discussion of Libyan case in section 6.3. 
208 Interview #49. 
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authority over certain issues, and to focus the attention of the member 
states on them. 
The advantage of linking the different spheres of EU foreign policy 
making via the Vice-President post in the European Commission did 
not bear fruit either. Again, while there existed a potential to put items 
on the agenda, there was no authority on the side of the High Repre-
sentative to carry this agenda through vis-à-vis fellow Commissioners. 
The different policy fields of the Commission follow their distinct poli-
cy agenda. The competition over the foreign policy agenda between the 
Commissioners and the High Representative limited the High Repre-
sentative’s agenda-management discretion (H4).  
The foreign policy agenda in general is rather event-driven, and pro-
vides for limited agency by any actor. However, the analysis shows that 
supranational agency in agenda-management is in addition to that con-
strained by the multitude of priorities stemming from the collective 
principal, as well as competing agents. While this section solely focused 
on the possibility to manage the agenda, the next section will look at 
the discretion to develop strategies.   
6.2. The High Representative in search of a strategy209 
A new strategic doctrine? 
“EU foreign policy is different. You may have your own vision and 
your own idea. But the nature of EU foreign policy is that you are 
not to go alone. Everyone has to be happy [...]. This is why there are 
limits. But there are benefits: once you reach a decision, there is a 
good chance that it is a good one”.210 
The European Security Strategy (ESS), written in 2003 by High Repre-
sentative Solana’s team, can serve as an example of a strategic doctrine. 
It sought to identify challenges to, and the objectives of, EU foreign 
policy, and translate these into policy implications for the Union 
(European Security Strategy, 2003; Lazarou et al.,  2014). Leaving aside 
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the question of whether the ESS was a success, it is a fact that a similar 
comprehensive exercise has not taken place during the first term of the 
High Representative of the Union. 
Nevertheless, the EU machinery has produced strategic documents. It 
was very active regarding the adoption of sectoral and regional strate-
gies,  such as  the Sahel  Strategy (EEAS,  2011)  and the Action Plan on 
Human Rights (Council, 2012). Still, experts highlighted a need for a 
new overarching, or “grand”, strategy (Biscop, 2013). While the identi-
fied threats and objectives of the ESS might still be valid,211 the context 
in which the EU is placed is in permanent flux. Notably, the rise of the 
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) (Renard, 
2010) and the worldwide economic crisis that refocused attention on 
economic issues (Grevi and Renard, 2012; Lehne, 2012) created a de-
mand for a new strategic doctrine. While the 2003 ESS had a focus on 
issues of security policy and multilateralism, the last decade saw addi-
tional attention on a more comprehensive set of policies, and the de-
velopment of strategic relations with key international partners 
(Bouchard et al., 2014). What discretion did the High Representative 
have in the dynamic strategic landscape of the EU?  
A disaster for Europe and its consequences 
“A  disaster  for  Europe”  is  how  Herman  Van  Rompuy  assessed  the  
weak performance of EU diplomacy at the Copenhagen climate change 
conference in 2009 (US cables, 2010). He announced a special meeting 
of heads of state or government and foreign ministers to discuss how 
better to engage with strategic partners (European Council, 2010c: 15). 
Strategic partnerships were not a new instrument of the Union, but 
were already specifically mentioned as a tool in the 2003 ESS, which 
referred to the US, Russia, Japan, India, China and Canada. However, 
despite the need for close cooperation, the Strategy did not go into 
further detail on how broader objectives would be strategically pursued 
with each partner (Renard, 2013). As Van Rompuy (2010) put it:  “We 
have strategic partnerships, now we need a strategy”. In September 
2010, the European Council asked “the High Representative, in coor-
dination with the Commission and with the Foreign Affairs Council, to 
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evaluate the prospects of relations with all strategic partners, and set 
out in particular our interests and possible leverage to achieve them” 
(European Council, 2010a: Annex I). 
At the meeting, the High Representative presented a list of nine strate-
gic partners: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South 
Africa and the US. Especially in the early phase, she ‘pushed’ the issue 
of strategic partnerships intensively.212 The scope of the exercise was 
open, and no specific mandate was given besides the need for “medi-
um-term planning that sets out objectives to be reached over time, with 
each summit concentrating on two or three core issues” (European 
Council, 2010a). In addition, the task fitted the double-hatted character 
of the post and drew benefits from Ashton’s role as Commission Vice-
President.213 In theory, the unspecified mandate and the opportunity to 
cooperate with other services in the Commission should have opened 
up the possibility for unintended discretion on the part of the High 
Representative. However, it led to only few results.  
The problems during the process of ‘beefing up’ the partnerships were 
numerous, and stemmed from a lack of organisation and focus. The 
heads of state or government had an extensive discussion on the sub-
ject during the September 2010 European Council meeting. However, 
the discussions led to a ‘Christmas-tree’ approach, meaning that the 
diverse preferences of the member states instigated a long shopping list 
of strategic partners and priorities that lacked focus.214 The following 
December 2010 European Council meeting was not much different in 
this regard. The documents produced by the High Representative were 
not concrete policy papers, and the lack of focus led to a brainstorming 
session, rather than a constructive discussion. The heads of state or 
government were not engaged in the discussion,215 and got even more 
disengaged in the process that followed.216  
                                                   
212 Interviews #43. #51. 
213 Interview #32. 
214 Interview #35. 
215 Interview #35. 
216 While the initial idea was to take stock of the exercise once a year (European 
Council, 2010b), the anticipated discussion at the October 2011 European Council 
meeting did not take place, as the ‘Eurocrisis’ hijacked the agenda (#35). The topic was 
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On top of the disengagement of the heads of state or government, the 
High Representative’s cooperation with the Commission and the For-
eign Affairs Council was scarce. DGs of the Commission were not 
thoroughly consulted, even though their input would have been rele-
vant regarding energy policy towards Russia, or trade policy towards the 
US.217 The strategic  unit  of  the EEAS,  as  well  as  the corporate  board 
member of the EEAS responsible for strategic partnerships, were part 
of  the  process  only  at  a  later  stage.218 In autumn 2012, the strategic 
partnerships were high on the agenda for the September informal 
Gymnich meeting of foreign ministers in Sopot. However, dissatisfac-
tion among the member states’ delegations was apparent, as the papers 
were only circulated the evening before the meeting, and again led to an 
unfocused discussion with few results.219 The High Representative al-
lowed only a limited degree of oversight of the drafting process; there-
fore, the Commission, as well as the member states, lost ‘ownership’ 
over the strategic-partnerships exercise.220 The subsequent disengage-
ment of relevant actors, as well as the disinterest of the member states, 
drove the process into “quicksand”.221 Strategic partnerships were no 
longer among the “top five priorities” of the member states.222 
In  the  case  of  a  possible  update  of  the  ESS,  the  member  states  even  
failed to delegate a mandate to the High Representative. While some 
member states – Sweden, Finland, Poland, Italy and Spain – were in 
                                                                                                            
back on the agenda in October 2012, where an exchange of views was held. To follow 
up on the issue, the preliminary agenda of the upcoming European Council meetings 
included separate discussions on individual strategic partners. Also in October 2012, the 
European Council discussed China, and in March 2013 an exchange of views was held 
on Russia. Repeatedly, however, the item dropped from the agenda. Similarly, the issue 
of a strategic partnership with the US for example was put on the tentative agenda for 
the heads of state or government for the May 2013 European Council, postponed to 
the June 2013 European Council, and then dropped altogether. Heads of state or gov-
ernment made plans in 2013 to have a session on strategic partners in May 2014, how-
ever the May 2014 European Council was cancelled completely, due to the European 
Parliament elections taking place in the same month. 
217 Interview #32. 
218 Interview #42. 
219 Interview #39. 
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favour of a new strategic exercise, the idea of drafting a comprehensive 
strategic document did not get the same support as back in 2003. In 
particular, France and Germany hesitated to launch a new strategic 
debate (Helwig, 2013; Kempin and Overhaus, 2012). At the Gymnich 
meeting in March 2012, the member states decided against tasking the 
High Representative with an update of the ESS.223 Instead, a group of 
four member states agreed to commission their national think tanks to 
work on elements of a European Global Strategy (EGS), which were 
presented in May 2013.224 Until the end of the first term of the High 
Representative, the EGS remained an academic exercise and the ele-
ments presented by the think tanks had difficulty gaining any traction in 
the unfavourable environment without a catalyst, such as an interna-
tional  crisis  (Lundin,  2012).  It  was  clear  that  the appetite  for  a  signifi-
cant strategic debate was very low among the member states.225 The 
High Representative had no mandate to write a new strategic docu-
ment. 
The fix-it approach 
As we have seen, the High Representative’s more prominent role in 
formulating a strategic doctrine was limited due to failed delegation. 
Given the conflicting preferences and missing political will of the 
member states to develop broader strategic objectives, the High Repre-
sentative thus resorted to a “fix-it approach”.226 From this perspective, 
the EU was a toolbox, which was only used if its instruments fitted the 
priorities of the member states. Extensive strategic debates were either 
not initiated (update of the ESS), or not followed up (strategic partner-
ships).  
The case of the ESS seems like a textbook example of a failed EU for-
eign policy initiative. Conflicting preferences did not lead to unintended 
discretion on the part of the High Representative (as H1 would sug-
gest). Instead, because of the non-compulsory nature of EU foreign 
                                                   
223 Interview #43. 
224 Unfortunately, the presentation day coincided with a Foreign Affairs Council meet-
ing, which saw member states’ disagreement over the continuation of the arms embar-
go on Syria, and once again showcased the challenges of a common foreign policy. 
225 Interviews #42, #49, #41, #43, #44. 
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policy, disagreement among the member states prevented them from 
delegating the authoring of a new strategy to the High Representative, 
and left Ashton with no discretion. On the other hand, the case of the 
strategic partnerships challenges the theoretical framework of this the-
sis. The member states delegated a review of the strategic partnerships 
to the High Representative, and the undetailed mandate – in theory – 
offered plenty of room for Ashton to promote the so-far ambiguous 
concept. Meanwhile, she allowed other actors only limited oversight 
with respect to the actual progress of her work on the strategic partner-
ships. It was exactly this secrecy and detachment that lead to dissatis-
faction and unease on the part of the member states and the Commis-
sion. In the case of the strategic partnerships, the High Representative’s 
discretion had the unwanted and counterproductive side effect of a loss 
of ‘ownership’ by the relevant actors, which partly contributed to the 
slow death of the instrument.  
It can be concluded that the sum of Lisbon’s institutional innovations 
(the EEAS, the ‘double-hat’ and the permanent chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Council) had little influence on the strategic capability of the 
EU.  The  successful  drafting  of  the  2003  ESS  showed  that,  10  years  
earlier, the degree of institutionalisation was not determining the discre-
tion of Solana; rather, the political will of the member states (especially 
of the ‘big three’; Germany, France UK) and the structure of the in-
formal process allowed him discretion. Bailes (2005: 12) concluded that 
what stood out from the drafting of the ESS was  
“the confidence placed by EU members in Solana and his team; the 
self-restraint shown by states when they refrained from quibbling be-
fore  the  […]  publication  of  his  text,  or  from  prolonging  and  over-
complicating the phase of intergovernmental redrafting; and the novel 
and rather successful use made of intellectual resources in the Euro-
pean (and partner countries’) security research community.”227 
                                                   
227 The process,  at  that  time under the supervision of Solana,  was structured in three 
phases: (1) a drafting phase amongst a closed circle of key individuals that produced a 
short, non-bureaucratic text, (2) a public consultation phase with three conferences at 
European think tanks, (3) A closed consultation phase involving the member states and 
the Commission (see Bailes, 2005). 
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While Catherine Ashton could not show off a similar success story, the 
post-Lisbon set-up started to replicate the successful informal working 
procedures. It follows that the Gymnich meetings became the main 
forum for the High Representative to conduct more strategic discus-
sions among the ministers. Co-chaired and hosted by the member state 
holding the rotating Presidency, the meetings provided a more informal 
opportunity to think ‘outside the box’.228 In addition, the Political Af-
fairs Departments of the EEAS included a small unit for strategic plan-
ning. The unit represented a mix of former Commission and Council 
staff, as well as national diplomats, and provided advice to the Corpo-
rate  Board  and  the  EEAS  Political  Director  Helga  Schmid.  Its  assets  
were its informal connections, such as regular meetings with the na-
tional policy planners of the foreign ministries in Brussels. The unit also 
maintained contacts with the strategic units of the Commission, such as 
the in-house think tank Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA)229 
and a newly established trade strategy unit.230 The set-up thus provided 
a first nucleus from which a strategic EU foreign policy network might 
grow.  
6.3. The High Representative as a crisis manager 
A crisis manager on paper 
The bulk of the institutional reform was designed to make the EU’s 
structures fit for crisis-management tasks (Blockmans and Wessel, 
2009). On paper, the new provisions seemed promising. Given the 
post’s central institutional location, the High Representative became the 
linchpin of crisis situations. The capacity of the High Representative to 
summon Union foreign ministers for emergency meetings was intro-
                                                   
228 The Gymnich meetings are designed to provide a setting for frank discussions. As 
they take place in the member state holding the rotating Presidency, the foreign minis-
ters can meet in an atmosphere that differs from that of the meeting rooms in Brussels. 
Only the ministers are allowed in the room, and the European Correspondent of the 
EEAS is the only official. The member states’ European Correspondents wait in the 
neighbouring room. After a session, the EEAS European Correspondent briefs his 
national colleagues on the discussion of the minsters. No formal decisions or conclu-
sions are made (#51).  
229 Bureau of European Policy Advisers.  
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duced with the Lisbon Treaty.231 Meanwhile, the post allowed the pos-
sibility of working closely with the standing group of PSC ambassadors 
in Brussels.232 Moreover, the High Representative’s competences in 
civilian or military crisis operations were strengthened, giving the post 
(together with the Council) overall responsibility over CSDP mis-
sions,233 and the formal right to propose new operations.234 In the early 
phase of a crisis, the prevention of conflicts through diplomacy has, 
since Lisbon, been in the hands of the High Representative, and is not 
carried out by the rotating Presidency, which brings the potential bene-
fit of improved abilities to engage with international partners. Finally, it 
was envisaged that the High Representative would coordinate the 
whole range of instruments under the remit of different crisis-
management players – for example, the different short-term humanitar-
ian, as well as long-term development, instruments in the Commission. 
Catherine Ashton did not have to wait long for the first stress-test of 
the new crisis-management provisions. 
First moves in the Libyan crisis…235 
The first  test  for  the EU’s  capacity  to react  to a  crisis  situation in  the 
post-Lisbon framework was the unfolding conflict in Libya in early 
2011. All of the elements that characterise a crisis (urgency, threat and 
uncertainty) were present. Decisions had to be made swiftly, since, at 
the beginning of the conflict, developments were unfolding quickly on 
the ground. First reports from major news outlets on clashes between 
protesters and government forces were reported on 18 February 2011 
(BBC, 2011; The Guardian, 2011). Only one month later, on 19 March, 
NATO began its military air force operation. The time for immediate 
crisis-management was thus very short. The Libyan crisis also posed a 
                                                   
231 Within 48 hours or less – see Art. 30(2) TEU. 
232 The idea behind the possibility of working closely with ministers and ambassadors 
was to enable the EU foreign policy chief to mobilise the assets of the member states in 
crisis situations. See, for instance, Solana’s address to the Convention on the future of 
Europe, WD 8.  
233 The Political and Security Committee exercises the political control and strategic 
direction of the crisis-management operations under the responsibility of the High 
Representative and the Council. See Art. 38 TEU. 
234 Art. 42(4) TEU. 
235 This subsection draws on Helwig (2013). 
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potential threat for the EU. The country’s geographic position in the 
immediate southern neighbourhood exposed Europe to negative exter-
nal effects arising from instability in the region. In the short term, these 
effects presented risks for European citizens in the country, as well as 
increased migration movements (see European Council, 2011). In addi-
tion, the crisis contained an element of uncertainty. Former Head of 
the Libyan state, Muammar Gaddafi, had been an active partner for the 
member states, and a source of stability who had cooperated in the 
fight against terrorism and illegal migration. It was not at all clear how a 
post-Gaddafi Libya could or should be organised.  
How much discretion does the High Representative have during the 
phase of immediate crisis-reaction? The general assessment of com-
mentators of the EU’s performance in this situation was rather nega-
tive. Too slow, weak and incoherent was the reaction of the EU and its 
member states (Koenig, 2011; Kundnani and Vaïsse, 2011). The High 
Representative was also criticised for her lack of profile during the crisis 
(Castle,  2011).  However,  a  closer  analysis  shows that  the High Repre-
sentative had limited discretion as a crisis manager in this situation.  
At the beginning of the crisis, the High Representative issued declara-
tions on behalf of the EU, which condemned the use of force against 
protesters. On the question of “an immediate end to the use of force”, 
the member state positions were aligned, making a quick reaction using 
EU declarations possible.236 However, the continuing escalations of the 
conflict prompted the EU to take further actions against the regime. 
The EEAS had already started to prepare targeted sanctions at an earli-
er point in the conflict (Ashton, 2011). Shortly after the corresponding 
decision  of  the  UN  Security  Council,  the  EU  was  the  first  entity  to  
impose sanctions on the Gaddafi regime.237 Again, swift action was 
possible as the member states were on the same page on this issue, and 
there was no need for further discussion at the foreign-ministers level.  
Even though some questions arose around Italy’s ties to Gaddafi, as 
well as those of its Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi (Babington, 2013), 
                                                   
236 The two declarations, from 20 and 23 March 2011236 (6795/1/11 and 6966/1/11), 
were cleared through the use of the network of EU Correspondents and the PSC. 
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a top-level diplomat said that the meetings of the PSC showed that all 
member states were aligned in the opinion that Gaddafi had to re-
sign.238 The clear assertion of this common goal in the PSC gave the 
High Representative the mandate on which she could base her activi-
ties. During this phase, she was particular engaged in crisis diplomacy, 
and coordinated with the relevant interlocutors, including NATO Sec-
retary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Ashton, 2011). 
… and the limits as a crisis manager 
Parallel to coordination with international partners, the High Repre-
sentative and the EEAS also had to organise their activities with the 
Commission, which is in charge of humanitarian aid assistance and the 
civil protection mechanism.239 This proved challenging. An official of 
the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European 
Commission (DG ECHO) explained:  
“we are not going to make humanitarian aid decisions subject to a 
political coordination led by the High Representative […]. If we 
wait until all of this coordination is endorsed by member states in the 
PSC we  have  probably  a  couple  of  hundred  or  thousands  of  people  
dying.”240 
 Consequently, interviewees in DG ECHO were of the opinion that the 
coordination role of the High Representative did not cover humanitari-
an aid coordination.241 
Nevertheless, the EEAS insisted on its coordination role in crisis-
response situations that have a political dimension. Given the political 
                                                   
238 Interview #9. 
239 In the case of the Libyan crisis, the humanitarian assistance and civil protection 
activities of DG ECHO, together with the member states, had funding of 158.8 million 
Euro (European Commission, 2012). 
240 Interview #33. 
241 Interviews #33, #34. The autonomy of humanitarian aid delivery is further ensured 
by  its  separate  crisis-management  structures,  such  as  the  40-plus  field  offices  around  
the world. These structures coordinate their activities locally, as well as directly with the 
counterparts in the member states. 
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nature of the crisis, DG ECHO had to cooperate with the EEAS. The 
cooperation consolidated the new crisis platform as the main coordina-
tion instrument for crisis response. Chaired by the Secretary-General of 
the EEAS, or, in its absence, by the Managing Director for Crisis Re-
sponse (occasionally also by the High Representative),242 the crisis plat-
form brought together relevant actors from Commission DGs243 and 
from EEAS crisis-management structures,244 as well as respective geo-
graphic desks. Still, DG ECHO perceived the crisis platform as a chan-
nel through which to share information on its activities, rather than a 
way to be told what to do by the EEAS.245 The discretion of the High 
Representative was thus limited through agent competition with the 
crisis response structures in the Commission. 
Another limitation with respect to the High Representative’s room for 
discretion was the growing disagreement among the member states, 
particularly with reference to the question of erecting a ‘no-fly-zone’ 
over the Libyan territory, and the recognition of the Libyan opposition 
as a legitimate interlocutor. As a consequence, the decision-making 
responsibility shifted to a higher level, and the heads of state or gov-
ernment took over the show. A PSC ambassador explained the situa-
tion as follows:  
“Catherine Ashton realized from the discussions we already had and 
from the different political statements that there were huge differences 
between the member states about how we had to get involved in the 
Libyan situation. So she was definitely right to put the issue on the 
level of the European Council.”246  
Following this decision, the High Representative and the EEAS (as well 
as, to some extent, the national foreign ministers and their ministries) 
were sidelined. The European Council convened at the request of 
                                                   
242 In  the  case  of  a  natural  disaster  with  less  prominent  political  implications,  DG  
ECHO calls in and chairs similar meetings, as was the case after the tsunami in Japan. 
243 Service  for  Foreign  Policy  Instruments,  DG  DEVCO,  DG  ECHO,  and  Home  
Affairs. 
244CMPD, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EU Military Staff, Intelligence 
Analysis Centre. 
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France, and in spite of some wariness from the side of Germany.247 
While Britain and France wanted a strong statement on the issue of the 
no-fly-zone over Libya (Cameron and Sarkozy, 2011), the High Repre-
sentative, Germany, and other member states were less inclined to go as 
far.248 The conclusions of the European Council represented a com-
promise, and stated that “in order to protect the civilian population, 
member states will examine all necessary options, provided there is a 
demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region” 
(European Council, 2011), which essentially meant a positive vote by 
the UN Security Council and support by the African Union and Arab 
League. 
Another dividing issue concerned recognition of the National Transi-
tional Council (NTC) as the political interlocutor in Libya. The member 
states were divided with respect to whether, and to what extent, they 
should recognise the opposition group. While France pushed ahead and 
recognised the NTC as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people, other member states were more cautious (Koenig, 2011). In-
stead of taking a position, the High Representative waited for the 
member states to align their preferences. This became especially obvi-
ous during the EP plenary session on 9 March 2011. A delegation of 
the NTC happened to be in Strasbourg on an invitation from the liberal 
group at the same time as Catherine Ashton. While it was not expected 
that she would politically recognise the Libyan opposition group when 
the member states themselves were struggling to find a position, she 
was asked to meet with them. Ashton was hesitant but, after long delib-
erations, a meeting was arranged. As an EP official recalled: “we had to 
bring them secretly to Ashton. After two hours she decided to admit to 
the press that she met them”.249  
Two days later, under the pressure of France and Britain, the European 
Council recognised the NTC as the EU’s political interlocutor in Libya 
(European Council, 2011). For MEPs, the reason for Ashton’s wariness 
was that she wanted to wait for the member states to take a clear posi-
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tion.250 However, an EEAS official identified the High Representative’s 
cautiousness as her way of behaving diplomatically. While public state-
ments and actions could be attractive for the media, they might be 
harmful for the furthering of diplomatic activities; instead, the High 
Representative preferred private diplomacy, which did not reveal the 
actions, aims and position of the Union to all audiences.251 However, in 
this case, France and Britain preferred the public support of the Libyan 
opposition over Ashton’s quiet diplomacy behind the scenes. Ashton 
thus had no control over the diplomatic strategy of the Union in this 
crisis.  
After the European Council conclusions in March, the Libya issue 
moved out of the remit of the EU institutions. France, the UK, and, 
after initial hesitation, also Italy, allied with the US and imposed a no-
fly-zone after the positive vote of the UNSC. The decision concerning 
an EU military operation to support humanitarian aid for Libya, made 
by the Council on 1 April 2011 based on a formal initiative by the High 
Representative, was a success only on paper. The EU did not receive 
the necessary request for its operationalisation by the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Helwig, 2013). 
Facilitator without discretion 
The nature of a crisis places a PA relationship into a specific context of 
uncertainty, urgency and threat. Under these circumstances, the hy-
potheses suggests that the agent has unintended discretion available for 
its activities. The collective principal’s conflicting preferences in times 
of urgency (H1), given the time pressure to arrive at a common posi-
tion (H3), should theoretically lead to wider room for discretion for the 
agent. Crisis situations in general imply that the principal’s ability to 
control the agent are limited, as the urgency and uncertainty of a crisis 
situation does not allow for a detailed, rules-based mandate for the 
agent  (H2).  However,  the  case  of  the  immediate  EU  response  to  the  
Libya crisis showed limited discretion for the High Representative. 
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The first reason for the lack of discretion was the inability of the mem-
ber states to delegate. In the intergovernmental sphere of international 
crisis-management, the High Representative’s actions need to be based 
on a mandate. The division between member states on the question of 
how to get active in Libya led to a situation in which the High Repre-
sentative was sidelined and the heads of state or government took over. 
Without a specific mandate to act on their behalf, the High Representa-
tive cannot have discretion. 
Second, one could argue that the High Representative does not need a 
specific mandate from the member states. The function of the High 
Representative implies being in contact with international interlocutors, 
and representing and discussing policy choices. However, even as the 
High Representative has this general mandate to represent and coordi-
nate EU foreign policy, the discretion of the post in a crisis situation is 
constrained. The possible sanctioning of unwanted behaviour by the 
member states hangs over the High Representative like the Sword of 
Damocles. The control of the member states over the High Repre-
sentative does not imply that they have to formulate detailed mandates 
or closely observe the High Representative’s activities. Given the miss-
ing specific mandate of the High Representative in this crisis situation, 
Ashton anticipated the political damage that could result from unau-
thorised activities (such as the political recognition of the Libyan oppo-
sition).  
A third reason for the limited discretion of the High Representative is 
agent competition with the Commission. The division of competences 
between the humanitarian aid structures of the Commission and the 
crisis-management structures of the EEAS is not clear-cut. It is difficult 
to identify whether a crisis is more political in nature, is a natural disas-
ter, or is a mixture of both; however, the answer determines who is in 
charge of coordination. Furthermore, even if the crisis has a political 
nature, humanitarian aid actors want to maintain their autonomy. A 
Commission official described this situation as it occurred in Libya:  
“you have a conflict so it’s obvious you have a political situation, so 
you need the different political and security tools of the EU. But at 
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the same time humanitarian assistance by its mandate and priorities 
keeps its independence.”252  
Vaguely defined competences and diverging policy objectives create 
agent competition between the Commission and the High Representa-
tive, and limit the discretion of the post.  
The findings of the Libya case show that a supranational agent, such as 
the High Representative, only has limited discretion in crisis situations, 
but acts as a facilitator for the member states. However, even without 
supranational agency, the legacy of the first High Representative shows 
where the added value of a common crisis-management structure lies. 
More than the individual member states, the High Representative and 
the EEAS can offer a comprehensive answer to a crisis situation. With-
in the cycle of a conflict, the comprehensive approach of the EU has 
the possibility to apply different instruments, ranging from immediate 
humanitarian aid and stabilisation efforts, to long-term peace-building, 
development and trade policies.253 While pre-Lisbon High Representa-
tive Solana was still focused on CSDP, the EEAS can potentially draw 
on wider resources. A former Solana staff member explained:  
“CSDP was our big toy. Structurally it will take a while until peo-
ple  from  the  Commission  start  thinking  about  CSDP,  or  people  
from the Council start thinking about assistance policies. But we 
have to realize they are our policies.”254 
6.4. Communicating EU positions 
The aim of the Lisbon Treaty was to increase the visibility of the EU, 
and it assigned the High Representative the role of representing the 
                                                   
252 Interview #34. 
253 The latest effort to articulate the EU’s comprehensive approach was a joint commu-
nication of the High Representative and the Commission in December 2013, which 
outlined the use of joint instruments and the shared responsibilities of EU-level and 
member-state actors in reaction to crises. The communication is based on previous 
experience of EU engagements in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the Great Lakes 
(see JOIN(2013) 30 final). 
254 Interview #3.  
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Union. Pre-Lisbon, the rotating Presidency represented the Union on 
CFSP matters, while the High Representative was only assisting the 
member state holding the Presidency.255 The  new  treaty  put  the  High  
Representative in charge of EU foreign policy and muted the rotating 
Presidency on the international stage.256 However, the High Repre-
sentative had to share the space with a number of other EU-level ac-
tors, such as colleagues in the Commission that speak on integrated 
policy aspects, and the new President of the European Council repre-
senting the Union at the level of heads of state or government. The 
High Representative’s ability to communicate on behalf of the Union is 
thus potentially constrained by member states’ control and competition 
with other EU level agents. 
The new communication system 
Even though the High Representative had various informal and formal 
opportunities to speak and conduct diplomacy in the name of the Un-
ion, this section concentrates on the formal instruments of third-party 
communication. At the start of her term, the High Representative in-
stalled a new hierarchical communication system (see Table 6.1.). The 
rotating Presidency lost its function of representing the Union on CFSP 
matters, and thus the High Representative could choose between a 
wide range of channels, such as declarations on behalf of the Union, 
personal statements, and spokesperson statements. Moreover, EU dele-
gations had the possibility to issue local statements and démarches. The 
instruments have different drafting processes and were used for differ-
ent purposes.   
  
                                                   
255 Art. 18(1,3) TEU Nice. 
256 Art. 18(2) TEU. 
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Type Sender Drafting process Purpose 
Declarations by the 
High Representative on 
behalf of the Union 
EU: “The EU con-
demns/is con-
cerned/welcomes…” 
 
MS involved via 
COREU/unanimity 
decision 
Define new poli-
cies 
Statements by the High 
Representative 
High Representative: 
“I condemn/am 
con-
cerned/welcome…” 
Without consultation 
of the MS, but based 
on previously agreed 
policies 
 
Representation of 
existing policies 
Statement by the 
spokesperson of the 
High Representative 
High Representative: 
“The High Repre-
sentative con-
demns/is con-
cerned/welcomes…” 
 
Without consultation 
of the MS, but based 
on previously agreed 
policies 
 
Reiterate state-
ments made by the 
HR; address less 
salient issues 
Local statements EU delegation: “The 
EU delegation issues 
the following state-
ment in agreement 
with the EU heads of 
mission in [host 
country].” 
 
Coordinated by the 
EU delegation on the 
ground with the 
national delegations 
represented in the 
country 
Country-specific 
statements 
Démarches EU. Carried out by 
EU delegation, or 
member state, or 
both. 
EEAS or member 
state initiative; EEAS 
drafts text and in-
structions; member 
states involved via 
COREU 
Private communi-
cation 
Note: COREU = Correspondance Européenne. 
Table 6.1: Communication instruments (author’s own compilation) 
The two main communication channels – declarations and statements – 
both left the High Representative with limited discretion. The lack of 
discretion is most obvious with regard to declarations on behalf of the 
Union. These are usually agreed through exchanges via the COREU 
network, or discussions in the PSC. All member states have to agree on 
the text; thus, member states had tight control over the drafting pro-
cess. There was a reason for the close participation of the member 
states: declarations were always used to formulate new policies. They 
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were not based on previously agreed EU positions, and were thus un-
der intense scrutiny by the member state capitals.257 
Nevertheless, the personal statements of the High Representative also 
did not leave much discretion for Ashton to speak freely. Even though 
statements always use the first-person singular, they represent the posi-
tions of the Union as a whole. The High Representative can issue them 
without consulting the member states, which makes them quicker and 
easier to issue. However, according to an EEAS official, the press team 
in the service made sure that the statements were in line with the agreed 
policy of the Union defined over previous years in declarations and 
conclusions, as well as with “relevant individual member state posi-
tions”.258 The effort that was put into aligning the statements with EU 
and member states policies can partly be explained by the rather risk-
averse approach of Catherine Ashton. However, diplomats and EEAS 
officials involved in the process pointed out that future High Repre-
sentatives will also be constrained by the agreed policy lines.259 There-
fore, member states still have a forceful ex ante control over the person-
al statements of the High Representative. 
Statements instead of declarations 
The High Representative has been very engaged in communicating the 
positions of the EU. The High Representative counted 504 statements 
in the period 1 January – 9 November 2011, including: 
· 78 Declarations on behalf of the EU,  
· 279 Statements by the High Representative,  
· 102 Spokespersons’ statements and  
· 45 Local EU statements (High Representative, 2011).  
                                                   
257 Interview #47. 
258 Interview #47. 
259 Interviews #47, #6. This is in line with the general approach taken by EU represent-
atives. The reference handbook of EU external action officials, the vade mecum on the 
external action of the Union issued by the Secretariat of the Commission, states that 
“[d]epending on the subject matter concerned, the EU position to be defended in any 
international forum is the position which flows from EU legislation or policy or from 
Conclusions (Resolutions) of the European Council or of the Council” (SEC(2011)881, 
p.20).  
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In addition, the EU carries out around 200 démarche campaigns per 
year, including larger ones that go out to more than one recipient.260  
A closer analysis reveals that the patterns of communication have 
changed (Helwig et al., 2013). The High Representative used intensively 
personal statements, while the number of declarations on behalf of the 
Union dropped (see Figure 6.1). Before the Lisbon Treaty, the rotating 
Council Presidency was in charge of declarations and had an additional 
incentive to issue them in order to boost its international profile. How-
ever, Ashton could more easily issue personal statements, and only 
resorted to the more lengthy process of formulating a declaration to-
gether with the member states if there were no prior policy lines. How-
ever, the fact that more messages were issued on behalf of the High 
Representative does not mean that she had more discretion in their 
formulation, as described above. The statements of the High Repre-
sentative fell within the predefined policy lines of the member states. 
 
Figure 6.1: Declarations and Statements (source Helwig et al., 2013) 
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 EU cacophony  
The High Representative was not the only voice of EU-level diploma-
cy, even though the Lisbon Treaty combined the external communica-
tion functions of the Relex Commissioner, High Representative and 
rotating Presidency in one post. Several EU-level agents competed for 
the attention of international and EU audiences. In theory, the compe-
tences of the Commission President, European Council President and 
High Representative are delimited: the High Representative and the 
European Council President speak on CFSP at the level of either the 
foreign minister, or heads of state or government, while the Commis-
sion President and other Commissioners speak on non-CFSP matters. 
At an administrative level, competences are divided between the Com-
mission services and the EEAS headquarters. On the ground, the Un-
ion delegations represent all EU actors (see Table 6.2).  
 CFSP Non-CFSP 
External action 
(part five TEU) 
External action of 
sectoral policies 
Heads of state or 
government level 
President of the 
European Council President of the Commission 
Ministerial level High Representative Commissioners (including the High Representative acting as Vice-President) 
Administrative level EEAS Commission services EEAS HQ services 
In third coun-
tries/at interna-
tional organisations 
-------------------- EU Delegations -------------------- 
No role for the member state holding the rotating Presidency in EU external representation (unless 
acting on behalf of the High Representative) 
 Note: TEU = Treaty on European Union. 
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 Table 6.2: Representation of EU external action (source SEC(2011)881) 
 
In practice, however, the lines were blurry and gave space for agent 
competition. This was partly due to an unclear hierarchical division of 
competences between the President of the Commission and the High 
Representative as its Vice President. The High Representative un-
doubtedly had the competence to speak on matters of CFSP without 
any guidance from superiors in the Commission, as the Commission 
had no competences in this policy field. However, competences were 
overlapping when Ashton spoke in her role as Vice President of the 
Commission. Here, the Commission President “with the exception of 
CFSP, and other cases provided for in the Treaties […] shall ensure the 
Union’s external representation”.261 Hence, it was usually the central 
press service of the Commission that provided guidance to the speakers 
of Commissioners. However, the double-hatted set-up of the High 
Representative caused confusion: in practice, it often remained unclear 
as to whether Ashton’s statements were made under the hat of the 
CFSP or the Commission, and thus her press team was in large part not 
subject to coordination by the Commission press service.262 
During Ashton’s term, coordination between the press services of the 
High Representative, the Commission President and the President of 
the European Council remained challenging.  In the case of the crisis in 
Libya, all three entities issued similar statements on the latest develop-
ments in the Southern neighbourhood (Koenig, 2011). Even though 
the statements did not contradict each other in substance, they arguably 
left the global audience and media puzzled about the importance of 
each individual actor: a single voice in EU foreign policy remained an 
illusion (Busse, 2011). As explained by a high-ranked member state 
diplomat, the reason for the multitude of voices was simple and una-
voidable:  
                                                   
261 Art. 17(1) TEU. 
262 Interview #32. 
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“we live in an age of Twitter and constant media interaction. If Bar-
roso or Van Rompuy are asked to give a statement on a particular 
issue, they cannot afford to not give a statement.”263 
Only in cases where there was time to coordinate in advance did the 
press services of the actors manage to divide the responsibility among 
themselves.264 This was especially the case if a diplomatic line could be 
followed. For example, on the occasion of Obama’s re-election in No-
vember 2012, the Presidents of the Commission and European Council 
issued a joint congratulation message,265 while the High Representative 
congratulated John Kerry on becoming Secretary of State.266  
Thus, the Lisbon Treaty did not change the multitude of voices, and 
left the possibility for several EU-level agents to speak on the same 
issue. Nevertheless, there was no clear sign that the agent competition 
would constrain the discretion of the High Representative in her com-
munications. As all statements issued by EU-level agents (except those 
of the President of the EP) have to be based on the agreed policy lines 
of the member states, they were not hugely contradictory in their con-
tent. The EU-level agents’ discretion over the issuing of statements was 
therefore limited not so much by agent competition, but rather by the 
preferences of the member states on which all of the statements were 
based.  
A spokesperson for the member states 
The High Representative and her press team in the political affairs de-
partment of the EEAS had little discretion over the content of com-
munication. Declarations and statements are either drafted and agreed 
upon by all member states, or firmly based on pre-existing policy lines. 
The amount of ongoing control and anticipated ex post sanctioning is 
high, thus ruling out any unintended discretion (H2). The officials fear 
to send out a political message in the name of the High Representative 
that would ex post be criticised or corrected by member states and thus 
                                                   
263 Interview #9. 
264 Interview #47. 
265 MEMO/12/841. 
266 A 592/12. 
In action     179 
 
 
lead to a loss of reputation of the High Representative. An EEAS offi-
cial commented that even though “member states are bound as well by 
the treaties to act in line with the EU position, they can act more 
freely”.267 As a consequence, member states sometimes reveal their own 
public position very quickly, while the EEAS is still working on a 
common statement. 
This observation is largely in line with the general argument of the the-
sis that the increase of the High Representative’s institutional authority 
is not necessarily increasing the incumbent’s discretion over foreign 
policy content. Pre-Lisbon High Representative Solana’s discretion on 
some policy areas has been well-documented by previous research 
(Aggestam et al., 2008: 42–47; Crowe, 2005: 14–18; Dijkstra, 2011a), 
which shows that Solana’s authority over certain policy issues signifi-
cantly depended on the region in question, and the characteristics of 
the rotating Council Presidency under which he worked at the time. 
The Western Balkans is the classical example, where Solana gained such 
a high profile and notable expertise that rotating Presidencies and other 
member states stepped back and left the stage for the foreign policy 
chief. Solana himself admitted: “I don’t have to check everything with 
everyone. I would rather have forgiveness than permission. If you ask 
permission, you never do anything” (Crowe, 2005: 15). In the inter-
views  for  this  study,  a  press  person  from  Solana’s  team  recalled  that  
Solana ‘owned’ certain portfolios:  
“He created certain policies, such as the EU’s policy towards the 
Western Balkans, and member states trusted him on these. If a 
statement was needed in a subject he was personally very involved in, 
his margin was very wide.”268  
However, he was also more prudent on other topics, and was careful 
not to overstretch the trust of the member states on issues that he pio-
neered: “one wanted to break ground with the statements, but not too 
much”.269 
                                                   
267 Interview #47. 
268 Interview #3. 
269 Interview #3. 
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A similar discretion on foreign policy statements cannot be observed 
under Ashton’s legacy. This might be partly due to the characteristics of 
the incumbent, who prefers a soft, “quiet diplomacy” (Rüger, 2011: 
224), had less foreign policy experience when entering the post, and 
developed an EEAS, which is – like her – “much more risk-averse”.270 
However, a sole focus on the personality of the High Representative 
falls short in explaining the loss of discretion. The analysis here sug-
gests an explanation based on the institutional set-up. Pre-Lisbon High 
Representative Solana had discretion on foreign policy communication 
and diplomacy not despite being subordinate to a rotating Council Presi-
dency, but because he had the rotating Presidency as a fixed member 
state interlocutor and direct principal. Although it was true that the 
rotating Presidency was able to take over the show and sideline the 
High Representative, it could also give deliberate discretion to Solana to 
manage entire portfolios or specific policy questions. Presidencies hap-
pily delegated the tedious and time-consuming Western Balkan and 
Middle-East portfolios to Solana (Aggestam et al., 2008; Crowe, 2005). 
Post-Lisbon, with a muted rotating Presidency on CFSP matters, the 
High Representative received full authority to represent CFSP; howev-
er, permission is needed from all 28 member states in the Council in 
order for the High Representative to act. 
The authority of the post-Lisbon High Representative came with con-
trol of the post’s activities by all member states, which arguably left the 
High Representative with less discretion than before. Meanwhile, Ash-
ton’s ‘Commission hat’ did not have the desired effect: a widespread 
perception amongst interviewees in this study was that she predomi-
nantly focused on her role as High Representative, and too rarely 
played the Commission Vice-President card. Speaking in the name of 
the Commission could, however, allow for discretion with respect to 
bolder statements.  
Conclusion 
The first years of the revamped post of EU High Representative did 
not grant much discretion to the incumbent, Catherine Ashton. While 
the Lisbon Treaty created a potentially strong actor on paper, the actual 
                                                   
270 Interview #50. 
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performance indicates that EU foreign policy remained tightly in the 
hands of the member states. The member states created an agent, how-
ever, they did not delegate authority to the post. Without clear man-
dates, the High Representative was a constrained agent.  
What conditioned the discretion of the High Representative? Conflict-
ing preferences among the member states’ principals had an effect on 
the High Representative’s room for manoeuvre; however, in contrast to 
H1, and to what the PA literature would predict, conflicting preferences 
among the principals did not enable the agent to exploit the differences 
and to follow a personal agenda. The fact that the High Representative 
continuously needed new mandates on which to base her actions 
changed the PA dynamics in favour of the member states. For them, 
common EU actions are just one option among several. Therefore, 
conflicting preferences led to missing delegation, and often left the 
High Representative without mandate. For example, Ashton received 
no mandate to update the ESS, nor did she have a common EU posi-
tion to represent  during the Libya crisis.  A different,  but  equally  con-
straining, effect was witnessed in the agenda-management of the For-
eign Affairs Council: here, the multitude of preferences among the 
member states overloaded the High Representative’s mandate and led 
to an often unfocused agenda. The evidence suggests that the PA ap-
proach in the field of supranational agency has room for refinement: 
conflicting preferences in the anarchic international system – in which 
agents beyond the states do not have their own legitimate authority 
base – are likely to cause failed delegation. 
The evidence collected for this chapter also suggests that the High Rep-
resentative had no deliberate discretion because of the tight control and 
oversight mechanisms used by the member states. This observation 
supports H2. The control and sanctioning mechanisms, which con-
strain the agent from running loose, were thereby less explicit and 
could only be revealed via careful process-tracing and expert interviews 
with practitioners. The hesitant reaction of Ashton to the crisis in Lib-
ya, which was often portrayed in the media as a missed chance “to seize 
the international spotlight” (Castle, 2011), was rather conditioned by 
the member states’ anticipated sanctioning of overly bold and unwant-
ed actions from Ashton. Taking a position on the no-fly-zone that was 
not in line with the view of some of the member states, could have led 
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to informal sanctions against the High Representative, for example 
through public criticism  or further side-lining of her role in the crisis. 
While a risk-averse mindset of the agent might be a crucial factor here 
(and should be conceptualised and analysed in future studies), the 
agent’s discretion was in this case significantly limited by the member 
states’ control over a high political-crisis situation. With regard to the 
statements of the High Representative, the control of the member 
states was also indirect. Even though the member states were not con-
sulted for the High Representative’s statements (and hence not exercis-
ing ongoing control), the discretion of the statements was limited 
through the acquis of previously agreed policies.  
The enhanced, but also complex, institutional structure of the EU for-
eign policy machinery, which installed the High Representative as the 
Commission Vice-President, did not bear fruit. It proved difficult for 
the High Representative to set the agenda in the Commission. This was 
partly due to organisational constraints and a slow adjustment of the 
Commission structures to the new treaty rules; however, different poli-
cy objectives, for example in the field of humanitarian aid, were also an 
impediment to the High Representative’s discretion. Furthermore, 
competition with the Commission hindered the High Representative’s 
discretion as an agenda- and crisis manager.  
To sum up, this chapter suggests that the new institutional structures 
around the post of High Representative only brought limited changes 
to EU foreign policy. The related policies remained a strict aggregation 
of the member states’ preferences, and offered no deliberate discretion 
for the post to launch bold initiatives. On the contrary, some compari-
sons with the pre-Lisbon foreign policy set-up showed that the lower 
degree of institutionalisation of the post often allowed Solana to move 
more freely. Implementing the CFSP together with the rotating Presi-
dency and based in the General Secretariat of the Council, allowed 
Solana to receive mandates with deliberate discretion to set own agen-
das. The institutionalisation of the post has increased not only the ca-
pabilities of the High Representative, but also the desire of the member 
states to control the post. It also intensified competition with other 
Commission actors. The net effect on the discretion of the foreign 
policy chief has – so far – been negative.  
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7. The EEAS review: an institutional deadlock 
 
“It was in a word, tough.” (Ashton, 2013b) 
Looking back at her first years in office, Catherine Ashton underlined 
that the position as EU foreign policy chief was demanding. In 2013, 
those who had high-flying expectations of the new foreign policy play-
ers were knocked out of the skies. While Ashton and her service had 
developed and managed well in the first four years under new Lisbon 
Treaty rules, even the optimists had to realise that the new players faced 
difficulties in gaining authority in Brussels, and in being accepted by the 
member states as a facilitator for their foreign policies. It was rather a 
sober environment in which the review of the EEAS was scheduled.  
Meanwhile, the member states were tired by the tedious negotiations 
that had been carried out with respect to the EU foreign policy ma-
chinery throughout the last decade. As the analysis below will show, the 
discussed issues and dividing lines between the member states regarding 
negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty and the set-up of the EEAS were 
reoccurring themes. The discussions portrayed the deadlock of the 
institutional development of EU foreign policy. Remembering the un-
bridgeable differences during the European Convention, and during the 
set-up of the EEAS, the member states lost their determination to try 
to overcome this deadlock. In the following, the overall scope and pro-
cess, as well as the most prominent discussions of the review, will be 
analysed. 
7.1. Reason, structure and scope 
The review as a control mechanism 
The Council decision on the EEAS included the crucial provision of 
conducting a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS 
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in mid-2013.271 A review of an administration before its third birthday 
might come too early to evaluate its institutional architecture and prac-
tices. It seems unlikely that the mid-2013 date was set with the idea that 
a comprehensive evaluation of the new structures could be undertaken. 
Ashton (2013b: 1) pointed out that a review was “a long way off” at the 
time of the EEAS Council decision, and that “nothing had been put in 
place to make the EEAS a reality”. It was a widely shared view in the 
literature (see, for example, Drieskens and Schaik, 2010), and among 
those interviewed for this study,272 that an institutional consolidation of 
the service needs more time. As one diplomat explained, the review 
should be seen as one step within the longer process of setting up the 
new service, rather than as a one-off exercise.273  
Some observers preferred to look at the shortcomings of the EEAS 
from a policy perspective (see, for example, Balfour et al., 2012). The 
hope was that the review would not just involve a discussion on pro-
cesses and competences, but would also “broaden the debate within 
Europe on the future of Europe’s role in the world” (Balfour and Raik, 
2013). Indeed, the EEAS review was seen as part of a wider discussion 
on the EU’s strategic outlook, which had taken place in 2013.274 How-
ever, the specific task of the High Representative was to “provide a 
review on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS […]”.275 The 
review was specifically focused on the procedures and structures, rather 
than on the policy outcomes.  
In line with the theoretical argument of this thesis, the review can large-
ly be seen as a possibility for the member states to oversee, control, and 
potentially correct the institutional set-up of the EEAS, and of the of-
fice of the High Representative. From the PA perspective, the motiva-
tion of the member states behind the review of the EEAS was twofold: 
first, it was installed as an opportunity to discuss open issues that had 
not been settled between the member states during the negotiations on 
the EEAS in 2010. The mandate of the High Representative had blank 
                                                   
271 Art. 13(3) EEAS decision. 
272 For example, interviews #41, #45, #49. 
273 Interview #49. 
274 See for example the discussions during a seminar of practitioners and academics on 
EU security policy (Helwig, 2012). 
275 Art. 13(3) EEAS decision 
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spots, which gave Ashton unintended discretion in the set-up of the 
service (see Chapter 4). The national representatives adjourned negotia-
tions on unsettled issues to the 2013 review. For example, the member 
states did not agree in detail on the integration of the crisis-
management structures, and on the role of the EEAS in the coordina-
tion of Commission policies. Blockmans et al. (2013: 77) pointed out 
that   
“given  the  originality  of  the  EEAS in  the  EU institutional  land-
scape, and the ambiguity of the provisions governing its organisation 
and functioning, it is unsurprising that the monitoring of the deci-
sion’s implementation, and its possible revision, were deemed neces-
sary.”  
Second, the review served as an inbuilt control mechanism for the 
member states. It gave them the possibility to correct developments 
that were not in line with their preferences. The Council decision spe-
cifically mentioned a review of the national and gender balance of the 
EEAS staff, of the controversial chain of command of the EU delega-
tions, and of the programming of financial instruments.276 Krätke and  
Sherriff (2012: 4) concluded that  
“[p]olitical motivations can therefore be presumed to be behind and 
at the core of the review, […] it is in the stakeholders’ interest to as-
sess, justify and (if necessary) modify the Council Decision establish-
ing the EEAS. ” 
The nature of the review was not a technical and apolitical evaluation of 
best practices, but rather part of a political process in which the mem-
ber  states  tried  to  control  the  set-up  of  the  EEAS,  and  of  the  High  
Representative’s office.  
                                                   
276 Art.  13(2)  EEAS  Council  decision.  The  instruments  already  had  to  be  part  of  a  
report on the implementation of the EEAS decision at the end of 2011.  
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Who conducted the review? 
The EEAS Council decision stipulated that the High Representative 
would carry out the review.277 The High Representative  was thus in  a  
powerful position as she was able to frame the discussion on the organ-
isation and functioning of the service. In addition, the revision of the 
EEAS Council decision was based on the same article in the Lisbon 
Treaty as the initial set-up of the EEAS (Blockmans and Hillion, 
2013).278 As a consequence, any revision of the EEAS decision had to 
be based on a proposal by the High Representative.  
The EEAS decision did not specify who had to be involved in the re-
view, and left it to the discretion of the High Representative to decide 
on the procedures used during the drafting process. According to high-
ranking officials of the EEAS, Catherine Ashton personally oversaw 
the process of writing the review report.279 The main document, which 
set out the findings and recommendations of the review (Ashton, 
2013b), was written in a closed circle involving only some of her Cabi-
net members, though the EEAS provided input and support.280  
In addition, Ashton (2013b: 2) thanked “delegations across the world, 
Brussels-based staff, Commission, Council, member states, the EP, 
think tanks, NGOs and individuals” for their contributions. Think 
tanks got involved in the process from very early on: the first publica-
tions had already emerged by the end of the EEAS’s first year (Balfour 
et al., 2012; Blockmans, 2012b; Duke, 2012; Hemra et al., 2011). The 
member states sent a letter signed by 12 foreign ministers to the High 
Representative in late 2011.281 More  input  was  to  follow  a  year  later,  
                                                   
277 Art. 13(3) EEAS Council decision. 
278 Art. 13(3) EEAS Council decision stated, “the Council shall, in accordance with 
27(3) TEU, revise the decision […].”  
279 Interview #46. 
280 The Political Affairs Department played a role in this respect, coordinated with the 
member states ahead of the Gymnich meetings, and inter alia carried out a survey on 
EU delegations (#47).  
281 Joint letter from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden to the 
High Representative of the Union, 8 December 2011. 
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including another letter signed by 14 member states,282 analyses and 
recommendations by think tanks (Balfour and Raik, 2012; Blockmans, 
2012a;  Helwig  et  al.,  2013),  and  reports  by  the  EP283 and the British 
House of Lords (House of Lords, 2013). Together with a discussion 
held with foreign ministers at the Gymnich meeting in Dublin in March 
2013, the High Representative had a reasonable amount of outside 
assessment to use for the review.  
Scope of the review 
The Council decision on the EEAS stipulated that the review should, 
“if necessary, be accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision 
of this decision”.284 Based on this, different scopes of the review were 
possible. A maximalist review could have included recommendations 
that even went beyond the EEAS Council decision and looked into the 
overall functioning of the EU foreign policy architecture. The argument 
was that the effectiveness of the service is closely connected to its inter-
institutional relations with the Commission and the Council (Helwig et 
al., 2013; Wouters et al., 2013). A maximalist approach included fun-
damental questions on the division of competences between the differ-
ent actors (development cooperation in the EEAS?), on decision-
making procedures (unanimity decisions in CFSP?) as well as on institu-
tional designs (deputies for the High Representative?). However, ambi-
tious changes required modifications to the Lisbon Treaty, and would 
have opened debates on the same issues that could not be settled in the 
European Convention. Changes to the Lisbon Treaty were highly un-
likely. 
Changes to the July 2010 Council decision on the EEAS were difficult 
to achieve. A corporate board member of the EEAS dismissed the idea: 
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference
=P7-TA-2013-278. 
284 Art. 13(3) EEAS. 
188     The constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy 
 
 
opening the long-negotiated Council decision would open ‘Pandora’s 
Box’, since “if one member state requests a change to the Council deci-
sion, ten others will raise their hands”.285 In general, the member states 
were not fond of the idea of renegotiating the Council decision on the 
EEAS. The UK in particular warned of new debates. Secretary of State 
William Hague, in a letter to Catherine Ashton just ahead of the Gym-
nich meeting on the EEAS review, wrote: “Renegotiating the 2010 
Council decision would be a lengthy exercise and could detract from 
important work on the many pressing foreign policy issues we face”.286  
Therefore, a minimalistic version seemed likely. In this scenario, the 
High Representative only had the possibility to propose changes within 
the  existing  legal  framework.  The  EEAS Council  decision  did  not  go  
into detail about the internal organisation and structure of the service; 
hence, inter-alia suggestions could touch upon the structure of the 
Corporate Board or the coordination between crisis-management and 
geographic departments of the EEAS. However, stages of program-
ming cycles of financial instruments could not be changed, as they are 
regulated in the Council decision.  
As the review got closer, it seemed more likely that the Council deci-
sion would be left untouched. A new EEAS decision was not be possi-
ble against the will of the UK.287 Being asked what reform she consid-
ered most important, Ashton hinted at rather limited modifications: 
“The most important reforms are to ensure that we have the right inter-
institutional framework […], that means being ready and willing to 
tweak and change things […]” (Ashton, 2013c). Here, it became clear 
that all those who hoped for ground-breaking changes would be disap-
pointed.  
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7.2. The High Representative moderates, the member states 
initiate 
Ashton’s approach to the review 
Catherine Ashton chose a moderating role during the review. She struc-
tured the discussions along the lines of certain themes with the member 
states, instead of pre-formulating a list of proposed changes to her 
office. Her cautiousness became apparent when she presented her non-
paper for the discussion with the foreign ministers before the Gymnich 
meeting in Dublin in early 2013. Based on the generally subdued mood 
regarding the changing of the EEAS Council decision, Ashton began 
by clarifying the scope of the review exercise: 
“My  approach  is  that  the  review  should  identify  a  programme  of  
short-term and medium-term actions and recommendations to allow 
the EU and member states to use the full  potential of the new ser-
vice.  Some-short term measures could be taken at EU level within 
the existing legal and institutional framework; while others may re-
quire changes to the EEAS Decision or other legislation; and some 
may need to be implemented as part of the next institutional configu-
ration in 2014.“288 
Thus, a change to the Council decision was off the table in the short 
term. The focus would be on changes within the existing legal frame-
work. However, medium-term changes to the EEAS Council decision, 
or to the new 2014 Commission, were still open for discussion.  
Ashton continued in her non-paper with a list of issues that the review 
should focus on. These were based on the previous input from the 
member states, the EP, and preceding informal discussions. Ten points 
were briefly introduced, and complemented with a few guiding discus-
sion questions (see Table 7.1). This exemplifies the High Representa-
tive’s bottom-up approach: in the paper, Ashton did not express her 
own position on the future shape of the service to the member states. 
The review would be based on the input of the foreign ministries, and 
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the discussion among the ministers. Moreover, the Commission was 
not involved in the review process, and thus was not able to impose its 
interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty on the member states. The ap-
proach fundamentally differed from that taken during the initial set-up 
of the EEAS, when the High Representative and the Commission ne-
gotiated side by side (see Chapter 5). Without cooperation between the 
EEAS and the Commission, one would expect that the member states 
would control the review of the EU foreign policy architecture. How-
ever, the member states still had to coordinate their position, and the 
potential remained for disagreements to hamper their ability to suggest 
concrete changes.   
Annotated agenda 
1. The High Representative as the CFSP Presidency 
2. EU delegations (relations with member state delegations) 
3. EU delegations (internal arrangements) 
4. EEAS support to EU institutions 
5. Relations with the Commission (High Representative as Vice-
President)  
6. Relations with the Commission (Development Cooperation) 
7. CSDP/crisis management 
8. EU Special Representatives 
9. EEAS staffing 
10. Deputies for the High Representative  
Table 7.1: Annotated agenda for the Dublin Gymnich meeting 
The involvement of the member states 
The review resulted in deepened cooperation between the national 
foreign ministries, wherein the involvement of the member states was 
characterised by proactiveness, coalition-building and informality. After 
the experience of partially losing control of the set-up process of the 
EEAS, the member states wanted to be proactive and make sure that 
their views would be fully taken into consideration this time around. 
The member states issued position papers early on in the process. A 
senior diplomat from a greatly committed member state explained that 
some member states  did not  want  to wait  for  the first  draft  from the 
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EEAS or High Representative.289 Afraid that they might not be asked 
for their opinion, the member states felt that they had to make their 
position heard early on in the process. As noted by one interviewee,290 
the proposed changes should not be understood as criticisms of the 
High Representative, as perceived by some in the media (Rettman, 
2012), but as constructive support for the EEAS review,. 
Second, the involvement of the member states was structured in coali-
tions. The member states were divided: one group (among them Ger-
many, as well as small and medium-sized member states) was on the 
whole interested in a strong EU foreign policy, and therefore wanted to 
use the review to make the new system work. Others (such as the UK 
and, to some extent, France) disengaged from the process, as they be-
lieved the limited scope of changes that were to be expected would not 
affect their interests.291 The main driver of the former group was Ger-
many. The German initiative started with the so-called ‘Majorca Group’ 
(named after one of their meeting spots). The high-level reflection 
group was initiated by the German Foreign Minister Guido Wester-
welle, and comprised, next to him, the foreign ministers of Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Po-
land, Portugal and Spain. The final report (Future of Europe Group, 
2012) had a rather visionary character, and touched on a wide range of 
issues concerning the future development of the EU, inter alia the 
strengthening of the position of the High Representative in the institu-
tional architecture.  
The positive experience of the Majorca Group prompted the idea of 
using the existing cooperation structure for a more detailed paper for 
the EEAS review. Germany started to form a homogeneous group 
around its aim to strengthen the High Representative.292 Nevertheless, 
the constellation of participating states changed. France, which was part 
of the Majorca Group, was reluctant to participate in a joint paper for 
the EEAS review.293 Germany won over a couple of smaller countries 
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for the initiative. According to one diplomat, there was interest in small 
and medium-sized member states joining, as they did not have the re-
sources themselves to look into the review in depth.294 In the end, Es-
tonia, Finland, Latvia, Slovakia and Sweden joined the German initia-
tive.  
Germany took the lead, and the Europe division of the Foreign Office 
wrote the first drafts. In a second step, the other members of the group 
were given the chance to add recommendations or to make amend-
ments. The participants did not always agree with each other; for ex-
ample, while Germany was outspoken about having the neighbourhood 
portfolio assigned to the High Representative, Finland did not perceive 
this  as  a  decisive  issue.  However,  all  of  the  participants  aimed  for  a  
strong input paper, and thus were willing to make concessions. The 
Group members made sure that the paper295 was not a ‘watered down’ 
compromise, but represented the maximum of what they wanted to 
achieve.296 
Finally, the review process was generally informal. The review was not 
on the formal agenda of the Council WGs and the EP was not formally 
involved. EU State Secretaries and Secretary-Generals met several times 
to discuss the EEAS and its relations with the national administra-
tion.297 The decisive meeting at ministerial level was the informal Gym-
nich meeting on 22–23 March 2013 in Dublin. On that occasion, the 
EP, represented by Elmar Brok (Chair of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs) was able to share its views as well.298 Another round of infor-
mal meetings took place in October 2013, after the High Representa-
tive presented her main points in the EEAS review paper. The October 
meetings included an informal Coreper ambassador lunch (18 Octo-
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ber), an informal PSC ambassador lunch (23 October), and an informal 
meeting of the EU State Secretaries of the foreign ministries (24 Octo-
ber).299  
The characteristics of the coordination process defined the principal’s 
ability to control and oversee the agent. Germany used the informality 
of the process to form a group of like-minded states to formulate a 
strong position. As we will see, Germany ultimately managed to widely 
realise its preferences, while the High Representative had limited discre-
tion over the content of the text.   
7.3. Focus I: Relations with the Commission300 
Different readings of the Lisbon Treaty 
From the start, the relation between the EEAS and the Commission 
was subject to debate as a consequence of diverging interpretations of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The Commission took up the position that the crea-
tion of the EEAS had no impact on the division of competences 
among EU institutions. The Commission would still be in charge of 
external affairs other than CFSP and, as the EU’s executive, would have 
authority over financial programmes. The mandate of the High Repre-
sentative to coordinate the external activities of the Commission as its 
Vice-President301 was acknowledged. However, it was seen as a man-
date for soft coordination of the independent activities of the Commis-
sion, and not as a hierarchical order that would rank the High Repre-
sentative above other external relations Commissioners.302 Commission 
officials stressed the fact that the Lisbon Treaty clearly states the com-
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petences of the Commission over external representation of the Union 
for matters outside the CFSP.303 
The member states, on the other hand, read the Lisbon Treaty in a 
different way. For them, the coherence of the EU’s external action was 
the overall objective. The High Representative post, with its double-hat 
structure, was created in order to bring all aspects of external action 
under one roof. Thus, the HR/VP should have authority over all exter-
nal policy aspects, and the mandate to coordinate the external activities 
of the Commission was stressed. However, it has to be noted that the 
degree to which all member states subscribed to this position varied. 
Some of the member states were open to a division of tasks between 
the High Representative/EEAS and the Commission, given the sheer 
breadth of external action and the heavy workload involved. The need 
for the political guidance of the High Representative was nevertheless 
undisputed. These underlying different interpretations set the frontlines 
on the issues discussed in the review that touched upon relations with 
the Commission.  
Neighbourhood policy 
The allocation of the neighbourhood portfolio to the Commissioner 
for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, raised eyebrows in the member state 
capitals (see Chapter 5). The move came as a surprise, because the 
neighbourhood portfolio had been under the remit of the Commission-
er for External Relations in the previous Commission. Consequently, it 
was expected to be in the hands of the HR/VP under the new Lisbon 
rules (see also Weiss, 2010). The allocation of the neighbourhood port-
folio was not regulated in the decision on the organisation of the 
EEAS, but rather lay in the hands of the Commission President.304 
Nevertheless, the member states wanted to use the EEAS review to 
examine whether the neighbourhood policy should be reassigned to the 
High Representative.  
Ashton approved Commission President Barroso’s decision to assign 
the neighbourhood portfolio to Commissioner Füle. From her point of 
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view, having a Commissioner in charge of the neighbourhood would 
enable her to share the burden of her representational duties around 
the world.305 However, Germany in particular made a strong argument 
for transferring the authority of the neighbourhood portfolio to the 
High Representative.306 In the German-led non-paper, the 14 member 
states argued that “the HR/VP (and the EEAS) should be responsible 
for neighbourhood policy as this constitutes a central area of European 
foreign policy”.307  
The demands of Germany and others were disputable. First, they over-
looked the fact that the EEAS services already managed the neigh-
bourhood policy. Commissioner Füle did not have a neighbourhood 
directorate inside the Commission because all of the respective staff 
had moved from the DG Relex of the Commission to the EEAS. Thus,  
“the EEAS’ divisions dealing with the European Neighbourhood Poli-
cy became the de facto service of Commissioner Füle” (Helwig et al., 
2013: 46). Second, commentators saw benefits in the established set-up. 
Commissioner Füle de facto functioned as Catherine Ashton’s deputy 
for the implementation of the neighbourhood policy, and was the 
“EEAS’ ally in the Commission” (Kostanyan, 2013). An EEAS corpo-
rate board member spoke in favour of the current set-up:  
“I would leave that untouched. Ashton forms a well-working tandem 
with Commissioner Füle. In addition, the neighbourhood Commis-
sioner can stay in close contact with DG DEVCO [responsible for 
the implementation of the financial instruments in the region]”.308 
In her review paper, Catherine Ashton acknowledged Germany’s con-
cerns: “Designating a Commissioner for the neighbourhood when the 
geographical responsibilities for these countries were transferred to the 
HR/VP and EEAS risked confusion” (Ashton, 2013b: 8). However, 
she shied away from making any final recommendation regarding the 
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future organisation of the neighbourhood policy. The next Commission 
term, starting in 2014, would represent an opportunity to review the 
set-up.  
At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that the status quo will change 
in the near future. During the informal October 2013 discussions in 
Brussels, member states did not agree on this issue.309 Without a unified 
position of the member states, it seems unlikely that the future Com-
mission President will transfer the authority over the neighbourhood 
policy to the High Representative. A member state diplomat comment-
ed on the situation, saying, 
“the Commission is not a natural partner in implementing this re-
form. In order to make changes that reallocate authorities from other 
Commissioners to the High Representative, there needs to be unity 
among the member states. This however is not in sight [on the ques-
tion of the neighbourhood policy].”310. 
Development cooperation 
A similar debate on the division of competences between the EEAS 
and the Commission emerged in the area of development cooperation. 
The wording of the respective article in the EEAS Council decision is a 
product of the intense negotiations between the member states and the 
Commission (see also Blockmans and Hillion, 2013: 53–60).  Each side 
was pleased with the formulations in the text: the Commission was 
made responsible for the “management” of financial programmes, 
while the High Representative was tasked with  “overall political coor-
dination”.311 The Commission still retained authority over development 
cooperation policies.312  
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The outcome – namely, the fact that the political coordination was 
given to the High Representative and the EEAS, while the overall au-
thority stayed in the Commission – was evaluated differently in the 
years that followed. One long-term EU insider and member state dip-
lomat interpreted the result as favourable to the member states’ posi-
tion of having a strong High Representative:  
“the decision to give the EEAS the political stages of the program-
ming was quite a strong one for the EEAS. The price was to leave 
the daily management of the financial instruments in the Commis-
sion.”313  
From this point of view, a strong Commission was unavoidable, be-
cause the EEAS does not have the power to implement financial in-
struments.  
However, the High Representative is also the Vice-President of the 
Commission; therefore, it came as a surprise to commentators that the 
High Representative was not assigned overall political authority over 
development instruments (see Stroß, 2012). The German-led input 
paper of 14 member states demanded greater authority for the High 
Representative, and argued that “strategic and multi-annual program-
ming in the area of development cooperation should be conducted 
under the overall authority of the High Representative”.314 Strategic 
planning thus lay in the hands of the High Representative. This re-
quired a change to the article on the financial instruments in the EEAS 
Council decision, which, in the latest version, clearly highlighted the 
authority of the Commissioner for development cooperation.  
The development community was sceptical about this argumentation, 
and feared an unnecessary politicisation of development cooperation. A 
Concord report stressed, that “the ‘D’ in PCD[315] is not being 
acknowledged by the EEAS, which interprets it as an effort to ensure 
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consistency of EU policies with a foreign affairs agenda” (CONCORD, 
2012: 13). The report pinpointed examples in the Sahel and the Horn 
of Africa, where security goals were prioritised over long term-
development efforts. An Oxfam report noted:  
“the risk of granting leadership to the EEAS is that development 
and humanitarian aid cooperation will be used for political ends ra-
ther than to deliver emergency relief, protect civilians, provide aid, 
and work towards reducing poverty in the developing world” 
(Oxfam, 2012) 
Consequently, the development community proposed keeping respon-
sibility for the programming with the Commission (CONCORD, 
2013).  
The German position did not get much support from other member 
states at the early 2013 Gymnich meeting. Some of the member states, 
for example, had positive experiences with an independent develop-
ment cooperation policy in their own national administrations.316 In 
addition, the EEAS leadership valued the experiences of the first pro-
gramming exercise, which proved the practicality of the existing solu-
tion.317 The decision to leave the EEAS decision untouched dealt a final 
blow to the German initiative, which required a change to the article 
regarding the financial programming.  
Germany again raised the point that the coherence of EU foreign poli-
cy could be improved by giving more authority to the High Representa-
tive during the consultation meetings on the EEAS review in October 
2013. However, how this could be achieved in practice, “was not 
spelled out”.318 Meanwhile, the point did not feature in the main review 
paper. 
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Relex group 
Catherine Ashton had difficulties capitalising on one of the major inno-
vations of the Lisbon Treaty: the double-hatting of the post that made 
her Vice President of the Commission.319 In this job, the group of ex-
ternal relations Commissioners (Relex group) was seen as a platform 
for the High Representative to coordinate the external activities of the 
Commission. However, as outlined in previous chapters, organisation 
of the group did not start off on the right foot. Commission President 
Barroso, with support from the General Secretariat of the Commission, 
secured the management of the group and retained the right to chair it. 
In the time that followed, the track record of the group was poor, and 
it rarely convened. 
To some extent, the effective bilateral working relations between Cath-
erine Ashton and other Commissioners compensated for the weakness-
es of the Relex group. However, some member states wanted to further 
institutionalise cooperation of the High Representative with the other 
Commissioners. The Relex group was seen as the perfect starting point. 
The German-led input paper thus proposed that,  
“in addition to close bilateral contacts, the Relex Commissioners 
should  meet  at  least  once  a  month  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  
HR/VP in  order  to  allow for  efficient  coordination  in  the  field  of  
external relations. These meetings should be jointly prepared at sen-
ior level by the EEAS and the Commission.”320  
In a letter dated 14 March 2013 from British Secretary of State William 
Hague to Catherine Ashton, Hague specifically supported the German-
led initiative. A separate Romanian non-paper also took up the same 
argumentation, and pointed out that “the mandate [of the EEAS] can-
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not be fully implemented without a more coherent coordination of the 
High Representative with all Relex Commissioners”.321 
These inputs signalled that the member states broadly supported the 
High Representative as a coordinator in the Commission. During the 
2013 Gymnich meeting, the relations with the Commission were dis-
cussed at length. A close observer of the meeting recalled that Cathe-
rine Ashton had reported on the intense challenges of her role as Vice-
President of the Commission. On the one hand, she valued the working 
relationship with Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, and Füle. On the 
other, she had to rely on the support of the General Secretariat of the 
Commission for the organisation of the Relex group. The cooperation 
with the Commission Secretariat turned out to be an impossible organi-
sational hurdle that prevented her from effectively coordinating the 
external relations of the Commission322. It thus became clear that addi-
tional resources should be allocated for the Vice-President post.  
Against this backdrop, Ashton (2013b: 16) proposed a joint Commis-
sion–EEAS secretariat for the organisation of the Relex group as a 
short-term recommendation. In addition, it was announced that Com-
mission President Barroso and she had agreed to organise regular meet-
ings of the external relation Commissioners with her in the chair. These 
were to start  during the last  year  of  their  term.  Thus,  the push of  the 
member states to improve the coordination role of the High Repre-
sentative was the most immediate result of the review. According to 
one diplomat involved, the immediate change was due to the fact that 
all member states supported the initiative. Swift implementation was 
possible because changes were within the current legal framework323. 
The review also examined the possibility of the EEAS coordinating 
external aspects of internal policies, such as “energy security, environ-
mental protection and climate change, migration issues, counter-
terrorism, financial regulation and global economic governance” 
(Ashton, 2013b: 8). Being the agenda manager of the Foreign Affairs 
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Council, the EEAS needed to provide input for the ministers on these 
policy areas. According to the review paper, additional resources were 
required to cooperate with the relevant Commission services. A close 
observer pointed out that the EEAS already had some coordination 
capabilities within the directorate for Multilateral and Global issues;324 
however, a further increase of resources did not receive the necessary 
support from the member states in the negotiations. Though the mem-
ber states acknowledged the objective of making the EEAS a coordina-
tion hub for all aspects of external policies, they were hesitant to speak 
out in favour of an increase of EEAS resources, given their budgetary 
restraints.325 It remained open in terms of how far Catherine Ashton’s 
suggestion to “reinforce EEAS capacity for external aspects of key EU 
policies” (Ashton, 2013b: 16) would be taken up.  
7.4. Focus II: The functioning of the High Representative and 
the EEAS 
Deputies 
The question of introducing deputies for the High Representative has 
been subject to debate since the days of the European Convention (see 
also Chapter 4). Does the High Representative need a number of depu-
ties to implement her lengthy job description? The question was picked 
up on during the set-up of the EEAS: the member states and the 
Commission were sceptical about the practical and legal implications of 
having to deal with substitutes. Nevertheless, the EP saw benefits in a 
system of politically accountable substitutes who could act as high-level 
interlocutors towards the MEPs (see Chapter 5). However, no agree-
ment was reached. The post-Lisbon years established an informal sys-
tem of deputies. Commissioners filled in for Ashton on matters regard-
ing Commission policies, while a representative of the rotating Council 
Presidency acted on her behalf in matters of CFSP. The informal sys-
tem thus sustained the organisational-pillar division between the Com-
mission and the Council that the Lisbon Treaty meant to overcome. 
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The question on deputies was never solved, and it was no surprise that 
it came up again in the run-up to the review. The fact that the offices of 
the High Representative and Vice-President were legally still two sepa-
rate positions further complicated the matter. Consequently, commen-
tators with a legal background argued in favour of introducing two 
separate deputies: one inside the Commission for the Vice-President 
hat, and one for CFSP (Blockmans, 2012a). Others maintained that it 
would be ideal if a deputy would be double-hatted as well and repre-
senting  the  High  Representative  in  all  related  tasks  (Lehne,  2011).  A  
deputy based in the EEAS was seen to have the closest insights into 
most  matters  of  EU external  action  (Helwig  et  al.,  2013).  The  EP  re-
peated its call for a politically accountable deputy that could appear in 
parliament on behalf of the High Representative when absent. In gen-
eral, experts agreed that the established informal system did not provide 
a satisfying remedy for the job overload of the High Representative, 
however they failed to provide a solution that would not require a trea-
ty change (see House of Lords 2013, pp.12–13).  
The deputy question was destined to become a complex issue in the 
review discussions. In the run-up to the review, none of the member 
states clearly positioned themselves on the matter. A top EEAS official 
assumed that the likely result would be to formalise the developed prac-
tices and stick to the use of Commissioners and (trio)-Presidency minis-
ters as fill-ins.326 Nevertheless, the foreign ministers engaged in discus-
sions on the matter of deputies during the Dublin Gymnich meeting.327 
Catherine Ashton summarised the findings in her review paper, and 
presented two models. The first model could be introduced within the 
existing legal framework, and would formalise the present arrange-
ments; the Commissioners and foreign misters would continue to act 
on her behalf. The second, medium-term, recommendation foresaw 
that the High Representative would be allocated either a double-hatted 
deputy in the EEAS, or clear authority over other Commissioners that 
would act on the High Representative’s behalf. These formal arrange-
ments would allow the deputies to represent the High Representative in 
the Council, the EP and the Commission College (Ashton, 2013b). 
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In late 2013, the likelihood of reaching a comprehensive solution was 
low. Introducing,  ‘Junior Commissioner’, subordinate to the High 
Representative as Vice-President of the Commission, might require an 
unwanted treaty change.328 Meanwhile, the EP insisted that any deputy 
in the EEAS would need to be politically accountable. However, the 
member states argued that the political accountability of EEAS officials 
also required a treaty change (Helwig et al., 2013). Concessions by the 
EP were unlikely, as MEPs already considered their approach to be 
flexible as they accepted Commissioners and ministers on the High 
Representative’s behalf.329 The most  likely  outcome of  the review was 
thus a declaration or decision that would formalise where and how 
Commissioners and ministers could fill in for the High Representa-
tive.330  
Internal EEAS organisation 
The Council decision on the EEAS did not go into much detail on the 
internal organisation of the service. Thus, there was flexibility to intro-
duce changes within the existing legal framework. Two points came up 
in the discussion in and around the review: the efficiency of the organi-
sational structure, and the integration of the crisis-management struc-
tures into the rest of the service. 
Due to the way in which the EEAS was established, initial inefficiencies 
in the organisational structure of the service were inevitable. The ser-
vice was patched together from services of the Commission and Coun-
cil Secretariat, as well as seconded national diplomats. The Commis-
sion’s DG Relex thereby constituted the largest building block in the 
headquarters, with 585 officials. As argued by a long-term insider, “It 
was a Commission takeover”, and the service was modelled around the 
organisational chart of DG Relex.331 The prime objective was not al-
ways efficiency, but rather managing integration of the various units 
from the Council Secretariat and the Commission. The result was an 
organisational chart that resembled a “reversed pyramid” (Wouters et 
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al., 2013: 19), with too many management positions at the top. Wouters 
et al. (2013) pointed out that the chain of command was too long, and 
the communication between the upper and lower echelons was ineffi-
cient. The corporate board structure was also seen as dysfunctional, 
because responsibilities for certain EEAS policies were spread across 
the members of the top leadership, and created confusion over who 
was  in  charge  (House  of  Lords,  2013;  Lehne,  2011;  Wouters  et  al.,  
2013). In particular, the fact that the Chief Executive Officer, David 
O’Sullivan, received political responsibility within the top leadership, 
while the title would suggest that he was only in charge of administra-
tive issues, raised eyebrows among observers.332  
The inefficiency of the management structure of the EEAS did not 
pass unnoticed. The German-led paper stated that “the processes and 
structure at senior management level should be reviewed with a view to 
ensuring clear reporting lines and division of tasks”.333 In addition, the 
UK pressed for an efficient use of resources, and stated its position that  
“[a]t time when all member states are facing budgetary pressure […] 
the UK consistently takes the view that it is vital that all EU insti-
tutions and services, including the EEAS, are innovative in ensur-
ing resources are used as efficiently as possible, with rigorous focus on 
priorities.”  
Thus, the UK believed that “the priority lies in developing working 
methods and procedures that enable us to come to decisions quickly 
and mobilise necessary resources”. The discussions did not dig to deep-
ly into managerial issues, because the Gymnich meeting of the foreign 
ministers was not the place to discuss technical details. However, con-
sensus among the member states emerged that the organisation of the 
EEAS had to be streamlined.334 
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333 Non-Paper: Strengthening the European External Action Service by the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
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Ashton (2013b: 4–5) thus proposed reforming the corporate board and 
management directorate structures in her EEAS review paper, which 
was accepted by the member states. The Corporate Board would lose 
one member in future, and not have a distinct executive secretary-
general, which was mainly seen as useful for managing the build-up 
phase of the service. In addition, the number of managing director 
posts  would  be  reduced,  thus  making  the  EEAS  less  top-heavy.  Re-
sources would become available for other functions, inter alia for a 
shared service centre that would integrate the EUSRs into the EEAS. 
The integration of the CSDP/crisis-management structures into the 
EEAS was challenging. Any substantive change would require a change 
of the EEAS decision. However, such as change was unrealistic. The 
EEAS decision stated that the crisis-management structure had to be 
“placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Repre-
sentative” and that “specificities of these structures, as well as the par-
ticularities of their functions, recruitment and the status of the staff 
shall be respected”.335 A second review on defence policy was carried 
out  at  the  time  of  the  EEAS  review.  Decisions  on  matters  of  crisis-
management structures were more likely to be made at the European 
Council on defence in December 2013.336 Ashton’s review paper thus 
resorted to looking mostly at very technical aspects of cooperation 
between the crisis-management units and the geographic and thematic 
units. Suggested changes included short-term staff loans between units, 
speeding up of decision-making procedures, and greater responsibility 
of the EEAS Secretary-General on the issue (Ashton, 2013b: 5–6). 
EU delegations 
One of the main challenges for the EEAS delegations was to integrate 
the staff, structures and policies of the member states and the Commis-
sion. In February 2013, 3,514 (64.6%) of the 5,436 staff in EU delega-
tions were Commission staff, which primarily worked on development-
cooperation issues (House of Lords, 2013: 26). In order to allow for the 
coherent functioning of the EEAS delegations, the member states de-
cided that heads of delegations should be double-hatted, and be in 
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charge of CFSP and Commission matters in 2010. The Commission 
retained the right to instruct the delegations on matters of its compe-
tences, however it had to copy-in the Head of Delegation and the geo-
graphic desk at the EEAS headquarters.337  
The review was not expected to bring any change to this arrangement. 
Even though some member states were in favour of a more ambitious 
coordination mechanism (see Chapter 5), it was undisputed that the 
Commission had to be able to instruct its personnel.338 This was only 
logical, as the competence for, inter alia, the implementation of devel-
opment instruments still rested with the Commission. However, even 
more problematic was the fact that Commission officials did not follow 
the agreed guidelines, and failed to inform the EEAS and the heads of 
delegation. The Secretary-General of the EEAS, Pierre Vimont, had to 
admit that the “Heads of Delegation struggled to control the group of 
people in the delegation who retained a direct link with different ser-
vices inside the Commission” (House of Lords, 2013: 23). As Wouters 
et al. (2013: 66) stated, “problems arise when instructions coming di-
rectly from the Commission apparently disregard political considera-
tions on the ground and political priorities set by the EEAS”. Based on 
these concerns, the German-led paper argued that “all instructions to 
delegations should be transmitted via the Heads of Delegation”.339 
Concerns over a second, independent Commission structure within the 
EEAS delegations were also part of the discussions at the 2013 Gym-
nich meeting. 
Surprisingly, Ashton’s EEAS review paper did not place too much 
importance on the issue, and noted that “the general principle that both 
EEAS and Commission services can send instructions directly to heads 
of delegation with a copy to the responsible EEAS geographical desk 
works well in practice” (Ashton, 2013b: 11).  A change in the proce-
dures was very unlikely at the time of writing, as all actors were satisfied 
with the rules. However, member states remained attentive that the 
                                                   
337 See EEAS Decision, Preamble, recital 13.  
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rules would be implemented and the heads of delegation would retain 
control over their delegations, as well as implementing the political 
priorities of the EEAS.  
Integrating EU Special Representatives 
The creation of EU delegations via the Lisbon Treaty, which also cov-
ered the representation of political matters under the CFSP for the first 
time, sparked a debate about the need to maintain a system of EUSRs. 
The debate was not new. Special envoys were one of the first instru-
ments of the CFSP to ensure better representation in particular regions 
of interest. The first envoy was dispatched to the African Great Lakes 
Region in 1996. When the Amsterdam treaty introduced the High Rep-
resentative for CFSP and the policy unit in the Council Secretariat, 
close observers in Brussels questioned the added value of having sepa-
rate EUSRs (Adebahr, 2011: 92). However, instead of abolishing the 
instruments, EUSRs were integrated into Solana’s administration, and 
valued because of their function as ‘Solana’s eyes and ears’. Another 
advantage was their flexibility. The mandate could be quickly set up 
and, when no longer needed, simply discontinued (Grevi, 2007).  
The EUSR instrument remained largely unchanged with the Lisbon 
Treaty. The EUSRs kept their individual status and had their own staff 
and budget separate from the EEAS. An exception was the double-
hatted EUSRs, who also held the post of head of the corresponding 
EU delegation (for example the EUSR to the African Union). The ar-
gument for keeping a separate instrument for CFSP representation in 
the form of special envoys is arguably the greater weight of the EUSR, 
as they are directly appointed by the member states in the Council. As 
explained by the current EUSR to the African Union, Gary Quince, on 
the importance of the special envoys in a House of Lords inquiry,  
“Its significance is that it gives [the EUSRs] political gravitas 
[…] because their partners know that they are appointed by the 
Council  on  the  advice  of  the  High  Representative,  not  just  by  the  
High Representative.” (House of Lords, 2012: 197).  
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However, several experts argued in favour of the partial integration of 
the  EUSRs  into  the  service.  With  the  EU  delegation  covering  all  as-
pects of external action, the continuation of the EUSR mandates 
should be reviewed, and the EEAS should build the administrative 
support system for the remaining, strategically important, EUSRs in 
order to avoid duplications (Adebahr, 2010). Having heads of EEAS 
delegation in addition to EUSRs in a region risks causing confusion 
over who represents the EU. Within the EU system, the EUSRs work 
under the High Representative and report to the PSC, but coordination 
with the regional desks in the EEAS remains limited (House of Lords, 
2012). Other experts argued against giving-up on the flexible instru-
ment of the EUSR, and were worried that it could be “buried under the 
multiple layers of the EEAS” (Fouéré, 2013: 3). Their ability to ensure 
maximum coherence between the different foreign policy players in 
Brussels would be highest if they could act independently from bureau-
cratic hierarchies.  
The High Representative took a strong position in the review paper, 
and argued for integration of the EUSRs into the EEAS. The status of 
the EUSRs would be “an anomaly post Lisbon” (Ashton, 2013b: 4): 
according to Ashton, the EUSRs should be fully integrated into the 
EEAS, while still keeping a close link to the member states via the PSC. 
This  would  entail  a  transfer  of  their  budget  and  staff  to  the  EEAS.  
However, as duplications were avoided and the salary levels of the staff 
were adjusted to EEAS levels, the total costs would go down (Ashton, 
2013b). 
The member states were sceptical about the integration of EUSRs, and 
the issue was debated in the PSC throughout the autumn of 2013. In 
particular, the unilateral decision of Ashton to terminate the activities 
of the EUSRs in the framework of the Middle East Peace Process be-
fore the end of 2013 by cutting off their budget raised eyebrows in the 
member state capitals (Fouéré, 2013; Gardner, 2013a).340 On 28 No-
vember 2013, the member states conducted an extended discussion 
with the EEAS Secretary-General, Peer Vimont, on the subject.  
                                                   
340 From the start of 2014, Helga Schmid, a close confidante of Catherine Ashton and 
the Political director of the EEAS, began to manage the Middle East Peace Process. 
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The result of the discussion was that full integration of the EUSR in-
strument into the EEAS was off the table in the medium term. In the 
Council conclusions on the EEAS review, the member states expressed 
their commitment to the EUSR instrument, but agreed to review the 
general guidelines on appointment, mandate, salaries and financing of 
EUSRs by March 2014 (Council, 2013: 4).  
It  has  to be noted that  Ashton was able  to decide to cease  the EUSR 
mandate while facing opposition on the part of the member states. This 
suggests that the High Representative had the potential to gain unin-
tended discretion. The obvious clash between the preferences of the 
High Representative and those of the member states is noteworthy, and 
supports the initial assumption that the High Representative, as a bu-
reaucratic actor, follows distinct preferences that aim to strengthen its 
organisation. 
Conclusion 
The review of the EEAS and the post of High Representative could 
not have been more different from the initial set-up process in 2010. 
The most telling difference in the negotiation dynamics was the ab-
sence of the Commission. During the setting-up of the EEAS, the 
Commission used the nascent status of the post of High Representative 
to take over the show and impose – with partial success – its reading of 
the Lisbon Treaty on the member states. The High Representative, 
coming from the Commission and being de facto appointed by the 
Commission President, wilfully accepted the Commission’s lead, and 
the strong agent cooperation led to unintended discretion of the supra-
national actors (H4).  
In 2013, the Commission did not play a significant role in the delibera-
tions, which were carried out among the member states together with 
the High Representative. The reason for the Commission’s decreased 
involvement can only be speculated. Part of the reason might have 
been that the High Representative could rely on her own administrative 
structure for the planning this time. Ashton often had frustrating expe-
riences with the Commission over the first years in office, which made 
it difficult for her to play the role of Vice-President of the Commission. 
Given the sometimes limited support of the Commission leadership, 
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she had limited interest in inviting them to the negotiation table 
(Gardner, 2013b). 
In addition, the High Representative chose to play a moderating role, 
rather than confronting the member states with pre-set construction 
plans that would have been costly for the member states to alter. From 
the start, the review was largely characterised by the inclusion of the 
member states through various informal meetings and consultations. 
The  fact  that  the  final  drafting  of  the  findings  in  a  review  report  was  
completed in a closed circle around Catherine Ashton did not negative-
ly affect the rather open approach. Compared to the closed working 
groups around Ashton and her advisor Christoffersen during the set-up 
of the EEAS, the member states had much better ongoing control over 
the whole review process. The final report primarily summarised the 
positions and discussions of the member states. As the review was 
mostly based on the input of the member states, unintended discretion 
seemed to be almost impossible (H2). In addition, it can be argued that 
the review started more or  less  from the first  day of  the EEAS.  With 
the constant possibility of member states bringing in their view, no 
situation of immediate deadlines – which would have pressured the 
member states to make quick decisions in favour of the discretion of 
the High Representative – appeared (H3). In the absence of a clash 
between the Commission and the member states, and because of the 
smooth moderating of the High Representative, the attention of the 
think-tank world – let alone of the media – declined significantly to-
wards the end.  
Based on the absence of supranational cooperation, uncontrolled agen-
cy and time pressure, one would expect the member states to have 
constructed an EU foreign policy architecture to their liking, and possi-
bly to have made significant changes to the way the EU’s external ac-
tion was organised. However, as seen in the past, the member states 
could not agree on far-reaching changes. Given the fundamental con-
flict of preferences on the integration of foreign policy that had already 
divided the member states during the European Convention, any major 
changes were off the table. The reallocation of non-CFSP competences 
from the Commission to the EEAS, or CFSP competences from the 
EEAS to the Commission, was never considered for the review, and 
neither was a change away from the intergovernmental procedures of 
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the CFSP, such as QMV. The Treaties stayed untouched, and not even 
long-term alterations to them were suggested in the review report.  
Not only had the European Convention defined the dividing lines be-
tween the member states, but the negotiations on the set-up of the 
EEAS also made the conflicting positions of the member states surface. 
A major division was between member states that favoured the strong 
authority of the High Representative over all policy fields, and those 
who wanted to preserve a balance between the Commission and the 
EEAS competences. The latter effectively allowed other policy objec-
tives, such as poverty eradication, to be safeguarded by the authority of 
the more independent Commission service. On the other end of the 
policy spectrum, integration of the crisis-management structures in the 
EEAS was still a thorny topic, and remained under the direct authority 
of the High Representative. In anticipation of the difficulties in untan-
gling the package deal that was carefully created in summer 2010, the 
member states refrained from renegotiating the EEAS Council deci-
sions. The mandate of the High Representative for the review was only 
to look at technical issues that did not require treaty change. Once 
more, conflicting preferences of the member states did not increase the 
discretion of the High Representative, but left the High Representative 
with no discretion at all (in contrast to H1).  
It can thus be argued that the experiences arising from the discussions 
around the foreign policy architecture of the last 10 years, as well as the 
mixed experiences of the first years of action under the new set-up, 
lowered the ambition of the actors involved to make significant chang-
es to the status quo. The focus was thus on the rather technical changes 
of more clearly spelling out actors’ competences and the division of 
labour. At least this showed that, when the member states could agree 
(H1) and the Commission did not intervene (H4), the member states 
were able to realise their preferences and control the set-up of the of-
fice of High Representative. Potentially important alterations comprised 
a joint secretariat for the organisation of the Relex group of Commis-
sioners that intended to strengthen the High Representative in the 
Commission, as well as a streamlining of the internal EEAS organisa-
tion.  
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A further observation of this chapter might provide valuable feedback 
to be used for the theoretical development of this field: the importance 
of informal processes with respect to aggregating preferences. Being 
less rule-based, this trend especially strengthens the more powerful 
members of the collective principal (in this case Germany), while at the 
same time enhancing the ability to come to an agreement. Ceteris paribus, 
informally organised principals might thus have a stronger ability to 
control the agent, and principals’ preferences can more easily be ap-
proximated by looking at its strongest constituting member. In the case 
at hand, Germany’s initiative and preferences only made the drafting of 
a strong position paper of half the member states possible. The review 
report by Catherine Ashton was thereafter modelled around this paper. 
In foreign policy, the EU agent’s discretion might be determined by 
looking at Berlin. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The Lisbon Treaty’s major foreign policy innovation, the post of High 
Representative of the Union, can be seen as an indicator of the overall 
state of EU foreign policy. On the one hand, the creation of a position 
above the level of nation states, akin to a foreign minister, reflects the 
ambitions that the member states had (and still partly have) with re-
spect to Europe’s role in the world. Instead of keeping the main repre-
sentation and planning of EU foreign policy rotating among the mem-
ber states’ foreign ministers and the leadership of external financial 
instruments to the Commission, they created a potentially powerful 
‘centre of gravity’ with the post of High Representative. On the other 
hand, the empirical analysis in this study reveals that the High Repre-
sentative’s activities are also indicative of the challenges that EU foreign 
policy has to face. Foreign policy remains an issue of ‘high politics’ 
within which member states refuse to surrender sovereignty over their 
choices, and common EU action is often paralysed. 
The relationship of the High Representative to the member states fol-
lows dynamics that differ from politics in other activity fields within the 
EU. While a functional model of delegation serves to explain why the 
European Commission can gain autonomy in the agenda-setting power 
in regulatory policies (Pollack, 1997), the factors that explain the extent 
of the High Representative’s room for manoeuvre as an EU actor in its 
foreign policy have yet to be unearthed. This study aimed to make a 
first advance towards an analysis of the High Representative’s office 
within a PA framework. Seen from an historical perspective, the Lisbon 
Treaty made a leap forward in terms of EU-level foreign policy instru-
ments. However, this observation alone tells us little about the discre-
tion that the High Representative possesses as Europe’s foreign policy 
agent. Instead, the analysis took into account a number of institutional, 
as well as contextual, factors in order to answer the research question: 
What conditions the discretion of the post of High Representative? 
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8.1. Analysis of the independent variables 
Conflicting preferences 
Conflicting preferences of the member states were defined as a possible 
variable that explains the discretion of the High Representative of the 
Union. PA literature suggests that conflicting preferences of a collective 
principal lead to a situation in which the agent gains unintended discre-
tion. The members of the collective principal cannot agree on sanctions 
for the agent. In anticipation of this, the agent has greater discretion in 
the conduct of its activities. Eventually, because member states cannot 
agree on a common position, the High Representative has the discre-
tion to choose its own course of action. Indicators for conflicting pref-
erences among member states were defined as initially different posi-
tions among member states  as  well  as  their  failure  to arrive  at  a  com-
mon position through deliberations and brokerage. 
Based on the findings, this hypothesis (H1) can be rejected. In most of 
the cases considered here, the High Representative did not have unin-
tended discretion when the member states disagreed. It is quite clear 
why the High Representative did not have discretion, when the mem-
ber states were already struggling to find a common position on a man-
date: the High Representative depended on a mandate for each of her 
activities to be initiated, as this was the only source of her authority; 
thus, without a mandate from the member states, the High Representa-
tive had limited discretion over diplomatic activities. This explains, for 
example, the low profile that the High Representative had in the crisis 
response to Libya, or the limited activity of the High Representative in 
the development of the strategic visions of EU’s foreign policy. 
Moreover, even in cases in which the High Representative had a man-
date, conflicting preferences of member states rather limited her discre-
tion. For example, the discretion of the High Representative over the 
agenda-management of the Foreign Affairs Council was limited, be-
cause the member states did not agree on the priorities for their discus-
sions. Moreover, when the High Representative issued statements, she 
has to take into account the positions of all member states and could 
not go beyond the lowest common denominator position. This obser-
vation suggests that PA relationships in the intergovernmental field of 
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foreign policy fundamentally differ from those of the previously ana-
lysed sectors, such as in the case of international negotiations conduct-
ed by the Commission. Foreign policy is still the domain of the mem-
ber states, with EU activities complementing the efforts of the member 
states, rather than substituting them. The mandate that EU agents re-
ceive is thus subject to permanent contestation, and adaptation to 
member state needs.  
Member states – so far – have the possibility of engaging unilaterally, or 
in other constellations outside of the EU framework. This process of 
‘agent-shopping’ has also been observed in other EU PA relationships 
(Dür and Elsig, 2011). In matters of foreign policy, member states ei-
ther select agents that are most likely to represent their interests, or 
choose to act unilaterally. In anticipation of a loss of the principal, the 
agent has an incentive to keep the mandate flexible, and to adapt to the 
different preferences of the member states, which in turn limits the 
resulting discretion. In the case of management of the Foreign Affairs 
Council, for example, this means that the High Representative has an 
incentive to reflect all preferences of the member states in the agenda 
of the Foreign Affairs Council, in order to ensure their participation in 
the CFSP. 
Only in the case of setting up the EEAS was the original hypothesis 
(H1) confirmed. The member states had different visions of the organi-
sation and functioning of the EEAS, which allowed the High Repre-
sentative, together with the Commission, to follow her own agenda. It 
has to be pointed out that the context differed from that of the day-by-
day business of foreign policy making. The mandate for the High Rep-
resentative to create a proposal for the organisation and functioning of 
the service is clearly spelled out in the Lisbon Treaty. All member states 
had already committed to the creation of the EEAS, so the High Rep-
resentative did not have to anticipate that one of them would disengage 
completely. 
The analysis of the preferences thus points to a finding that is worth 
exploring in future studies. When PA models are applied to less inte-
grated policy  fields  of  the EU, the fragile  and contested nature  of  the 
agent’s mandate has to be taken into account. Incorporating this find-
ing into future research models will fundamentally change the conven-
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tionally predicted PA relationship between preference distributions 
within a collective principal, and the discretion of an agent. The agent 
has to permanently secure support for the relevant mandate, and hence 
adapts to the preferences of the principals. Conflicting preferences of 
members of the collective principal lead to a decrease in the agent’s 
discretion. In the case at hand, when the member states did not agree, 
the High Representative had less room for manoeuvre.  
The empirical findings also beg another question: To what extent do 
the preferences of all member states weigh equally? In the history of the 
EU, the Franco-German alliance has often been crucial for reaching 
agreements between all member states, but also for enabling the leader-
ship of EU institutions. For example, Jacques Delors’ often-praised 
political entrepreneurship as Commission President was partly enabled 
by working closely together with Helmut Kohl (German Chancellor) 
and Francois  Mitterand (French President)  (Lord,  2002).  It  can be ar-
gued that, given the contested nature of the High Representative’s 
mandate, support from the ‘big three’ member states (Germany, 
France, UK) is indispensable for the foreign policy agent to play a 
strong role. Solana’s tenure as EU foreign policy chief showed that the 
initiatives of directiores (Hill,  2011),  consisting  of  a  couple  of  larger  
member states, were decisive in the development of his portfolio. The 
Iran nuclear  talks  started out  with a  unilateral  initiative  of  France,  the 
UK and Germany, and only subsequently developed into a major dip-
lomatic mission headed by the High Representative (Crowe, 2005; 
Meier,  2013).  The  empirical  material  of  this  study  supports  the  claim  
that preferences of big member states are crucial. The Franco-German 
position paper during the course of the European Convention led to a 
compromise on the High Representative’s institutional design. During 
the Libya crisis, differences between Germany and France muted and 
paralysed the High Representative in the immediate crisis-management. 
While support from all of the big member states for Solana’s ESS made 
adoption possible in 2003, the initiative of some of the member states 
to write a new global strategy led nowhere in 2013, as none of the ‘big 
three’ committed to it. During the EEAS review, the German-led input 
paper became the main point of reference. The decision-making dy-
namics in the EU thus show that smaller member states tend to follow 
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their big neighbours, which makes the preferences of the ‘mighty few’ 
the point of reference for the foreign policy agent.  
Control and oversight mechanisms 
H2 stated that the control and oversight mechanisms of the member 
states conditioned the discretion of the High Representative. According 
to this logic, the member states prevent the High Representative from 
unintended actions by setting a rule-based mandate, by being present in 
the implementation, or by having a low threshold for sanctions. If these 
mechanisms are not present, the High Representative can have unin-
tended discretion. 
Once  more,  the  set-up  of  the  EEAS  turned  out  to  be  a  special  case.  
During the deliberations of the set-up of the EEAS, the member states’ 
(in)ability to oversee the complex drafting of the decision on the service 
was decisive. The member states did not have the mechanisms in place 
to follow up on the latest drafting stages of the High Representative 
and her team. However, when we look at the day-by-day management 
of the EU’s external action, ongoing control by the member states can 
be seen as a less decisive issue.  
The empirical evidence suggests that the anticipation of informal ex-post 
sanctions of the member states had a major limiting effect on the dis-
cretion of the High Representative. The High Representative’s com-
munication efforts are a case in point: her personal statements were not 
formally checked with the member states; still, anticipation of sanctions 
by the member states in form of possible necessary public objections, if 
the High Representative issued a statement that did not reflect their 
preferences, significantly limited the discretion of her press team. 
Statements are checked carefully by the officials and compared to pre-
viously adopted policies of the Union and positions of individual mem-
ber states. Another example was the crisis response to Libya. In this 
case, Ashton’s room for manoeuvre was limited, as she could not af-
ford a diplomatic move that was not backed by the member states.  
The findings add a new facet to the evaluation of the post of High Rep-
resentative. Catherine Ashton was often criticised for not being out-
spoken or bold enough in her activities as High Representative. How-
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ever, critics often overlooked the fact that the post of High Representa-
tive was not imbued with the necessary legitimacy to make bold deci-
sions without being backed by the member states. As a consequence, 
the member states did not have to set up costly control mechanisms to 
keep the High Representative in line with their preferences – what 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) call a system of “police patrol over-
sight” – which would allow constant monitoring of the High Repre-
sentative’s activities. The High Representative is not a bureaucratic 
agency, which is difficult to oversee by nature; rather, the EU foreign 
policy chief is a public and political figure. Missteps on the diplomatic 
stage trigger “fire alarms”341 such as media articles, parliamentary de-
bates or diplomatic cables; this automatic decentralised system of 
checks meant that the High Representative herself made sure that she 
stayed within the predefined scope of manoeuvre set by the member 
states.  The  member  states  could  thus  rely  on  the  fact  that  the  High  
Representative anticipated ex-post sanctions, such as public criticism, 
contradicting statements or unilateral actions all leading to a loss of 
credibility, in case of unwanted behaviour.   
This finding has implications for future research. There are few observ-
able formal oversight mechanisms in place. The High Representative’s 
anticipation of informal ex-post sanctions, which for the most part limits 
the room for manoeuvre, is not straightforward to identify. Future 
research can thus hardly rely on written accounts and analyses of pri-
mary and secondary text sources. Rather, it is necessary to directly en-
gage with those in the field. Expert interviews, though having their own 
weaknesses regarding objectivity and comparability, are an indispensa-
ble source for PA scholars to reveal subtle oversight and control mech-
anisms. 
Time pressure 
The existence of a close deadline increases pressure on the member 
states  to  come  to  an  agreement.  The  PA literature  identifies  this  as  a  
                                                   
341 While “police patrol oversight” is analogous to real police patrols, and includes 
control mechanisms that are “centralized, active, and direct”, “fire alarm oversight”, 
just like real fire alarms, is “less centralised and involves less active and direct interven-
tion” (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 166) 
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condition for the discretion of the agent, as hastily written mandates 
lack detail that would otherwise constrain the agent in the task. The 
evidence collected for this study, however, suggests that time pressure 
of member states can be largely neglected as a source of constraint on 
the discretion of the High Representative.  
During the set-up of the EEAS, there were indeed signs that time pres-
sure contributed to the member states’ inability to control the estab-
lishment of the service. However, the combination of unfavourable 
conditions for the member states on the whole contributed to their loss 
of control. Time pressure towards the end of the negotiations prevent-
ed the member states from going into more detail about the construc-
tion of the EEAS, and from reopening some contested issues. Never-
theless, the permanent representatives spent many hours in the weekly 
sessions discussing each article of concern thoroughly. If it was not for 
their internal disagreement and the ‘secrecy’ of the High Representative 
and Commission in preparing the drafts, it is likely that they would 
have managed to create a service that was closer to the member states’ 
preferences. This is also highlighted by the fact that further delibera-
tions on the service during the review in 2013 did not bring about ma-
jor changes to its organisation and functioning, even though there was 
no time pressure. 
The findings on the activities of the High Representative confirm the 
observation that time pressure played only a limited role. Neither the 
absence of a deadline (for example, when developing a strategic vision 
for the EU) nor pressure on the member states to aggregate their pref-
erences (for example, in the Libya case) had an effect on the general 
limited discretion of the High Representative. In the analysed cases, it 
was rather a matter of the member states agreeing or disagreeing on 
actions and priorities. Deadlines were less of a constraint for the mem-
ber states in arriving at an agreement. 
Agent interaction 
Interaction with other supranational agents was posited as another 
possible condition for the discretion of the High Representative. The 
Commission was defined as a second EU-level agent. In cases where 
the two agents are in a state of bureaucratic competition, their struggle 
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for influence over a particular EU action limits their discretion. On the 
other hand, if the Commission and the High Representative coordinate 
their position vis-à-vis the member states, they will seek to widen their 
scope of competence. Through their cooperation they can make it 
more difficult for the member states to control their activities.  
The interaction between the Commission and the High Representative 
was a crucial aspect of the analysis. The innovation of the Lisbon Trea-
ty – making the High Representative the Vice-President of the Com-
mission – was the centrepiece of the reform geared towards increasing 
coherence between the economic and political external relations of the 
Union. However, it was also a subject of concern for the member 
states, which were alarmed about the prospect of losing sovereignty in 
the foreign policy domain. What was the impact of these new possibili-
ties on cooperation? 
The empirical observations show that in the initial years following the 
Lisbon Treaty, there were few signs that the Commission and the High 
Representative would closely cooperate on foreign policy issues and set 
an independent agenda. Again, it is important to differentiate between 
the dynamics during the creation of the EEAS, and the actions of the 
High Representative. The build-up phase of the EEAS showed clear 
signs of cooperation between the High Representative and the Com-
mission President and Secretariat. As a consequence, the initial set-up 
followed, to some extent, the blueprint of the Commission, rather than 
of the member states, which struggled to follow the drafting of the 
EEAS decision.  
With the EEAS preliminarily in place, the interaction between the High 
Representative and the Commission was characterised by competition – 
or at least by the absence of cooperation. During the response to the 
crisis in Libya, or the review of the strategic partnerships, the coopera-
tion between the two EU actors was constrained by diverging prefer-
ences and the inefficiency of mechanisms that would ensure their co-
operation. This might well have been due to the nascent status of the 
EEAS, which first had to establish itself as a credible foreign policy 
player in Brussels and abroad. Mechanisms such as the crisis platform 
and the potential revival of the group of external relations Commis-
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sioners, headed by the High Representative, might in the future in-
crease the cooperation at EU level.  
The review of the EEAS revealed that the High Representative and the 
service developed as a bureaucratically independent body. A ‘divorce’ 
from the Commission was apparent, as it was not playing an active role 
in the review of the service. Furthermore, any issues of closer integra-
tion into the Commission that were raised during the setting-up of the 
EEAS were not part of the discussions. The main link between the 
Brussels actors will remain the single geographic and thematic desks of 
the EEAS, joint work in the Council WGs, and the High Representa-
tive’s coordination function concerning the external portfolios of the 
Commission. Future research should track these developments.  
8.2. The constrained agent 
The evaluation of the conditions for discretion of the High Representa-
tive contributed to further refinement of the PA approach. First and 
foremost, it can be stated that the PA approach offers a useful toolbox 
with which to analyse intergovernmental policy fields such as the CFSP. 
Given the limited transfer of competences to the EU level, the EU’s 
foreign policy is, by definition, prone to showing less discretion for 
supranational agents. Limited discretion is intended by the member 
states in order to maintain control over their foreign policies. Neverthe-
less, the member states create foreign policy agents at the EU level, and 
hence risk losing control of their activities. It was shown that the inter-
action between the member states and the High Representative can be 
analysed within a PA framework. Even though the results showed that 
the High Representative has had very limited discretion, the PA frame-
work provided additional insights into the mechanisms and dynamics 
of the relationship between the member states and the Commission. 
Nevertheless, the application of a theoretical approach to a new field of 
study challenges researchers by pushing them to refine the existing 
theoretical toolset and to scrutinise its assumptions. Accordingly, the 
PA framework could be adjusted to increase its explanatory power in 
the realm of foreign policy. The High Representative is a qualitatively 
different agent than, for example, the Commission in the field of com-
munity policies. The High Representative is a ‘constrained agent’.  
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Three interdependent elements characterise a constrained agent. First, 
its mandate is contested. In the established fields of PA analysis, princi-
pals acknowledge the general legitimacy of the agents’ mandates. When 
the Council Presidency or the European Commission negotiates envi-
ronmental agreements on behalf of the EU (Delreux and Kerremans, 
2010), member states do not put the principle negotiator role of the 
two entities into question. Even though the principal might have differ-
ent preferences on specific issues, and might sometimes sanction the 
agent, there is a basic agreement that the agent is the legitimate actor to 
be  entrusted  with  certain  tasks.  In  the  field  of  CFSP,  however,  it  is  
suggested that the member states have not yet acknowledged the post 
of High Representative as the agent of their common foreign policy. 
Given the intergovernmental and optional nature of the CFSP, the 
alternative to circumvent the Brussels policy machinery remained open. 
The new post still has to build up full legitimacy as a foreign policy 
actor, and needs to be accepted by all member states. A contested 
mandate shifts the power balance from the agent to the principal. With 
a contested mandate, the agent is rather prone to following the prefer-
ences of the principal in order to ensure its support.  
Second, the anticipation of ex-post sanctions is a major constraint on the 
agent’s discretion. Constrained agents have to carry out their activities 
in a context in which they expect swift sanctioning of unwanted behav-
iour in form of objections aiming at the questioning of their authority. 
In the field of the CFSP, the High Representative has to anticipate 
sanctioning by the member states in response to unwanted actions. 
Formally and informally, each member state can still intervene if it sees 
its national interests being affected by a position or action of the Union 
and its High Representative. A case in which a member state would 
publicly distance itself from a statement or action of the High Repre-
sentative would mean a major blow to the post’s authority. The cost of 
making a decision that is not backed by the member states is prohibi-
tively high for the High Representative. Other, more costly, control 
mechanisms are unnecessary. The thread of ex-post sanctions effectively 
prevents the agent from ‘running loose’. 
Third, the agent is constrained as it is part of an evolving institutional 
set-up. In the rather nascent development of the complex EU foreign 
policy architecture, it is likely that several agents stand in competition 
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over resources and competences. Mechanisms for cooperation still have 
to be developed and established. The competition, or at least absence 
of cooperation, between agents is a further constraint on the agent’s 
discretion.  
The analysis of constrained agents with limited discretion adds an inter-
esting new dimension, as positivist analyses of interstate cooperation 
seem so far to be caught in a divide between two schools of thought. 
On the one hand liberal intergovernmentalists see only limited discre-
tion for supranational agents. The discretion of agents is limited to the 
provision of functional improvements to the difficulties of interstate 
cooperation thereby lowering the costs for member states. Agents con-
trol commitments, chair meetings, plan the agenda, yet, they have no 
informational or institutional power to gain any unintended discretion. 
PA analysts on the other hand are focused on explaining events where 
supranational agents have gained discretion. Usually in fields were regu-
latory policies need to be followed up by the control of commitments 
or in cases were an increased amount of technical knowledge is re-
quired, PA researchers find instances were agents can exploit their posi-
tion and gain discretion. Less attention is paid to dynamics were agents 
do not gain autonomy. 342 
The proposed concept of a ‘constrained agent’ wants to close the gap 
between the views on supranational agents as passive providers of func-
tions, on the one hand, and exploiters of asymmetrical power relations, 
on  the  other.   A  constrained  agent  is  an  agent  that  was  created  as  a  
response to functional demands of the principal. It operates in a sphere 
were neither informational asymmetries nor the control of member 
state commitments is a central feature. Yet, the constrained agent has 
an incentive to operate with own discretion, either deliberately granted 
discretion in order to implement tasks more efficiently, or unintended 
discretion, in order to break ground in a decision-making context 
marked by narrowly defined principals’ interests. Even though the con-
strained agent might have limited discretion in a given state of devel-
opment due to tight control of the principal over the exercise of its 
                                                   
342 For a case where agents that suffer from limited delegation of tasks are analyzed see 
Elsig (2010). 
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functions, applying the PA toolkit offer the insights to the dynamics 
between the principal and the agent that a purely intergovernmental 
analysis would not capture. 
The High Representative is thus a constrained agent as things currently 
stand. However, it has to be pointed out that all of these characteristics 
can change over time. It is not impossible that the High Representa-
tive’s mandate will become less contested over time, that the High rep-
resentative will be less exposed to ex-post scrutiny regarding activities, or 
that mechanisms for close cooperation will be developed with other 
EU-level agents.  
 The community scenario 
Two scenarios seem theoretically possible. In the community scenario, 
the High Representative becomes less dependent on the member states. 
The assumption of this long-term scenario is that EU foreign policy 
will be more closely integrated into the “community model” of the EU 
over time. As the tracing of the discussions in the European Conven-
tion and on the review of the EEAS showed, it is very unlikely that the 
CFSP will become a shared, or even exclusive, competence of the EU 
in the foreseeable future, which would mean that the Commission plays 
a decisive role in its conduct. Nevertheless, a further development and 
application of QMV in the Council would give the High Representative 
more discretion, without having to anticipate a veto from individual 
member states. It would be more difficult for a member state to sanc-
tion an activity by the High Representative if the High Representative 
were backed by the majority of member states. However, there were no 
signs during Catherine Ashton’s term that majority decisions are a fea-
sible option. The High Representative’s focus in the planning of the 
Council agenda, in reacting to the crisis in Libya, or in formulating 
statements and strategies, was never on searching for a winning majori-
ty among the collective principal, but always achieving consensus 
among all member states.  
In the community scenario, the EP would be strengthened as an EU-
level principal. Already, interaction between the High Representative 
and  MEPs  is  intense.  The  EP  is  a  crucial  hurdle  for  the  incumbent’s  
nomination, and Catherine Ashton was under intense scrutiny in the 
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parliamentary hearings of early 2010. Exchanges of views and interac-
tions between the EP and the EEAS have been numerous, and the 
leadership of the EEAS identified the Parliament’s approval as an im-
portant condition for its work (Helwig et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the 
rights of the MEPs in matters of EU foreign policy are still very limited. 
Most importantly, the EP is not able to delegate any tasks to the High 
Representative. Further integration of foreign policy would entail the 
EP receiving an upgraded role in matters of CFSP, and becoming a full 
principal with the ability to set the foreign policy agenda and effectively 
task the High Representative. In turn, this would make the High Repre-
sentative less dependent on the member states, and widen the post’s 
room for manoeuvre. Again, besides some influence of the EP on the 
negotiations regarding the EEAS, the role of the Parliament in the con-
duct of EU foreign policy remained low, without any signs of signifi-
cant possibility for an increase. The Libya crisis was a case in point that 
the loyalties of the High Representative lay with the member states. 
The High Representative resisted pressures from the members of the 
EP, and did not formulate a strong based on the legitimisation of the 
EP. Instead, Ashton anticipated that any early position for or against a 
no-fly zone, or recognition of opposition would lack authority if the 
member states did not approve it.  
Furthermore, in the community scenario the High Representative has 
the authority to coordinate the external portfolios of the Commission. 
In the period analysed, the High Representative did not possess an 
elevated position within the college of Commissioners, despite holding 
the position of Commission Vice-President. The first consequence of 
the EEAS review was the strengthening of the coordinating role of the 
High Representative as the chair of the Relex group of Commissioners. 
Further strengthening of the position would be achieved through a 
reduction in the number of Commissioners, as was originally foreseen 
in the Lisbon Treaty, or in the introduction of ‘Junior Commissioners’ 
that would work together in clusters. The High Representative would 
be the one to head the external relations cluster. It remains to be seen 
whether the next Commission period (2014–2019) will see adjustments 
to the role of the High Representative in the Commission. On the basis 
of the empirical sections of this study, coordination of the College will 
remain extremely difficult for the High Representative, who not only 
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misses out on legal authority in the Commission hierarchy, but also 
faces different political cultures, and political objectives from the 
Commission DGs. Transforming selected Commissioners into ‘second-
class’ Commissioners that only play an implementing role under the 
HR/VP might thus cause opposition from the member states they 
originate from.  
Based on the findings of this study, a community scenario is unlikely in 
the foreseeable future. All of the above-mentioned developments had 
been part of the discussion during the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, and have been widely rejected by the member states. The re-
view of the EEAS revealed that even smaller changes to the system that 
would cause a further centralisation of foreign policy are controversial 
among member states. The member states arrived at an institutional 
deadlock. The path that was chosen when the post of High Representa-
tive was created – that is, operational integration without political inte-
gration – is likely to continue in the medium- to long-term. 
The national network scenario 
The alternative scenario is a closer link of the High Representative and 
the EEAS to the national foreign policy administrations. A closer net-
work with national foreign policy elites would essentially mean a 
strengthening of the intergovernmental method of foreign policy mak-
ing. Such a development would ideally be connected to an increased 
feeling of ownership of the member states towards the foreign policy 
chief.  
The ‘national network scenario’ means that no further steps of political 
integration in the foreign policy field are being taken, and member 
states are also guaranteed their sovereignty on foreign policy decisions 
in the future. Institutional developments, such as a strengthening of the 
role of the EP or QMV, would be off the table. Instead, the High Rep-
resentative would seek closer cooperation with the member states. The 
analysis in this paper revealed crucial elements of joint planning. For 
example, the Political Affairs Department in the EEAS increasingly 
provided an up- and downstream link to the member states, as it is 
directly linked to the WGs and plugged into the COREU network, and 
holds informal meetings with national counterparts (see also Helwig, 
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2014a). Gymnich meetings, even though they already took place under 
the pre-Lisbon system, gained further importance as they allowed for 
an informal exchange on strategic questions between the High Repre-
sentative and the foreign ministers. The rotation of national diplomats 
in and out of the EEAS is another case in point, as it exemplifies how 
the boundaries between national and European diplomacy might be-
come more blurred in the future.  
However, the argument is counterintuitive at first sight. How can EU-
level foreign policy making gain more discretion by anchoring the High 
Representative closer into national structures of foreign policy making? 
Indeed, conventional PA models would interpret such a development 
as a possibility for closer control of the agent, eventually leading to 
limited discretion.  
However, taking into account the three characteristics of a constrained 
agent developed above, the forecasted effect of a closer network of the 
High Representative and the member states suggests the opposite. 
Eventually, the High Representative would be granted deliberate discre-
tion. The High Representative, as a constrained agent, currently has the 
limitation of having a contested mandate. Joint work between the EU 
level and national administrations may, over time, contribute to in-
creased acceptance of the High Representative as one of the main EU 
foreign policy players. The argument is that the deficiency of the cur-
rent state of development of the High Representative is not primarily 
that the High Representative is closely controlled, but that it is not 
entrusted with major political work. The more closely national and EU-
level diplomacies work together, the less the High Representative man-
date will be contested, and the higher the probability that the High 
Representative will receive deliberate discretion on foreign policy 
choices. 
This is further underlined by the observation that the current main 
means of control is the anticipation of ex-post sanctioning. The ongoing 
control of the High Representative is less decisive. Early exchanges 
between the High Representative and national administrations, and a 
development of common strategies, might open up deliberate room for 
discretion of the High Representative. Actions within these set bounda-
ries will have little risk of being ex-post sanctioned by the member states.   
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What would an increased embeddedness of the High Representative in 
national foreign policy structures mean for the post’s interaction with 
the Commission? The answer depends on the future course of the 
Commission. In the wake of the EP elections 2014, a controversial 
discussion arose with respect to how far the Commission and its Presi-
dent should develop into a political institution akin to a national gov-
ernment (Bonvicini, 2014; Grabbe and Lehne, 2014). Rather than being 
limited to its role as an ‘engine of integration’ and “guardian of the 
Treaty” it would acquire the additional role of a ‘European govern-
ment’. In that case, the new understanding of the Commission as an 
independent, directly legitimised (through the EP), and politicised ex-
ecutive would stand in conflict with a member states-owned High Rep-
resentative. Coordination between the two entities might hampered, as 
it might become more likely that the Commission and member states’ 
priorities would not match. However, if such a development does not 
take place, and the Commission develops as an agent in the service of 
the member states, the High Representative might be more able to play 
a coordinating role within the Commission’s college.  
8.3. Future research 
Developing the PA approach 
The findings of this study pinpoint avenues for the future enhancement 
of the PA approach. The definition of a ‘ constrained agent’ has been 
provided as a result of the empirical findings of this study, and should 
be understood as a concept that is in need of further refinement and 
verification.  
Future conceptualisation of the PA approach could take into account 
the concept of constrained agency, and should specifically address how 
the concept relates to other types of PA relationships. A recent debate 
in the PA literature focuses on the question of whether there are differ-
ent types of agents (see Pollack, 2007). Majone (2001) distinguishes 
between two types of agents based on the logic of delegation. On the 
one hand, principals delegate power to an agent in order to reduce costs 
of decision-making, for example because of the specific expertise an 
actor has in a certain policy field. Just like in the model applied in this 
study, the principal is concerned with avoiding unwanted behaviour of 
Conclusion     229 
 
 
the agent, and sets up control mechanisms accordingly. A typical exam-
ple of the classical agent in the EU context is the Commission as an 
agenda-setter in the legislative process. However, Majone also identifies 
a second type of agent that he labels as “trustees”. Principals delegate 
authority to trustees, as they want to underline the credibility of their 
commitments. It is essential to the efficiency of trustees that they are 
independent, and thus have a long-lasting mandate and do not have to 
face sanctioning of unwanted behaviour. However, that is not to say 
that the trustees are operating in a political vacuum; they have to ensure 
that they are perceived as credible, which requires that they have a cer-
tain degree of reputation and attraction (Alter, 2008). The ECJ and the 
European Central Bank are typical examples of trustees in the EU sys-
tem.  
Based on the findings of the study, it can be argued that a constrained 
agent, such as the High Representative, belongs in the former category 
(functional delegation), as the delegation follows functional concerns of 
enhancing the efficiency of decision-making and representation. Yet 
constrained agents can be understood as a specific subcategory, as their 
mandate is not based on a transfer of competences and the agent can 
be sidelined. As a consequence, constrained agents cannot base their 
authority on the delegation of powers alone, but need to seek constant 
political legitimisation from the principals, as well as from the wider 
foreign policy community. A network of contacts and reputation are 
thus crucial qualities of the office-holder.  
The aim of further refining the typology of agents and introducing the 
constrained agent is to better understand the typical phenomena of 
agents with limited discretion that are typical in the field of IR. This can 
be achieved by trying to apply the concept to cases other than the High 
Representative of the Union. Two examples can be given, as follows. 
Even the European Commission, which is often depicted as the prime 
example of a supranational agent (Pollack, 1997), can be conceptualised 
as a constrained agent in some activity fields. For example, Niemann 
and Huigens (2011) describe the emancipation-process of the Commis-
sion as an international player in the G8 framework. They argued that 
while the Commission lacked credibility and was often sidelined by the 
participating member states in the G7/G8 in the late 1970s/early 
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1980s, it earned increasing trust and respect from the member states 
over time. The member states thereby deliberately chose to widen the 
discretion of the Commission actors. This long-term development of 
the Commission as an external actor is an example of how contested 
mandates, subject to extensive ex-post scrutiny by the principal, turn into 
international actors that have a level of discretion. Niemann and 
Huigen argue that emancipation as an agent with discretion was due to 
the Commission’s skilful networking ability, which, over time, encour-
aged the member states to increase its mandate. 
Furthermore, limited discretion of agents beyond the state level is by no 
means a phenomenon that is restricted to the EU. Elsig (2010) discuss-
es how the decrease of the role of the Secretariat-General of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) over recent decades can be explained from 
a PA perspective. While, from a functional perspective, member states 
would benefit from the delegation of agenda-setting and chairing tasks 
to the secretariat, the opposite has been the case. Elsig thereby discov-
ered similar dynamics between the member state representatives in the 
WTO and the General-Secretariat to those discovered in the study at 
hand. Mistrust among the member states towards the Secretariat led to 
an absence of delegation, and “every director general has to find the 
right balance in paying sufficient attention and respect to the [member 
state representatives], otherwise he or she risks backlash” (Elsig, 2010: 
509). The relation between the agent and the principal in the WTO 
hence seems to fit within the concept of constrained agency. Here, the 
General-Secretariat of the WTO seems to have a contested mandate 
within the activities of the international organisation, which is contrib-
uting to the decline of its role.  
A first look thus reveals other cases in which the concept of con-
strained agency might provide new explanations for phenomena related 
to international actors with little room for manoeuvre. Why do states 
create expensive agents, and subsequently offer them little to no discre-
tion? Why do some of these agents manage to stabilise their mandate 
over time and gain authority, while others lose relevance? The special, 
nascent status of constrained agents might shed more light on the fac-
tors that lead to the limited agency of supranational actors. 
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Further investigating the High Representative 
Future research should target the office of the High Representative of 
the Union. Looking into the work of the office under the first incum-
bent, Catherine Ashton, revealed interesting insights into the mecha-
nisms, options and challenges of the revamped foreign policy chief. 
The presented conclusions could be tested and further developed in the 
future. The research agenda could be expanded by following the post 
over time, widening the level of analysis, or comparing the post with 
those held by other actors. 
An obvious expansion of the research into this topic would be an anal-
ysis of the work of future post-holders. An analysis of the young office 
over time would be fruitful in order to examine the extent to which the 
office develops from a constrained agent into a fully fledged agent who 
is able to set their own foreign policy agenda together with the member 
states. So far, Catherine Ashton has been the first holder of the High 
Representative post, which was completely renewed with the Lisbon 
Treaty.  At  the  end  of  2014,  her  successor  will  take  over  the  portfolio  
and try to set his own priorities. Even though this study did not focus 
on the personality and leadership style of the incumbent, the new in-
cumbent would widen the empirical basis of this investigation, and 
allow for comparisons. Will the next office-holder be a constrained 
agent  as  well,  or  will  he  find  ways  to  engage  with  the  member  states,  
and thus secure credibility as a foreign policy player? What mechanisms 
will the new High Representative use to encourage the member state to 
widen the discretion? In this regard, the development of a network and 
informal communication channels with the member state administra-
tion can be followed over time. 
In this study, the analysis was conducted at the internal EU level. Fur-
ther research would benefit from incorporating effects from the exter-
nal (international) level into the study. Within this context, the High 
Representative can be seen as an actor in a classical two-level game. 
Future studies could shed light on the possibility of the High Repre-
sentative exploiting informational advantages of being a diplomatic 
actor on the ground. Already, the legacy of Catherine Ashton provides 
interesting cases that need further investigation. While she has often 
had to struggle with the member states on institutional developments 
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surrounding her office, and on deciding on common priorities and 
policy lines, she has been able to score successes at the international 
level. As a negotiator between Serbia and Kosovo, or as the representa-
tive of the E3+3 in the Iran Nuclear talk, the High Representative 
might have had considerable more discretion stemming from the dy-
namic and closed nature of these negotiations. Crisis diplomacy on the 
ground with meetings of leaders and representatives of the opposition 
in Egypt or Ukraine offer a completely different context compared to 
the negotiation rooms in Brussels. Asymmetrical access to information 
for the High Representative, and limited possibilities to consult with 
the member states, might be relevant factors in these cases. Neverthe-
less, the High Representative might also be subject to external contesta-
tion of the post’s mandate, and not be accepted as the EU’s interlocu-
tor. Effects from the international level were outside the scope of this 
study, and should be more closely investigated in future research.  
A wider level of analysis that goes beyond the scope of the work at 
hand could include an analysis of external shocks on the PA relation-
ship. International crises, such as those in Ukraine in 2014 or Kosovo 
at the end of the 1990s, tend to alter the dynamics in the institutional 
system of the EU. Schmitter (2005) points to the limits of purely func-
tional and EU-internal explanations of integration as "it is doubtful that 
[functional pressures] would have had such an impact [on European 
integration] were it not for the generalized perception that Europe as a 
whole was declining relative to other competing  regions of the world” 
(p. 266). Political crises in EU’s neighbourhood, as well as possible 
negative effects of the ‘eurocrisis’ on Europe’s appeal as a soft power, 
highlight the added value of common action, and might change the 
cost–benefit calculation of the member states in favour of granting 
more discretion to the High Representative in the long run.  
Meanwhile, external shocks result mainly in short-term disequilibria in 
the EU’s policy-making machine. First, “[i]n times of internal crises and 
external shocks the demand for some kind of leadership has always 
turned to the European Council” (Wessels, 2010: 4). A dominant role 
of the European Council in absorbing external shocks can have two 
effects on the High Representative. On the one hand, it might lead to 
increased agent competition, as the European Council might be in-
clined to upgrade the profile of the European Council President repre-
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senting  CFSP  matters  “at  his  level  and  in  that  capacity”.343 While the 
President does not posses the same authority over the EU’s foreign 
policy instruments as the High Representative, the seniority of the rank 
means that the two posts may vie for primacy in CFSP matters (Helwig, 
2014b). On the other hand, the European Council, as the highest for-
mation of the collective principal, might delegate more tasks to the 
High Representative and provide legitimacy for related actions. Either 
way, the European Council–High Representative relations, especially in 
times of external shocks, remain a crucial aspect of the analysis, and 
might be a key factor in the future development of the post and its 
portfolio.  
Last but not least, the functioning and organisation of the EU High 
Representative can be further evaluated by comparing it to other su-
pranational agents with similar characteristics. From an internal EU 
perspective, the President of the European Council is an obvious can-
didate for comparison. Both offices share certain characteristics, such 
as their chairing- and representational functions. However, the Presi-
dent post also differs regarding its policy focus, length of mandate, 
nomination procedures, and missing link to the European Commission. 
A comparison could reveal what effect these factors have on the discre-
tion of the two posts over their activities. A similar comparison could 
also be undertaken with the President of the Eurogroup that chairs the 
finance minister meetings, especially if the post becomes further institu-
tionalised in the future, as proposed by Germany and France.344 The 
EU-external actors, such as the UN or NATO Secretary-Generals, 
might offer a good case for comparison; however, they might lack the 
necessary comparability.  
Conclusion 
Most of the delegates to the European Convention at the turn of the 
century certainly had different aspirations when they started their en-
                                                   
343 Art. 15(5) TEU. 
344 German Federal Government: “France and Germany – Together for a stronger 
Europe of Stability and Growth”, joint press release. 30 May 2013, availbale at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/EN/Archiv17/Reiseberichte/2013/2
013-05-30-merkel-paris.html. 
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deavour to improve the functioning of the EU’s external relations. 
First, they had to find a compromise with the other members of the 
Convention in terms of what set-up was possible, without jeopardising 
national sovereignty over foreign policy matters. It became clear that a 
full integration of foreign policy in decision-making, and even adminis-
trative terms, was unrealistic in the mid-term. Instead, their compro-
mise foresaw closer connection between the different external policy 
realms of the EU, and enhanced coordination and representation via 
the creation of the office of High Representative, supported by an ex-
ternal action service. 
When the institutional reforms were finally put into action in end of 
2009,  they  suffered  from  a’  time  wrap’.  They  were  designed  during  a  
time of upbeat development of the European foreign policy project, 
when the CFSP structures consolidated and the defence policy made its 
first steps. However, they had to be implemented after a series of set-
backs. The lost constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands 
in 2005 revealed a sober public perception of the EU. At the same time, 
the enlarged Union displayed significant differences in their foreign 
policies during crises such as the Iraq intervention in 2003. On top of 
this, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in the middle of an economic 
crisis that caught the attention and resources of member state admin-
istrations. Little had been done to prepare the implementation of the 
institutional structure. The first High Representative started with little 
more than an office in the Berlaymont building in Brussels, and sup-
porting units were still  scattered around the EU district – not the best 
circumstances for any first incumbent to meet expectations and provide 
one voice to Europe’s cacophonic foreign policy.  
Nevertheless, exactly this moment of institutional creation seemed 
crucial to analyse and to capture in one of the first academic approach-
es to the topic after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The PA ap-
proach was picked as a starting point in order to capture the dynamics 
and mechanisms surrounding the post in a structured and established 
framework, and to formulate testable hypotheses under which the post 
could obtain discretion as an independent foreign policy actor.  
The analysis came to an empirical, as well as theoretical, conclusion. 
The empirical evidence collected here shows that the High Representa-
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tive had limited discretion as Europe’s foreign policy agent. This limited 
discretion was conditioned by conflicting preferences of the member 
states  that  caused  a  lack  of  delegation  to  the  High  Representative,  as  
well close control of the member states over the new office. In these 
early days of the new institutional architecture, the High Representative 
did not manage to gain additional room of manoeuvre by cooperating 
with the Commission. Deliberate discretion that would enable the in-
cumbent to set their own priorities and positions was not granted to the 
High Representative. Only during the complex set-up process of the 
EEAS did the member states grant unintended discretion to the High 
Representative.  
The theoretical conclusion of the study is that the PA approach is use-
ful for analysing cases in which the agent has limited discretion. How-
ever, in order to better understand the absence of discretion and under-
lying factors and changes, the PA approach has to be adjusted. To that 
end, it is suggested that the High Representative can be viewed as a 
case of a ‘constrained agent’, which is characterised by a contested 
mandate, sensitivity to ex-post sanctions, and weak institutionalisation of 
cooperation with other agents.  
By proposing this special category of constrained agents, new avenues 
for research open up. Other cases of constrained agents can probably 
be identified and examined more closely. More importantly for the 
subject at hand, the framework will allow us to track the development 
of the High Representative over time in the future. The focus will be to 
identify factors that either allow the High Representative to develop 
into a fully-fledged agent, or prevent the post from becoming a foreign 
policy player with a significant amount of discretion. 
Even though the young office of the EU High Representative still has 
to evolve into an authority in world politics in its own right, the Lisbon 
Treaty reform is not a failure. It installed the basic framework within 
which closer cooperation can take place in the future. This close coop-
eration between the Brussels actors and member state administrations 
can lead to positive results in the short term, and promote the devel-
opment of the High Representative into a powerful actor on the world 
stage in the long run. 

 
 
Appendix I: Research notes 
 
a) Interview design 
The design of the questionnaire was given special consideration. On the 
one hand, interviews should be designed to be open enough to let sali-
ent themes, as well as unknown details, emerge from the encounters. 
On the other hand, interview questions should be closed and fixed 
enough to enable the necessary comparability, and to produce robust 
results (see also Leech, 2002). A one-size-fits-all approach to interviews 
seems to be impossible, and the methodology has to be adjusted to the 
study at hand. After all, “it is not possible to formulate a strict guide to 
good practice for every interview context” (Dunn, 2005: 81). For the 
context of evaluating the brand new dynamic of the post-Lisbon EU 
foreign policy architecture, the following design seemed feasible. 
A semi-structured in-depth interview seemed to be the most appropri-
ate way of approaching the experts. The questions were constructed 
based on prior knowledge of the main issues at hand, arising from prior 
investigation into the research topic (Johnson and Reynolds, 2012). 
This knowledge was gathered via an assessment of secondary literature, 
as well as newspaper and Internet sources. Group discussions and 
brainstorming sessions at the Centre for European Studies in Brussels 
during the early interview-phase further added justification to the cho-
sen questions. 
Interview questions where clustered around three topic areas that 
seemed salient: the setting up of the EEAS, the immediate response to 
Libya, and the leadership possibilities of the High Representative. With-
in this thematic cluster, the interviewer started with a leading question 
that  did not  have to be adjusted to the individual  interviewee,  and al-
lowed the respondent to bring up points most salient to him/her 
(Johnson and Reynolds, 2012). Leading questions were formulated to 
be like “grand tour questions” (Leech, 2002: 667), which means that 
respondents can freely brainstorm on a number of issues of their 
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choice. A open-ended question approach was also necessary, as the 
interviews took place just after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force and 
prior studies on the effect of the Treaty changes were limited (see on 
this problem also Aberbach and Rockman, 2002).  
Often, the answers to the leading questions touched on many issues 
that belonged to the group of questions that followed: that is, tailored 
questions. Tailored questions are more detailed and customised to the 
individual affiliation of the interviewee, and related to the leading ques-
tion. Often, the questions in this section were “example questions” 
(Leech, 2002: 667) that prompted the interviewee to be more specific 
about the cases just mentioned.  Ideally, a conversation on the basis of 
the leading questions developed, but the tailored questions pushed 
towards further details.  
The semi-structured approach proved to have several advantages. First, 
the interviewees could freely answer the leading questions, which is a 
clear advantage of open-ended questions (Aberbach and Rockman, 
2002). Second, as the leading questions were formulated in a general 
way, they could be posed to interviewees with different affiliations. The 
interviews were thus comparable to a certain degree. Third, the tailored 
questions made it possible to provide the necessary depth to detailed 
issues of interest. In most cases, a conversation could develop in which 
the interviewee had the feeling of ownership, while the interviewer 
could control the course of the interview and gather the necessary de-
tails. 
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Thematic cluster 1:  
Setting up of the EEAS 
Leading question 1:  
What would you describe as the major implications of the changes made to this 
system from the previous one? 
Tailored question 1 (here for a member of the Political and Security Committee):  
Does it make a difference to have an institution chairing, instead of a 
rotating MS? 
Tailored question 2: … 
… 
Leading question 2: … 
Tailored question 1: … 
…  
… 
Thematic cluster 2: … 
… 
 Example of the semi-structured questionnaire 
The questionnaire was adjusted over time. Changing the interview ques-
tionnaire over the course of a study is controversial, as comparability 
gets lost (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002); however, for the study at 
hand, the costs of having less comparability were compensated by the 
benefits. As mentioned above, the post-Lisbon institutional architecture 
was widely uncharted and still fluent. A fixed questionnaire in such an 
environment would have equated to an attempt to ‘nail jelly to a wall’. 
In-depth preparation was undertaken in order to obtain an appropriate 
level of knowledge on the publicly known issues before the first round 
of interviews. Nevertheless, new issues emerged, and these had to be 
taken up during future interview rounds. In addition, questions had to 
be incorporated to check whether the statements given by earlier inter-
viewees were correct. Rather than limiting the focus of the study by 
being straitjacketed within the initial questionnaire, it was thus possible 
to explore new issues. As an example, the issue of strategic partnerships 
proved to be highly salient for many interviewees, and was incorporated 
as a thematic cluster.  
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b) List of interviews 
# Date Affiliations 
1 05.05.11 Permanent Representation of a member state to the EU 
2 11.05.11 EEAS, Working Group Chair 
3 04.05.11 EEAS, Political Affairs Department 
4 12.05.11 Permanent Representation of a member state to the EU 
5 27.05.11 EEAS, Political Affairs Department 
6 30.05.11 Ambassador, Permanent Representation of a member 
state to the EU 
7 07.06.11 EEAS, Working Group Chair 
8 08.06.11 Permanent Representation of a member state to the EU 
9 09.06.11 Ambassador, Permanent Representation of a member 
state to the EU 
10 10.06.11 EEAS, Development Cooperation Coordination 
11 14.06.11 EEAS, Managing Director 
12 14.06.11 European Parliament, Coordinator Committee on for-
eign affairs 
13 16.06.11 Commission, Secretariat-General 
14 17.06.11 EEAS, Head of Unit 
15 22.06.11 European Parliament, Coordinator Committee on for-
eign affairs 
16 27.06.11 European Parliament, Secretariat-General 
17 28.06.11 Commission, Development Cooperation 
18 07.07.11 EEAS, Corporate Board 
19 07.07.11 EEAS, Foreign Policy Instrument Service 
20 12.07.11 Commission, Enlargement 
21 13.07.11 EEAS, Managing-Director 
22 14.07.11 EEAS, Deputy Working Group chair 
23 14.07.11 European Parliament, Advisor to Political group 
24 14.07.11 European Parliament, Coordinator Committee on for-
eign affairs 
25 18.07.11 European Parliament, Secretariat-General 
26 18.07.11 Commission, Development Cooperation 
27 27.07.11 Commission, Development Cooperation 
28 27.07.11 EEAS, Head of Unit 
29 28.07.11 Commission, Trade 
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30 01.08.11 Commission Enlargement 
31 02.08.11 High Representative Cabinet 
32 02.08.11 Commission, Trade 
33 05.08.11 Commission, Humanitarian aid 
34 08.08.11 Commission, Humanitarian aid 
35 31.08.11 European Council President Cabinet 
36 15.08.11 Ambassador, Permanent Representation of a member 
state to the EU 
37 20.09.11 Ambassador, Permanent Representation of a member 
state to the EU 
38 28.09.11 European Parliament, member of Committee on foreign 
affairs 
39 20.03.12 Foreign ministry of a member state 
40 27.03.12 Member of the Convention on the future of Europe 
41 08.05.12 EEAS 
42 08.05.12 EEAS, Political Affairs Department 
43 02.07.12 Foreign ministry of a member state 
44 11.07.12 Foreign ministry of a member state 
45 25.10.12 Foreign ministry of a member state 
46 08.07.13 EEAS, Corporate Board 
47 09.07.13 EEAS, Political Affairs Department 
48 09.07.13 Commission, Secretariat-General 
49 11.07.13 Council, Secretariat-General 
50 12.07.13 Council, Secretariat-General 
51 02.08.13 Foreign ministry of a member state 
52 30.09.13 Foreign ministry of a member state 
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c) Process-tracing example 
Process-tracing – the High Representative and crisis response to Libya 
 
(1) No contradictory positions on calling on, and end of use of, force in 
Libya among member states 
(2) No contradictory positions that the Gaddafi regime lost legitimacy 
among member states (despite media reports suggesting Berlusconi–
Gaddafi ties) 
(3) Coordination and formulation of statements via COREU network 
and PSC 
(4) High Representative issues agreed statements 
(5) DG ECHO in Commission follows different policy objective (imme-
diate, apolitical relief for people on the ground)  
(6) DG ECHO has own, autonomous, crisis-management structures 
(7) DG ECHO rejects being coordinated by the High Representative 
EEAS 
(8) EEAS chairs coordination meeting (Crisis Platform) 
(9) DG ECHO sees Crisis Platform only as a venue for information ex-
change 
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(10) No substantial cooperation between High Representative and Com-
mission 
(11) No discretion for the High Representative over EU humanitarian aid 
instruments 
(12) Contradictory preferences on installing a no-fly zone over Libya 
among the member states 
(13) Time pressure stemming from the development of the situation on 
the ground 
(14) PSC fails to overcome differences at the ambassador level 
(15) European Council is called in on French initiative 
(16) Heads of state or government agree on conditions for military en-
gagement 
(17) Decision-making shifted to heads of state or government 
(18) Member states do not agree on recognition of the Libyan opposition 
at minister/ambassador level 
(19) No mandate for the High Representative to recognise the Libyan op-
position 
(20) High Representative offered an informal meeting with the Libyan 
opposition group at the EP in Strasbourg 
(21) High Representative anticipates disapproval of member states if steps 
towards recognising the opposition are taken 
(22) High Representative plays down informal meeting with the Libyan 
opposition 
(23) European Council recognises Libyan National Transitional Council 
as political interlocutor 
(24) No discretion for the High Representative as a crisis manager 
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d) List of peer debriefings/research presentations 
PhD-related presentations during the research period.  
22 Oct 2010: EXACT Initial Conference, Cologne 
14 Jan 2011: Workshop: Legal Dimensions of the EU’s External 
Relations, University of Twente, Enschede 
18 Jan 2011:  Workshop: CFSP One Year after the Lisbon Treaty, 
Institute für Europäische Politik, Berlin 
02 Feb 2011: Oberseminar, University of Cologne 
13 April 2011:  In-house seminar, Centre for European Policy Stud-
ies 
30 June 2011:  UACES Student Forum, Guildford 
07 Sept 2011: EXACT PhD workshop, Finnish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Helsinki 
04 Oct 2011:  EXACT midterm assessment, Brussels 
15 Dec 2011: 7th Annual Graduate Conference in Political Science, 
International Relations and Public Policy, Jerusalem 
08 Feb 2012:  FIIA in-house research roundtable, Helsinki 
05 Mai 2012: EU in International Affairs Conference, Brussels 
20 June 2012:  BISA Conference, Edinburgh 
26 June 2012: EXACT Intervision Workshop, Brussels 
29 Oct 2012:  Theory & Practice seminar, University of Edinburgh 
04 Sept 2012:  UACES General Conference, Passau 
18 Sept 2012:  EXACT Network Seminar on Academic Skill, Co-
logne 
24 Nov 2012:  EXACT PhD progress workshop, Dublin 
04 Feb 2013: Theory & Practice seminar, University of Edinburgh 
11 Feb 2013:  Report Presentation, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels 
18 April 2013:  EXACT PhD Intervision Workshop, Edinburgh 
23 April 2013:  PhD showcase event, University of Edinburgh 
14 June 2013: EXACT PhD Intervision Workshop, Cagliari 
08 July 2013:  Presentation at EXACT Final Conference, Brussels 
17 July 2013:  Oberseminar, University of Cologne 
 
 
Appendix II: Member states’ positions in the Euro-
pean Convention 
 
Austria:  The Austrian representative explicitly stated  that  a  full  merger  of  the  
post of High Representative and Commissioner for external relations 
under the roof of the Commission would be the most desirable solu-
tion to achieve an effective EU foreign policy. However, Austria was 
willing to compromise and to opt for a gradual solution. “[A full mer-
ger] would be the best way to ensure the consistency of the Union’s 
external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies. But we know that this 
option is not acceptable to all member states at the present time and 
can only be realised step-by-step in a long-term perspective” (WD 36). 
At an early point the foreign minister, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, said in 
a speech: “Austria and other smaller member states of the European 
Union want to delegate foreign, security and defence policy matters to 
the joint responsibility of the Union” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2001). Austria 
was  in  favour  of  extending  QMV  to  the  CFSP  (WD  36;  EUCON,  
2003) and right of initiative to the High Representative, with no con-
sent from Commission College needed (WD 060). The High Repre-
sentative should chair Council meetings concerning foreign affairs 
(WD 060). 
Belgium Belgium,  in  favour  of  a balanced institutional framework, argued for 
having the High Representative integrated into the Commission, while 
leaving links to the European Council: “Je suis partisan d’une voie 
médiane, que je qualifierais de ligne ‘réaliste’ conduisant au renforce-
ment du Haut Représentant et à son intégration dans la Commission, 
moyennant un lien avec le Conseil européen” (WD 4). The Prime 
Minister argued that a merger of the two posts would be inevitable 
(Verhofstadt, 2001). “Even before the Constitutional Treaty enters 
into force, the High Representative should be able to participate in the 
meetings of the Commission. The analysis and policy planning unit, 
which is already at his disposal, should be reinforced during this period 
and become a common service for him and the Commission” 
(Benelux, 2002). Belgium was in favour of extending QMV to the 
CFSP (EUCON, 2003; Scholl, 2003), and a  right  of  initiative  to  the  
High Representative (Benelux, 2002), as well a permanent chair for the 
Foreign Affairs Council (Benelux, 2002). 
Britain On several occasions during the Convention, British government 
representative Hain argued against any combination of the two posts. 
Synergies and coordination between the two posts should be en-
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hanced, and the High Representative should be allowed to take part at 
Commission College meetings when foreign policy questions are 
discussed (CONV 591/03). The UK opposed the extension of QMV 
(EUCON, 2003). The British representative argued for better use of 
existing QMV rules,  and stated that  QMV would heighten awareness 
of EU-internal disagreement (WD 40). It was suggested that a right of 
initiative and the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council would strength-
en the High Representative (CONV 591/03). 
Denmark Prime minister Rasmussen argued for an intergovernmental foreign 
and security policy: “The point of departure must be that the foreign, 
security and defence policies of the EU continue to be based on co-
operation among the member states, so-called intergovernmental 
cooperation, firmly anchored in the Council” (Rasmussen, 2003a). This 
also included that the High Representative should stay in the Council 
structures: “As foreign policy will remain a primarily intergovernmen-
tal matter, I think it only logical that the EU foreign policy representa-
tive should be anchored in the Council” (Rasmussen, 2003b). While 
stressing the intergovernmental character of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (Rasmussen, 2003a), “there should be an extended 
opportunity for qualified majority voting” (EUCON, 2003; Stig Moller, 
2003) (see also EUCON, 2003). Denmark was in favour of extending 
QMV to the CFSP (Stig Moller, 2003). Its position on the chair of the 
Foreign  Affairs  Council  was  more  ambiguous,  Denmark  was  first  to  
speak against giving the chairmanship to the High Representative, but 
later supported the idea (EUCON, 2003; Stig Moller, 2003). 
Finland The Finnish representative in the European Convention made a strong 
point for a High Representative in the Commission: “The only rational 
solution to the problem is to make the Commission – that already 
successfully represents the EU in a remarkable part of its external 
relations – the representative for the entire external policy (except 
defence)” (WD 9). In a report by the Finnish government to the par-
liament after the Convention, the Finnish position was again pro-
nounced: “The ‘double hatting’ principle of combining the duties of 
the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations 
is acceptable to Finland as a transitional measure and as part of a 
balanced overall institutional concept. In the long term, the objective 
should be to merge the posts of the High Representative and the 
Commissioner for External Relations and to place the new post in the 
Commission” (Finnish Ministerial Committee for EU-Affairs, 2003). 
Furthermore, Finland advocated the extension of QMV to the CFSP 
(Finnish Ministerial Committee for EU-Affairs, 2003; Scholl, 2003). 
“The right of initiative should be defined so that it does not encroach 
upon the right of initiative of the Commission” (Finnish Ministerial 
Committee for EU-Affairs, 2003). Whoever holds the post of High 
Representative should not be appointed President of the External 
Relations Council (EUCON, 2003; Finnish Ministerial Committee for 
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EU-Affairs, 2003). 
France Unlike  the  UK,  France  never  actively  argued  against  the  integration  
into the Commission, however it took a sceptical position towards a 
full integration (Interview #40). The French government put forward 
the idea of having the High Representative work under the direct 
authority of the President of the European Council (WD52). French 
President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder settled a deal on 
the new institutional architecture, which gave the idea of the double-
hatted High Representative the final blessing. This Franco-German 
proposal (CONV 489/03) also advocated qualified majority decisions 
in the CFSP, even though France did not promote this change in the 
past (EUCON, 2003). As part of the Franco-German deal, the French 
also agreed on a right of initiative and a permanent Council chair for 
the High Representative (CONV 489/03). 
Germany In a speech to the French Assemblée Nationale in 2001, German 
foreign minister Fischer spoke about the possibility to overcome the 
dualism in foreign policy between the Council and the Commission by 
merging the posts (Fischer, 2001b). The German representative in the 
Convention, Glotz, also supported a full integration of the CFSP in the 
long run (Crum, 2002). During the course of the Convention, Germa-
ny introduced the model of the double-hatted High Representative and 
supported QMV, a right of initiative for the High Representative, as 
well as a permanent Foreign Affairs Council chair (CONV 489/03). 
Greece In a keynote speech by the  Greek  Prime  minister,  he  argued for a 
federal model for the final transformation of the EU: “Faced with the 
prospect of a federation and with enlargement, we need more effective 
executive and governmental institutions. The European Commission 
can progressively undertake this role; it can evolve, that is, into a gov-
ernment institution for the effective management of the single curren-
cy as well as the common foreign policy (CFSP) in a visible, coherent 
and transparent manner while at the same time retaining its right of 
legislative initiative” (Simitis, 2001). Even before the Constitutional 
Treaty enters into force, the High Representative should be able to 
participate in the meetings of the Commission. The analysis and policy 
planning unit should be reinforced during this period, and become a 
common service for him and the Commission. During the plenary of 
the European Convention, this pro-integrationist stance was also 
repeated by the Greek government representative, who argued for a 
merger of the two posts (Katiforis, 2002). The government was in 
favour of an extension of CFSP, but stressed the need for a veto 
option (EUCON, 2003; Scholl, 2003). 
Ireland Ireland, with an electorate that had just dismissed the Nice Treaty in a 
referendum, stressed in a government position especially the need for 
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accountability of EU foreign policy.  A merger of the pillars into the 
first pillar, and under the responsibility of the Commission, would be 
favourable: “It is easier for national parliaments to follow negotiations 
in pillar one than in pillar three because of the transparency require-
ments imposed on the Commission” (Bruton, 2002). While a small 
state  like  Ireland  was  in  favour  of  such  a  move,  it  realised  that  the  
bigger states might be opposed to it: “While such a move would give 
smaller member states greater protection from the consequences of 
unilateral foreign policy initiatives of their bigger neighbours, the 
bigger states are unlikely to agree to such constraint on their traditional 
freedom of action in foreign and defence policy” (Bruton, 2002). 
During the course of the Convention, Ireland welcomed the idea of a 
double hat that would also have a base in the Commission (Cowen, 
2003b). Practical issues that needed to be addressed included the 
question of deputies of the High Representative (Cowen, 2003a). In 
terms of the qualified majority decision: “There are possibilities availa-
ble in the existing Treaties – including constructive abstention, en-
hanced co-operation, and limited QMV in implementing decisions – 
which have not been fully utilised up to now. There are those who 
argue that we should now move to wider use of majority voting. If this 
is  to  be  contemplated,  I  think  that  we  will  have  to  look  at  the  safe-
guards needed. It will also be necessary to respect the special position 
of security and defence matters.” (Cowen, 2003b). On the right of 
initiative for the High Representative: “The High Representative 
should have the right of initiative alongside the member states. Where 
appropriate, he or she should be able to table a proposal jointly with 
the Commissioner for External Relations” (WD 16). Like Finland, 
Ireland was sceptical about the chairing of the External Relations 
Council (WD 16). 
Italy One of Italy’s aims in the European Convention was to preserve the 
balance between the different institutions. That being said, the Italian 
delegates had a rather communitarian vision of the EU project (Croci, 
2002). In view of the Italy’s upcoming Presidency, in which Italy 
chaired the IGC, Italy, however, did not articulate a strong position 
(EUCON, 2003). “Gianfranco Fini [the Italian representative at the 
Convention] advocated the introduction of qualified majority voting 
under the condition that each Member state would be free to opt out 
of any decision it could not support” (Crum, 2002). Italy was in favour 
of giving the High Representative the chair of the Foreign Affairs 
Council (EUCON, 2003). 
Luxembourg “In the medium to long term, the common foreign and security policy 
must be pooled, in the true sense of the word. The Commission must 
be allowed to propose, which means that the High Representative for 
Foreign Policy (who does an excellent job – my comments do not 
refer in any way to the current holder of the office) must be integrated 
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into the Commission, which will have the right of initiative in the area 
of the common foreign and security policy.” (Juncker, 2001). “Even 
before the Constitutional Treaty enters into force, the High Repre-
sentative should be able to participate in the meetings of the Commis-
sion. The analysis and policy planning unit, which is already at his 
disposal, should be reinforced during this period and become a com-
mon service for him and the Commission” (Benelux, 2002). In general, 
there was a strong consensus in the national debate to strengthen the 
Community method and integrate the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (Bossaert, 2003). The extension of QMV, especially in combina-
tion with initiatives by the High Representative, were welcomed 
(Scholl, 2003). The High Representative should have a right of initia-
tive and chair the Foreign Affairs Council (Benelux, 2002). 
Netherlands The Netherlands was in favour of overall strengthening of the com-
munity method and stabilising the institutional balance of the Union 
(de Vries et al., 2002). However, the introduction of community ele-
ments in the area of CFSP was only advocated cautiously. A merger of 
the High Representative and the Relex Commissioner was formulated 
as a long-term objective (Dutch Foreign Ministry, 2002). An organisa-
tionally integrated foreign policy was seen as something to aim for; 
however, during the proceedings of the European Convention the 
Netherlands also supported having the High Representative under the 
authority of the European Council (Pijpers and Terhorst, 2003). “Even 
before the Constitutional Treaty enters into force, the High Repre-
sentative should be able to participate in the meetings of the Commis-
sion. The analysis and policy planning unit, which is already at his 
disposal, should be reinforced during this period and become a com-
mon service for him and the Commission” (Benelux, 2002). A right of 
initiative was supported, in particular joint proposals by the Commis-
sion and the new European Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the 
case of CFSP-related sanctions and/or decisions that have purely 
financial consequences, and neither operative nor military consequenc-
es (WD 47; EUCON, 2003). Together with the other Benelux coun-
tries, they supported the right of initiative and the permanent chair of 
the Foreign Affairs Council (Benelux, 2002). 
Portugal Portugal did not display a strong position with regard to the organisa-
tion question about the post of High Representative. It was argued at 
the time that Portugal’s main concern in general was to keep the insti-
tutional balance and level of sovereignty the same even after the Union 
enlargement (De Moraes Vaz, 2002). The Portuguese government 
representative mentioned its concern regarding a merger of the two 
posts as follows: “different views on the possible merger of both 
functions should be further evaluated on their full implications, both at 
competencies and institutional levels.” On the other hand, the creation 
of possible synergies, while keeping the posts separate, should be 
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further considered (WD 034). However, an earlier speech by the for-
eign minister mentioned the aim of consequently merging all three 
pillars: “three existing pillars must be merged into one, gradually bring-
ing joint foreign and security policy and the area of liberty, security and 
justice within the Community’s remit” (Guterres, 2001). This included 
placing the post in the Commission (EUCON, 2003). Portugal argued 
for a better use of the already existing possibilities for QMV (WD 34; 
EUCON, 2003). 
Spain Spain (together with the UK) published a paper arguing for rather a 
strengthened post of High Representative, while ignoring the double-
hatted idea of France and Germany. Aznar did not see institutional 
adjustments as a necessary condition: “From that perspective, we must 
first of all develop the contents of the Foreign and Defence Policy and 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, without upsetting the work 
in progress or the balance between the Community institutions” 
(Aznar, 2001). Spain did not support an extension of QMV in the field 
of CFSP (EUCON, 2003). The Spanish foreign minister represented in 
the European Convention was sceptical about applying the community 
method to non-legislative policy fields (Crum, 2002). Together with 
the UK, Spain wanted to strengthen the post of High Representative 
by granting the right of initiative and the chair of the Foreign Affairs 
Council (CONV 591/03). 
Sweden Sweden voiced concerns about the combination of the two functions 
(High Representative and external relations Commissioner), and 
pledged for a clear division of competences. The separation of the 
posts has the advantage “of maintaining and even clarifying the distinct 
roles and responsibilities of the Council and the Commission as pro-
vided by the treaties, and of avoiding confusing the roles and compli-
cating co-ordination” (WD 042). Sweden agreed to the possibility of 
using QMV in the field of CFSP, but only if strategies and priorities on 
which these decisions rest were agreed on beforehand. Opt-out possi-
bilities should exist as well (EUCON, 2003). The intergovernmental 
character of CFSP has to be preserved and a passarel clause should not 
be introduced (WD 68). Sweden did not support a right of initiative in 
the hands of the High Representative. The right of initiative in areas of 
CFSP should stay with the Commission (Hjelm-Wallen, 2003). Joint 
initiatives of the High Representative and the Commissioner for Ex-
ternal Relations should be possible (WD 068). Sweden argued for 
more continuity of the work program, but rather preferred the solution 
of team presidencies with joint working programs. A dedicated For-
eign Affairs  Council  should be headed by the foreign minister  of the 
rotating Presidency (EUCON, 2003; Persson, 2002).  
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